"The mission was to be carried out in two phases . The first phase, the
breakthrough, was to be carried out after preparatory artillery fire, with the
three assigned infantry divisions. During the second phase, the two
Panzerdivisions were to advance towards the Meuse. The Wehrmacht High Command
had forbidden all reconnaissance activities in the future attack area. So there
was no acquired tactical reconnaissance, especially concerning the enemy's main
line of resistance. Visual reconnaissance was impossible because of the wooded
terrain. For this reason the corps had repeatedly requested that there be no
preparatoy artillery barrage but that the artillery open fire with the beginning
of the attack. This was all the more advisable because the attack sectors of the
enemy positions lay in a wood 7-9 kilometers deep, its course could not even be
suspected and the amount of ammunition did not suffice for a rolling barrage.
Moreover , corps headquarters held the view that by an artillery preparation of
one hour along this comparatively quiet front, the advantage of secrecy would be
surrendered one hour too soon. The attacking troops would hereby be deprived of
a great advantage ; the surprise factor without gaining any substantial
support. The artillery reinforcement assigned by the Wehrmacht High command
consisted besides the three Volks artillery corps and the rocket artillery
brigades of a number of army batteries as a number of captured guns of heavy and
heaviest caliber. These army batteries were immobile, they had to be moved in
position and supplied with ammunition by means of towing means and vehicles
available in the panzerdivisisons. This led , already before the beginning of
the attack, to the unavailability of many of the towing means of the artillery
regiments of the Pz divisions."
"The 3 infantrydivisions assigned for the attack were very different in
compostion and battle worth. The 277th VGD which had taken position in the
attack sector had been set up in september 1944 and was in this quiet sector
without fighting since october. It lacked battle experience, particularly in the
attack; in addition it was not schooled in forest fighting. A lack of towing
means for the artillery made the division relatively immobile. Preparing for the
attack necessitated only a redistribution along the front coupled with a foot
march of maximum 20 km. The 12th VGD coming from the Aachen front was a unit
which had proved its worth in a number of major engagements and was very well
equipped. It was 15% below strength. It arrived in the assembly area promptly
and without difficulties and subsequently relieved elements of the 277th VGD .
The 3rd parachute division, which was also to be moved up from the Aachen
sector, had considerable losses during the fighting in the Dueren forest. The
combat value of the division was dimished by a lack of experience in ordinary
ground fighting, particularly among the regimental commanders. Its armament was
excellent, but it was deficient in prime movers. The vehicles of the two Panzer
divisions moved the bulk of this division into the assembly area promptly. But
since relief had not arrived for the troops in the Dueren forest , one parachute
regiment could not be counted on for the first day of the attack. At the
request of corps headquarters, one GHQ assault gun batallion each was promised
for the 277 th VGD and the 3rd parachute division but they did not arrive. The
12th VGD had 12 assaultguns at its disposal."
"Because the rapid success effecting a breakthrough was the main condition for
the success of the operation, the Generalkommando proposed, taking into account
the battle worth of 277 th VGD and 3rd parachute division and the difficult
terrain, that at least part of the Panzer divisisons should be used in the
breakthrough. This was the more advisable as the right neighbour would not
attack in close contact which would create a 15 km gap.This request was denied.
In spite of that, the Generalkommando prepared a battlegroup of each Panzer
division(1 batallion reinforced by assaltguns) behind 277 th VGD and 3 rd
parachute division. Sixth seventh of the attack area consisted of very rugged
terrain of medium altitude, in the northern Eiffel mountains. Only the most
southern part( one regimental sector) was open, slowly rising towards the enemy
positions. Only one good road led through the central part of the attack sector.
The other future 'Rollbahnen' consisted of field and wood tracks with weak
bridges and steep upgrades and downgrades. The good road parallel to the front
from Hollerath to Losheimergraben was in no mans land and had been completely
blocked since the west wall engagements of 1940. The conditions made it
necessary to have each battle group of the Panzer divisions take along
sufficient supplies, since it was impossible to bypass on these roads. This
could not be done because of lack of fuel. Corps headquarters therefore decided
to concentrate on the opening of the Hallschlag-Losheimergraben-Büllingen road
by the 12 th VGD. This was done with the full realisation that the commitment of
the 277 th VD in the northern sector would endanger the northern flank of the
corps. For its protection the battle group mentioned above was kept ready. Since
the 3rd parachute divivion arrived too late, it was committed in the southern
sector, which was favourable for road traffic. Thus, the infantry divisions
subordinate to the corps were distributed to the attack as follows: 277th VGD
on the right (behind it a battle group of 12th SS Panzer 12th VGD in the
center 3rd parachute divivion on the left (behind it a battlegroup of 1st
SS Panzer) "
