Entscheidungsschlachten des Zweten Weltkrieges p 242-243 Bernard & Graefe 1960
The speed and the dimension of this success were not in the least suited on the german side to remenber the previous arrangements and to make them more important than the impression of the victorious instance. While the Italian high command , in concordance with the commonly defined plan, tried to banish the army of Rommel to the defense near the Egyptian border by measured orders, and while Mussolini on the proposal of Cavallero , -in a premonition of what would come-urged the german commander againin chief again by letter of 21st june, to nconsolidate the successes and take Malta first, the thoughts of the german headquarters had ran for long in a totallly different direction. Hitler had, ,taking up the repeatedly renewed negative decision of 21st may,immediately after the news of the taking of Tobruk before his military evironment, again unalterably rejected the landing on Malta and linked to this at the same moment the decision to continue the pursuit of the british in the direction of the Suez Canal . Therefore the strong urging of the victorious commander in Africa nor an agreeing utterance from the Wehrmachtführungsstab and the Oberkommando of the Kriegsmarine had been needed to move Hitler in his answer already transmitted by telex on 21st june to Mussolini ,to commit the total weight of his 'advice' in this sense. Without dealing even with one word on Malta, he let the enthusiasm of the hour run its course by writing that a 'historical turning point ' had been reached 'which could be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war'. The british army was 'practically destroyed'. The 'quickest and completest exploitation of this situation, which would in no case present itself a second time in the same theatre' demands 4a pursuit without pause until the complete of the british troops' , before through the arrival of new reserves 'a change unfavourable for us would occur'. 'This time' he thought, 'Egypt could be taken from England' , while the simultaneous taking of Sebastopol freed the way to also over the Caucasus 'advance to the fall of the whole eastern construction of the english empire'. Under further referral to the 'historical hour', Hitler rose subsequently to a solemn - when also not quite original and successfull- form of speech with the words ' the Goddess of fortune in war approaches the commander only once. When one does not hold onto her in such a moment,one will very often not reach her anymore'. Behind the accessory of this exchange of correspondance which in the decisive hour had to makeshiftly replace the forwardlooking planning of a common staff, in the first place became visible again the contrast between the strategic objectives of both coalition partners and also closely entwined in there the differences in the method of warfighting.
