Combat method 1. The strength of the Panzer brigade is its mobility, firepower and armor. Decisive prerequisite for success is the closed , boldly conducted attack with surprise by the whole Panzer brigade. 2. By flexible and skilled leadership the brigade commander determines timing and terrain for the fight and prescibes events on the opponent. 3.Exploitation of terrain, deception,temporary evasion and retreat as wellas sudden advance from a different direction are further conditions for success. 4. The most important means for command is radio. Radio discipline and protection of secrets are important for success. ...... 5. Starting reconnaissance in good time creates the necessary basis for the attack. One must secure the establishing of contact with the troops which still hold in the breakthrough area and the staff at the same time. Detecting the front of the enemy attack and PAK fronts as well as the natural and artificial obstacles and ways of getting around them is important. 6. In spite of the initiation of the attack by the Panzerbrigade always being under time pressure, it is essential to make the time for recce. This is to be secured by a shortened preparedness for alarm( one hour for the brigade, 20 minutes for the recce platoon)and fast driving into the area free of enemy. 7. The recce platoon operates as a whole or in recce troops of 2 APC each..... 8. The organisation for the attack is based on the terrain and the available information about the enemy.It should bring to bear the firepower of all own weapons. The individual weapons oof the brigade are to be organised as they will probably be needed based on the assessment of the situation. 9. On the march in the area of engagement the building of a strong point composed of tanks(one company) has proved itself. APC have to be kept close and heavy infantry weapons are to be far forward. 10. In the attack the Panzer Abteilung always starts together as the main assaultforce of the brigade.The APC batallion follows closely. Dismounting the infantry only happens when the tanks cannot get further or when it is necessary to destroy dug in enemy.
11.Ttank obstacles are moved over by the infantry under fire support by the tanks. They build up firesupport on the other side. Under protection of this and that of the tanks , the engineers company make gaps in the obstacle for the armored vehicles. 12.After taking away the obstacle, the Panzer Abteilung advances further using its speed. The Panzergreandiere mount and follow the tanks. 13. If the enemy has fixed himself in a town or an important terrain feature, he is to fixed by attack with weak forces to hit him decisively from another direction with the mass of the firepower. 14. The concentration of all the heavy infantry weapons to suppress the enemy AT guarantees the best succes.
15.When strong PAK fronts or insurmountable obstacles are met, the Panzerbrigade breaks off its attack and fights back to the nearest cover under cover of smoke and mutual fire support. After new reconnaissance the attack is to started again from another direction. 16. If a sector that was gained, is to held temporarly , it is to be watched by standing recce troops while the brigade keeps itself ready for counterattack further back. The dismounting of the Panzergrenadiere and subdividing of the brigade for the defense of a sector is not done. 17. Often, the achieving of the objective is made easier by darkness. Strict command, the application of all technical means of orientation with use of directing fires makes keeping the coherence and the leading of the night figth easier. Nightfighting after thoruogh preparation often leads to success with low losses . 18. Often the Panzerbrigade will have to attack for short periods of times in different sectors of the front. When subordinated, the brigade ommander is personally responsible that the forces of the brigade are not split up and that after each three days of offensive the necessary repairs are ordered . He has to energetically point out that maintaining the comabt power of the brigade depends in the first place from the thorough technical maintance of the vehicles."
e can say now that it was morally questionnable ,when at that time the weight of the successes made the majority of the people-and with it the soldiers-blind for the violations of ethical fundamentals on which the state should be based. This may have as its foundation the overestimating of the material achievements over the eternal commandments of human cohabitation which have been given to us by God,-a phenomenon caracteristic for our times and not limited to Germany. May we learn from the consequences. One should be clear about one thing as I stressed earlier. Anybody that wants to put the responsability on the armed forces of a state to act with weapons against a government that violates the law or is acting disastrously in another way,gives it fundamentally the control over the authority of the government. One should reflect whether this can be in the interest of the state,the people or the armed forces themselves.
December 1943
Chief of AGS on the phone.
We have sent today a situation report in view of the russian breakthrough at Kiev and I should ask you to submit it as soon as possible.
Chief of the operations section: Hopefully it does not contain any expresions Hitler will immediately hook into. You know how distrustfully he looks at all proposals by Manstein, how he almost seeks to prove to him that he is smarter himself. He only needs to find one phrase which he thinks incorrect and the whole report is dismissed. Can Manstein not come himself?
Chief of AGS : Only if he is called as nothing comes from this. He cannot assert himself against Hitler's dialectic.
Chief of the operations section : He should not fight against the dialectic. Not long ago, Himmler said' Manstein is believing chistian and cannot be faithfull.'
Chief of AGS : Outrageous. So,one shoots at ones best people.
Chief of the operations section : Hopefully your reoport takes the same line as we : giving up the Nikopol bridghead,delaying action on the southwing of the Armygroup, strong concentrations to the west of Kiev to counterstrike.
Chief of AGS : Precisely our thoughts. We have had the focal point of our foreces on the wrong wing for months. It is a miracle that we have not been thrown into the black sea. When all details are further ordered from above, then you do not need a fieldmarshall ,but a corporal can command the Armygroup.
Chief of the operations section : At first we need the obtain the vacating of the Crimea, then the conclusions can be drawn more easily.
Chief of AGS: We are looking at things the same way and above all have refused the possibility of opening the link to the Crimea from the bridghead Nikopol.. Herr Schörner who has been sent to us will also not be able to change that. Even with 10 Führer mansates in his pocket. Another thing: can Koch and his Reichskommissariat Ukraine not disappear? Only one can command in the area of the Armygroup. Koch is superfluous , he makes things more difficult.
Chief of the operations section : the Generalquartiermaster has tried for a long time to get rid of him.Hitler does not want to makes this open admission of defeat. Koch can only be beaten out of the Ukraine by the Russians.
Chief of AGS : And a last thing. About these Feste Plätze. One cannot declare whatever city into a Feste Platz when it is not suitable terrainwise and divisions are need for its defense.
Chief of the operations section : Hitler has acceeded to our idea that the Armygroups can propose their Feste Platze themselves. More could not be obtained. But maybe more limitations can be pushed through.
