„Alles ist programmmäßig so eingetroffen, wie ich es den hohen Vorgesetzten gesagthabe. Alle Vorschläge lehnten sie ab, aus Angst, an oberster Stelle anzustoßen. Ob

die Leute Kluge oder Kübler

Rückzug', bleibt mit offenen Flanken stehen u. laßt dem Feind Zeit, in allerRuhe herum zu marschieren und uns von hinten im Rücken anzugreifen

hofft auf Heranbringen von neuen Divisionen. Aber die kommen so langsam, sotropfenweise, daß sie viel zu gering sind, uns herauszuhaun. So wird der Russe

wohl bei uns seine erste Vernichtungsschlacht gewinnen. Man hadert aber doch mitdem Schicksal, wenn man sieht, aus welchen verbohrten Köpfen alles kommt und

daß es der Mittel, es völlig zu vermeiden, genug gab, wenn man

Sie sind auch genugsam vorgeschlagen worden. Aber die oberste neue Heerführerstellelehnt alles ab, handelt darum, ob man von den eroberten 1200 km 20 mehr aufgibt

oder nicht. Dabei ist es völlig gleichgültig, wo wir in Rußland stehn. Ich glaubeaber, der Zeitpunkt kommt, wo man alles noch sehr bereuen wird. Für uns selbst

als Leidtragende ändert das aber nichts.Schon jetzt sind die Verhältnisse unglaublich. Überall macht


The german army escaped largescale disater in the winter of 1941-1942 by a hair's breadth.A timely retreat to a more defensible position could have avoided some of the desperate situations(particularly encirclements) the german army got  itself into.The fact that the german army escaped disaster was not mainly due to Hitler's stubborn standfast order,on the contrary such an order sometimes creates dangerous situations.And he himself drew wrong conclusions from it for the future.
I give an excerpt from a letter by one one the corps commanders(Heinrici wellknown for being a master of flexible defense)to show what some commanders thought. 

General Heinrici in a letter to his wife on the 11th january 1942(published in Viertelsjahrhefte für Zeitgeschichte 2000/2):

"Everything has happened as I told the superiors.All proposals were refused by them out of fear of  offending those at the highst place.Wether these people are named Kluge or Kübler(our new army commander),they are are all afraid of the highest  place.And that commands according to slogans like'no napoleonic retreat',stays put with open flanks and lets the enemy time to march around undisturbed and attack us from behind.One hopes for the bringing forward of new divisions.But these come too slowly,drop by drop,not enough to get us out.Thus the russian will win his first battle of destruction.,One rails against ones fate when one sees out of what obstinate heads this comes und that the re were  enough means to avoid this ,when one had taken ONE big decision three weeks ago,14 days ago,yes even 5-6ays ago,to retreat.They were proposed enough.But the highest command refuses everything,acts as if its matters to give up 20 kms or more of the 1200 conquered.It is indifferent where we stand in Russia.I believe however the time will come when one will regret this."

A quote from Mittlere Ostfront Juni 1944 by general Niepold pp256-257 to illustrate retreats effectively done by the german army in the summer of 1944
"It was shown  how the Army group in the 2nd phase of the battle,in defiance of the inevitable retreat ,.pressed sharply that the troops set themselves up again and again in postions wich were near to each other and continued the defense.It came to incessant fights by the armies,corps and divisions for the timely order for retreat before enemy break ins in the abscence of reserves could widen to unstoppable breakthroughs.
In general  it was about the appropriatedness of this tactic of retreat in short jumps.
Fieldmarshall Model said:'One can not retreat too fast.The artillery can only have its effect in defense.The point of view of the army to conduct the fight in a delaying action is false.'...
Whether one calls it defense or delaying action,the position was tenaciously held as long as possible with infantry to give  time to the artillery and the antitank weapons to have their defensive power have its effect.However,one protected oneself from breakthrough and destruction by  retreat at the last minute.Even when one continually had to give up terrain under pressure from the enemy,still this type of combat can most aptly be called ' defense limited in time',also when the troops had to retreat to a new position every day between the 6th and 16th july.
Because the mass of the divisions fought and moved on foot,only a retreat from line to line was possible.One can not enough appreciate the performance of german infantry which fought by day and marched by night.The real delaying action can only be done by armored troops,then and now." 
A quote from 'Von Minsk bis Lyck Die 12.panzerdivision' p 108-109,General  Niepold on the same subject

"It is my opinion that opinions of armygroup and army and corps command were justified to a certain extent.If the highest command could see a change in the course of the war by gaining time then it was correct to hold as long as possible in the east ,without having the irreplaceable frontunits destroyed.The biggest power in defense lay obviously with the artillery and all weapons suitable for action against tanks.Giving them the time and space necessary to enable their best effect and to protect them herein had become the most important task of the infantry.For this it had to at least for a time defend its positions ,but could not be exposed to destruction.
This type of action was applied in reality by the middle and lower command.It could be called 'defense limited in time' just as much as tenacious 'delaying action'.Principle and success would have remained the same.
But the fear of the highest command -Hitlers-did allow a formal legalisation of another type of defense than the 'fixed defenese' although its content and psychological effect had become extinct for a large part.So in the field one sticked with the command 'defense' and the practical execution 'delay',partially under negatively painted situation reports and invented enemy successes,to present free decisions as imposed by the enemy and spare the troops from the worst."

The step by step retreat, appropiately called 'defense limited in time' by general Niepold was the compromise between the retreat by big jumps the subordinate commanders of units belongingto AGC wanted in the summer of 1944 and the fixed defense ordered by Hitler.Model colluded with his commanders in presenting the step by step retreats as each time imposed by the enemy while in reality they were intentional.
Just another example of german infantry fighting in the day and falling back on the next line during the night.No attempt was really made to hold the line as this would expose the troops to breakthrough and destruction.This is real flexible defense.
The delaying action can obviously best be done by armored troops but infantry can do it too and did it.

Manstein makes a few comments in hindsight on his decisions (for example that the attack on the kursk salient was maybe a mistake)but he certainly did not do research on enemy dispositions for example .

Generalmajor Wagener(first general staff officer of 3rd panzer army during the battle) Moskau 1941 Podzun Pallas pp158-159:
"After it became clear that the attack on Moskau had failed,a big decision had to be made and a retreat had to be executed on a line which could be held in winter.And to be precise,the retreat had to be done in one move.
The point of a retreat is to break away from the enemy.
The purpose of this type of combat-the retreat is a type of combat,not something fatal,flight or shame- is to break off the battle and to remain master of your will,independent from the will of the enemy.....
 Only big jumps can shake the pursuer.
To break away fast from the enemy in all circonstances and gain space far back to preserve the own combat power  is more important than fighting for every square meter of ground.Hitler the Supreme commander of the german Wehrmacht ,did not know the word retreat and probably was even proud of this .He made the typical error of a layman,to see the objective of combat in gaining and holding terrain.
.....
In this retreat the troop had the feeling of a continuous wavering between standfast and retreat,deep retreat and small jumps.The way the german retreat from Moskau was executed,AGC got into mortal danger .
AGC was not destroyed  thanks to the german individual soldier and NCO.....
Their heroic fight under such conditions is proof that  the troops would not have run away when the retreat would have been allowed earlier and further.
It would have been executable with  fewer losses and would have come to a halt further to the east and without  the deep bends in the front at the 4th army and between AGN and AGC which were continual crisispoints in the new year ." 

The chief of staff of the third panzer army wrote the very apt statement about what happened  during the winter of 1941-1942.
Stating that the german army could not retreat is contradicted by the simple fact it did as is also mentioned by general Wagener..Hold or die simply meant that retreat was done to a much lesser extent than would have been the case if the hold or die policy did not exist.One problem with only retreating under pressure is that some parts of the front will not  be forced to retreat with the ensuing danger of encirclemnt.This is what happened to Army Group Center.The resulting Rhsew balcony was a continuous crisispoint in 1942 as general Wagener also mentions.
And the best thing would have been a planned retreat BEFORE the russian offensive started.

There is no doubt that Hitler was in favour of 'hold or die'.That is a historical fact.Also,it is pretty clear to any person with an aptitude for military operations that such policy is always inherently wrong.It always took a lot of time to convince Hitler of the necessity of retreat with negative consequences on the terrain.Quoting experienced generals just strenghtens this point as the opinion of practicians obviously carries more weight that that of a non professional.'Hold or die' policy is typical for politicians.Hitler is not an exception in that.
The whole 'scapegoat thing is therefore unjustified.It is based on nothing.

Incorrect.During and after the war generals expressed a 100% correct MILITARY expert opinion on 'hold or die'and many got fired over this during the war..
In practice,'hold or die' meant that it took a lot of time before generals could get Hitler to authorise retreats which continuosly lead to dangerous situations.The history of ww2 is full of examples of why of this policy .must faill.
'Hold or die' is typical for politicians who cannot bear giving up terrain.A competent offiver knows better.

No,Hitler was almost always in favour  of fixed defense.It was rarely that he could be convinced of a retreat without enemy pressure.And 'hold or die' is always wrong because if the choice is between holding and getting destroyed then you retreat to fight another day and you do it in a timely fashion.And only retreating when there is enemy pressure means no preplanned retreats to shorten the lines and too much delay in retreating to avoid encirclement.If Hitler had allowed a more flexible approach then losses would been a lot lower.
In general,Hitler as a politician could not be expected to know better than his generals who were very good at their job.

This is an exaggeration.Nobody wil say that all Hitler's military decisions were wrong but many were because Hitler is a politician after all.And a military professional should be able to do better than any politician.
Hitler's halt order did not save the german armly before moscow.The german army did orderly retreats before  the order..Hold or die simply meant that retreat was done to a much lesser extent than would have been the case if the hold or die policy did not exist.One problem with only retreating under pressure is that some parts of the front will not  be forced to retreat with the ensuing danger of encirclemnt.This is what happened to Army Group Center.The resulting Rhsew balcony was a continuous crisispoint in 1942 .
And the best thing would have been a planned retreat BEFORE the russian offensive started.