The following report was made towards the end of the war by an armored batallion while in combat with Russian forces in Hungary.Originally a cavalry unit aswhich it had taken part in 1941 campaign, the batallion had participated in the 1942/1942 engagements in the Ukrain right up to Stalingrad, had then been trasferred to France where it fought from this time to the invasion up to and including the Ardennes offensive, and had finally been sent to Hungary. It had an excellent record. This report is all the more valuable for having been written in the light of current experience, quoting numerous examples illustrating the principles of armored warfare, and giving a vivid impression of the conditions under which Germans and Russians fought at this time.The lowered training standard in repect to cooperation between armored forces, infantry and armored infantry become clearly evident. The armored batallion was equipped with type V tanks, more commonly known as Panther tanks.
I Experiences of 1st batallion 24 th Armored Regiment A report prepared while in combat between 18 January to 14 february 1945 The following are the experiences of a batallion which, in actions fought between 19 january and 15 february 1945 destroyed, by confirmed count110 tanks,153 AT guns, 13 artillery pieces and captured 74 AT guns. The report is intended to show the difficulties which tank crews currently have to contend with in the light of their own experience, and is to serve also as a counterpart to factual reports based only on the viewpoint of the infantry man
II Heavy weapons and methods of combat
In the eastern theatre of war,the main opponent of the tank is the AT gun, which the Russians use in great numbers, defensively and offensively, in the latter case bringing them up very quickly and skillfully. In the experience of the batallion, the term 'AT gun barrier' does not quite correspond to the actual situation on the field of battle, since the opponent prefers to employ this arm as facal point in AT gun pockets whichaim at achieving far reaching flanking effects.These anitank gun pockets sometimes consist of six to seven AT guns arranged within a radius of no more than forty to fifty meters.Just as the German troops at the front and those at the rear services are very extensively equipped with Panzerfausts, the Russians have, on a commensurate scale, equipped their troops with AT guns, which are rendered mobile by the use of tanks, farm vehicles or horses.Owing to excellent camouflage and adaptation to the terrain-wheels are sometimes removed to obtain a lower muzzle height- the Russians easily succeed in opening unsuspected fire at short or middle ranges. In these operations the Russians endeavor to let our advance vehicles pass by in order to strike the deep flank of our units with their fire. If the gun of a russian AT gun has been discovered and is taken under well aimed fire, the men will quickly leave the gun, but will return to it just as quickly in an unguarded moment or during a fire lull, to resume their own fire. It is therefore of great importance to disable immediately, after a tank attack, any AT guns which have been abandoned by their crews if the tactical situation is such that they cannot be removed. Infantry men do not make much use of ATguns, captured in good order, but call for tank support, no matter what the situation is. The tank is the weapon that is most endangered by AT gun fire.Tank personnel should therefore be the first whose opinion should be considered regarding action against AT guns of the enemy.Russians are dangerous only when they allow a German attack to approach within effective range before opening fire. Owing to inadequate reconnaissance, and because German tank units are required to attack without previously receiving clear-cut orders or orientation, we again and again provide the Russians with this opportunity. When on the other hand, it would be wise to allow an enemy attack to come within effective range, orders are given to the German units to counterattack. The result is that chances to destroy many enemy tanks are thrown away. When during the fight for Czekesfehervar, a Russian tank attack against the northern fringe of the town was to be expected on 3 february and the batallion commander had broached this subject several times, the batallion nevertheless received the order to lauch a counterattack further north, supported by a number of Tiger tanks from another unit in order to take the reported Russian tank units from the rear. The operation began in fog, so that visibility was poor.While the German tanks were assembling further north for the attack,the Russians lauched the attack further south. They were prevented from penetrating into the town only through the withdrawal of the Tiger tanks from the assembly, while our group attacking in the north, owing to the poor visibility floundered blindly into an enemy defensive position protected by a minefield, so that the attack came to a standstill. In mobile warfare, Russian tanks are handicapped through an apparent lack of firm control. The enemy is not able to hold his forces together during a long continued attack but is prone to disperse them. He tries to make up for this feeling of uncertainty by fast but purposeless moveement. The success of Russian tanks is due to mass commitment, weak German defense and to German counterattacks carried out without clearcut previous instruction.The Panther tank gun can pierce the plating of any type of tank. Type 85 blew with the first long range hit. In combat with the Josef Stalin, fire should be directed at the hull just above the tracks. Sherman tanks which are employed in large numbers, some with long- barreled guns,can be put out of action by hits from any angle and from any range and in most cases burn after the first hits. The Russians cleverly employ AT guns and tanks in the defense of towns. With dogged determination, the enemy awaits his chance, lets the opponent approach to within a short defense and disables him so far as possible by flanking fire. Russian infantry is of poor quality and leaves the field as soon as tanks appear. It is only in closed terrain or in tanks that the infantry proves a tough opponent, particularly if surrounded.Its unrivalled skill in the construction of field fortifications is a valuable asset.If not pursued immediately, Russian infantry recovers rapidly and is soon able to build up a new defense. Scattered mines cause delay.They only damage the tracks and suspensions of the Panther and these can be quickly repaired. III The assigned mission should be commensurate with the actual combat strength of the unit involved. In this connection it must be borne in mind that, owing to the strained tactical situation, pauses for repair have been impossible, so that the available striking power has decreased considerably in every action fought. All tanks within a unit should be concentrated perform an assigned mission . Time and again, this principle has been disregard and the available force split up for employment in separate directions.Then, one group of two or three tanks,owing to its numerical weakness will be held up by the first pocket of AT guns it encounters(at times unexpectedly)while a second group of tanks will be operating elsewhere under the same adverse set of circonstances.The final result of this dissipation of forces is that both attacks fail and that a number of tanks are permanently lost. ......... Even small armored units should always endeavour to employ a part of their force in a frontal holding movement and the balance in an attack on the enemy flank.Such operations require thorough preparation and clearcut orders, and this requires time.The operation should be carried out swiftly.If the unit has to travel several kilometers,short stops are necessary to restore order, otherwise the striking power will be dissipated, the units will become separated and tactical control will be impossible. One one occasion,while the batallion was attacking on the southwestern shore of V. lake on 18 january, the task force command made such exaggerated demands with regard to speed that by the time it began to grow dark the tanks of the batallion were all scattered and confused. Had the enemy suddenly offered strong resistance, an orderly conduct of operations woiuld have been impossible. Even if an attack made quick headway owing to scant enemy resistance,stops to restore order should be made, otherwise serious situations and inevitable losses will occur owing to the rapid situation changes characteristic of tank battles. A tank attack which a unit is forced to undertake in bad weather causes losses out of all proportion to the gains. On 3 and 10 february in spite of repeated remonstrances by the batallion commander, he was ordered to attack in fog with poor visibility. On 3 february, the first atttack wave encountered a prepared defense position consisting of AT guns and tanks. A number of the attacking tanks were permanently lost and the attack bogged down three kilometers north of Czekesfehervar .On 10 february , during an attack on a village, the enemy AT guns were discovered when only a short distance away, causing the unnecessary loss of two tanks. If an antitank front consisting of a series of AT gun pockets is encountered in battle, the firing range will be the deciding factor.If an armored unit is suddenly fired upon from a short distance, it is imperative to launch an immediate all-out attack. But if an armored unitencounters a strong antitank position at medium or long range, a withdrawal is called for with an attack at another place.The commander of the Panther tank should always endeavour to use the long range of his weapon.To this end stops should be made for carefull observation to discover the AT guns in good time. Closely connected with the probes is the employment of a combat reconnaissance unit which moves forward on a wide front ahead of the main force in order to draw the fire of antitank gun pockets, which can be discovered only by the flash of the guns. To carry out such reconnaissance , the tanks must drive forward from observarion point to observation point at the greatest possible speed, carry out careful combat reconnaissance with great coolness , and fire at suspicious points in the terrain in order to draw the enemy's fire. The combat reconnaissance units can only take careful and appropriate action if they are far enough ahead of the main force , and are not under pressure from the rear.To fight AT guns successfully requires careful reconnaissance, thoughtful probing, quick decison once targets have been discovered, clear and rational commands and prompt execution. Precisely in this respect armored command suffer from the lack of understanding on the part of infantry officers who cannot understand and appreciate tank methods of fighting antitank guns.If emplaced enemy tanks forming a defense front are to be destroyed, and if is this cannot be done by a flanking attack , the tanks must be painstakingly picked off individuallyby reconnaissance on foot and slow approach under cover.This requires a good deal of time.Resort to a ruse of one kind or another may guarantee success. Thus, for instance, the sound of running motors can be utilised to draw the attention of the enemy to the front while the tanks which are to fire approach on the flank. On two february 1945 , in the northern outskirts of Czekesfehervar, a single company in this way within minutes destroyed twenty Sherman three T 34 tanks, which were excellently camouflaged in the grouds of a factory and had destroyed every tank approaching without the above explained security measures. If an enemy tank attack is discovered in good time, fire should always be withheld until the attacking tanks are within close range. If an enemy must be attacked in open terrain, the attack should be launched simultaneously from two directions.In this way, caught in a pincer movement, the enemy will feel insecure. On 4 february 1945 , north of Czekesfehervar, the batallion thus succeeded in putting twenty-six tanks and forty-six AT guns out of action. If an armored unit is caught unawares, and unprepared for action, a lightning assault will increase the enemy's confusion and guarantee success, since owing to poor tank-to- tank communication the Russians are not able to improvise or countermand orders quickly. Under this set of circonstances, one of our batallions Panther tanks destrpyed three enemy tanks at a range of twenty meters in an attack at Kajaszoszenipeter on 26 january. Tank combat in towns or villages is impossible without the close cooperation of infantry. The limit range of vision from the tank gives cthe defending enelmy an advantage .This is were infantry must help. Jumping from cover to cover under the protection of tanks, the infantryman can spot antitank guns, tanks and heavy infantry weapons and inform tank commanders.This collaboration must be based on mutual trust. Often, however, infantry use tanks as cover and suffer casualties through fire aimed at the tanks. On 1 february 1945, while German tanks were advancing to the outskirts of Czekesfehervar, our tanks suffered losses through flanking fire from concealed AT guns which could have been spotted in good time with infantry collaboration. A firmly controlled and carefully prepared surprise attack by night has always been successful , with small losses. Bold and determined action is a prerequisite . A precipitated night attack will fail and result in heavy losses. Thus, in a properly conducted night attack a village situated in a commanding position on a river held by antitank artillery, tanks and a large infantry force , was captured in a surprise attack by eight assault guns and two command cars. The speed of a night attack is subject to less restrictions if a small unit is employed than woiuld be the case with a larger unit, consisting of thirty tanks, where the coordination of separate operations is required. Tanks should be amply equipped with carbines and grenade launchers for launching parachute flares, apart from special pyrotechnic devices, are the only effective way to illuminate the combat areawithout disclosing the position of ones own tanks. So far as the fire effect of tanks is concerned,, it must be said that on the whole far too little firing is done.A strong concentration of fire from more than ten tank guns will work miraclkes, even with tenacious russians. If a batallion in the course of attack sudenly concentrates its fire on a strongly fortified village, and then immediately advances a part of its forces, it can always count with certainty on effecting a penetration-a success without any losses. But again and again one discovers wrong conceptions of what a sudden concentration of fire means. If five tanks fire five rounds each on a target , it is often erroneously called a sudden concentration of fire, whereas for a Panther tank it is nothing but a skirmish. The ammunition expenditure must be in proportion to the strength of the available tank forces. Target points must be given beforehand; there will be no time for adjustments when the firing starts.The gun loaders must work fast enough to attain the same rate of fire as antiaircraft artillery. With such firing methods, Panther tanks are still able to breach the enemy defenses and prepare the way for an attack. On 30 january,in a night attack against Kapolnas-Nyek, which was held by tanks and antitank artillery, the strength of which could not be ascertained in the dark,the batallion fired fifteen rounds from each of twenty tanks against the outskirts of the village.The russians fired and tried to escape across the eastern tip of Lake Valencita with their tanks and antitank guns. At dawn the enemy tanks which had broken through the ice and had been abandoned by their crews were a proof of the effect obtained. The machinegun is not used enough.The turret machine gun has a devastating effect on massed infantry........ In an attack on an antitank position it is advisable to fire while still under way. The muzzle blast and the shell fragmentation will keep the enemy under cover and shake his will to resist. Hits inflicted upon our Panther tanks indicate that the Russians aim at the side of the turret level with the gunner. According to an order from the Inspektor of Armored troops, it is not permissable to attach chain links to the turret side. The batallion went into battle in compliance with this order . Due to the many armor piercing hits in this spot, chain links were again experimentally attached to some tanks. They proved their value by reducing the effect of the imact.
IV Armor-armored infantry relations and cooperation
Owing to the wide front sectors and the low manpower of the armored infantry units as a result of the great losses sustained, tanks participate in all operations. Successful cooperation with the armored infantry, whose commander is generally placed in command of a combined unit , depends on an understanding of the peculiarities and abilities of the tank arm.Proper cooperation will reduce tank losses. Unfortunately, training in this respect is at the lowest ebb, causing tank losses and a considerable wear and tear of equipment. The armored infantry commander the tank as a panacea for all ills, since he cannot realise the weakness and the limitations of the tank, limitations which cannot be surmounted even with the best of intentions. The armored infantry commander sees in the tank a heavily armored monster of many hundred horsepower with a huge cannon, without knowing its shortcomings, such as its thin side armor plating , its restricted field of vision, its limited mobility compared with an armored personnel carrier. How vulnerable the tank is to the weapons solely directed against it, is known to the armored infantry, only from a distance, for it will happen rarely that an armored personnel carrier is in the immediate vicinity of a tank exploding from a direct hit. During a battle between tanks and AT guns the armored infantry, as a rule, are not with their own tanks, since it is not their mission to be there and they have no business there.But no sooner has the tank battle ended that the armored infantry commanders come forward and ask why the battle is not continued or why it lasted so long. Then the tank force is precipitantly committed against the next objective so that it is at a disadvantage in the next tank versus tank action in which it may become involved. ....... Although infantrymen time and time again admit that they cannot solve a major combat assignment without tanks, they persist in committing tanks according to their own ideas; and to make matters worse the combat commands involved are small and under the command of junior officers who do not like to listen to the expert opinion of tank personnel....... There are armored infantrymen who would like to see tanks moving continuously out in front. Every tactically required stop or pause for observation makes them impatient. If ,before a village which is reported strongly held, tanks halt a while in order not to be trapped by flanking pockets of AT guns or to avoid running up against dug-in enemy tanks the infantry is too quick to assume timidy. An attack should be carried out briskly and systematically after exact reconnaissance and preparation, it should not be a haphazard ride into because an infantry commander is in a great hurry......
If a tank stops when encountering mines, if it reconnoiters and withdraws in order to advance at another place, if it halts for observation when enemy tanks are reported, or if on suddenly coming under flanking fire from AT guns, it wheels to the right and goes into position instead of proceeding in the desired direction, all this is not due to dilatoriness but is the correct action to take in the circonstances. ....... On 10 february, German tanks advaced into the rear of the enemy south of Lepczeny. An evading movement was carried out to bypass strong enemy resistance and a new direction of atttack was ordered. A immediate attack in the new direction was demanded, briefing and orientation being considered a waste of time. When the tanks halted for reconnaissance, having received flanking fire from enemy tanks, the headquarters of the combined armored battle group interrupted tank to tank cooperation to issue peremptory commands to advance, thus making radio communication and the conduct of operations all the more difficult. ........ On 14 february German tanks were engaged n house-to-house fighting at Czoesz . The German infantry failed to follow up although the Russian pockets of resistance were held down by the fire of the tanks.The enemy took advantage of this critical situation by sending out close combat detachments to attack the tanks, which were thus forced to withdraw to the infantry frontline. In retreating they ran into mines, resulting in the permanent loss of two tanks. Many unreasonable demands were deliberately ignored by the tank commanders in order to avoid major losses.
