The evolution of the tank strenth of the LAH between december 1943 andfebruary 1944 as taken from part III and V/1 of the divisonal history by Lehmann and Tiemann.
Just shows how quickly the strength of a tankregiment can melt away because of a combination of heavy fighting and moving in mudy terrain.Also shows how quickly the strength can rebound with a few days of rest during which many vehicles ion shortterm repair can become operational. There is no fundamental difference between the period of the fighting in dec-jan in which Peiper commanded and the relief operation for Tcherkassy in which Kuhlmann was in command during the leave of Peiper. Actually the regiment was almost down to nothing after the tcherkassy operation.This is not an indictment against Kuhlmann.It is just what happens in a combination ofheavy fighting and bad terrain. There is certainly also also no ground for the thesis that Peiper decimated the regiment.
A quotee from Die 1.Panzerdivision,Rolf Stoves pp474-475 on the fighting in november -december 1943 during which it belonged to the same army corps(the48th) as the LAH and fought in the same battles:
'Even when the 1st pzdiv. in this first 1 and a half month of its renewed fighting in the east....again achieved great successes,it also had to suffer grievous losses:in the pzGr Rgt 1 the commander of the 3rd batallion, and his successor were killed.In the sister regiment 113 both Btl commanders ,their successsors and the regimental commander were severely wounded;Major von Hübner later died of his severe wounds in hospital.Further were killed in this sector the lieutenants Beer,Fisher,Hause,Inselberger,Kurz,Mewes,Richter,Schubert and a number of NCO's of the Panzergrenadiere.The Pz reg. 1 had beside the loss of many brave tankcrews-especially experienced tankcommanders who as experts were irreplaceable at this time of the war-suffered the loss of many platoon commanders,the Abteilungsadjudant and other officers.Among which Oblt Georg(4.PzRgt 1),Lt Schauer(Adj I Abt Pz 1) and the lieutenants Kempe and Nehring.Lt Graf was mortally,Hptm von Krauss and Lt Stoves were severely wounded....The other unitsalso suffered bitter and irreplaceable losses.'
Just to show that heavy losses particularly among officers were very high in all units involved in the fighting in nov.-dec. 1943
If a panzerregiment is ging to be decimated,it it is not likly to happen during offensive actions because there the attacker will probably control the batttlefield and disabled tanks of which only a minority will be total loss,can be recuperated and repaired. In a retreat a panzerregiment can be decimated because it wil have to destroy non operational tanks that cannot be moved. This can easily be shown by looking at the losses of the Tiger company of SS panzerregiment 1(W.Schneider,Tiger im Kampf II p151). During the offensive actions until 23.12.1943 under Peipers command 2 tanks were lost to enemy actions,taking the total strength to 23.During four retreats 16 tanks had to be blown up ( 24.12:7 ; 29.12: 2 ; 02.01 : 4 ; 19-20.01 :3)and one was lost to enemy action,taking the total to 6.So the Tiger company was certainly decimated but purely due to having to retreat and certainly not because of alleged ill executed offensive actions.
Peipers misconduct was such that on 28.11.1943 SS Oberfûhrer Wish proposed him for promotion to Obersturmbannführer: 'He is a plain,prudent and energetic personality.As batallion comander of the armored batallion he showed smart tactical thinking and was able to use each favourable opportunity for the division by fast,agile advances.This special eye for the grasping and exploitation of a favourable situation,as also his hardness in counterattacks and his experience in the command of battles in the back of the enemy,make him seem,particularly as he is himself exemplary brave,especially suited as commander of the Panzerregiment.......'
Lehmann III p.429:' 0601.1944:...20.00 the commander of the PzRgt opens Osadowka from the south and keeps open the road for the retreat of the division until 24.00 23.00 Report to the corps:"the mass of the division has moved through Osadowka to the south..." 07.01.1944: 00.00 Stubaf Peiper retreats with the panzer rear guard from Osadowka after the Pz AA 1 has moved through.
Lehmann II p.431:' 08.01 30-40 enemy tanks with mounted infantry roll over the main defense line between PzGrenRgt1 and 2 penetrate atbPzGren Rgt 1 until the hollows to the north of Stepok and at III/2 in Sherebki.In this line they are stopped by concentrated fire from the PzAr1 and thereopon destroyed in a pincer movement by the armored battlegroup under the brave commander of the PzRgt 1 Stubaf Peiper in cooperation with the tank destroyers of Tank destroyer batallion 473. 09.00 the situation is resolved; 33 T34 and seven mechanized guns belonging to the 54.Guard Pz Brig. have been destroyed.
Lehmann III p.438-439: '13.01.1944 08.30 The enemy attacks the defense sector of PzGrenRgt 1 from Chutorysky Hfe with strong armored forces and mechanised guns ,achieves a break-in and advances until Tschessnowka.This armored force is smashed completely in a counterattack by the armored Gr. Peiper and 37 T 34 and 7 mechanised guns are killed.Ustuf Wittmann achieves his 80th and his gunner Woll his 80 th kill.Both get the knights cross..... Oberst von Künsberg Kdr IR 188 writes the author:"The good Peiper sent me then two Tigers in my sector ,where Ustuf Wittmann killed numerous tanks and the other one also twenty during a russian attack...I was then very pleased about the obliging and selfless collaboration between commanders." The CG General Balck congratulates Michael Wittmann in a radio message directed at him personally. 23.20 the armored battle group together with parts of Battlegroup von Künsberg and Pz Gren.Rgt 1 starts a counter attack and has restored the old HKL at 02.10 after driving away the enemy.'
14.10 12.30 Order to Stubaf Peiper to advance as fast as possible with all available tanks and APC , and also the II gep. /AR 1 from the area to the west of Smela to the northwest,destroy the enemy around Chutorysko Hf and gain the railroad Berditschef Ljubar.Krassnopol is then to be taken in collaboration with the armored group DR. 12.55 the armored Group starts,pushes into the relief movements at Chutorysko Hf,destroys at least two regiments,is able to gain the north egde of Krassnopol at 14.00 and stands ,turning to the west,at 16.30 at the bridge in the middle of Molotschki.The enemy flees abandoning his weapons to the norteast,east and northwest......'
Some context on the operation for which Peiper got the Oak leaves. A quote fom Ordnung im Chaos, General der Panzertruppe a.d.Herman Balck pp 477-479:'The 06.12 by favourable wetter-light frost and moonlight-all divisions crossed the road Schitomir-Korosten like oriented by a ruler,puctual to the second.The enemy was completely surprised.Our movements had not been noticed by him.He resisted bravely but without coordination.At the evening the enemy front had been rolled up in a length of 36 km. A fight as one experienced seldomly.Without any crisis. ...At first the enemy underestimated our attack completely.Later individual PAK and tanks were opposed to us.Then there was unrest in the radio traffic"report immediately from where the enemy comes."your report is not credible."Answer:"ask the devils grandmother. How could I know from where th enemy comes."...A little bit later the radio traffic stopped.The staff of the russin 60th army fled.Manteuffels tanks overran the command post.The 1.pzdiv.captured the staff of an armored corps,unfortiunately without the commanding general. ..... Attacking the night to 07.12 and during the day ,the divisions covered another 20 km;The 08.12 the Teterew was reached by the Leibstandarte and the 1.pzdiv.The 7.pzdiv.broke into the bridghead of Malin...... The russian 60th army was wiped away..... The next days brought variable fighting.The corps waged a forward defense in an offensive way to secure the setting up of the XIII th corps in its new position..... The russian threw everything he had in the counterattack.This created the opportunity to attack individual parts with the concentrated divisions and surround and destroy them.At Radomysl,by concentrating the Leibstandarte and the 1.pz.div.,supported by 8 artillery and 5 rocketlauncher Abteilungen on a close space,an advance succeeded towards the 68.div.When the pocket closed on the 12.12, 3-4 more russian divisions went towards their destruction. The 14.12 the corps attacked with all it had in the opposite direction to the north-again with complete success.The Wehrmachtsbericht of 14.12 reported about our sector:from 6-13.12 the enemy lost 4400 prisoners,around 11000 dead,927 guns,254 tanks.'
Die 14. Panzerdivision R.Grams p128-129:'The answer to the question concerning the best structure for the division for the expected offensive operations was almost obvious:the enemy attack spearheads consisted almost entirely of mechanised and panzer troops.Therefore the division had to put together its armored forces.During the night the orders went out from the HQ which took the I/Gren.Rgt 103,the I /Pz Art Regt and the 3./Pz Pi. Btl 13 from its units and put them under the command of the comander of the Panzerregiment,Oberst Langkeit.'
Die 16.Panzerdivision W.Werthen p.92 :'The 06.06.1942 the 16.Pz Div. lefts its assembly area in the following march order:Vorausabteilung Witzleben(K 16,PzKp Scheidemann,5./PzartRgt 16,Btl Mues,3./Pi 16) ,KG Sickenius((Pz.Abt Strachwitz,I/S.Rgt Fondermann,I/Artl.Rgt.16 Clemann),KG Krumpen(Pi 16,I/S.Rgt 79 Wota,11/79,1.Pz.Jg;Abt.16,Abt Ackermann mit 7./8.Artl.Rgt.16).
What is your point? You put a link to a bio of Wittmann which contains all the usual information.And then you simply confirm my point about other effects from air strikes other than killing tanks.
Many hits on a tank will cause it damage to its externals:antenna,opticals,gun,jamming turret which will diminish its effecdtiveness without destroying it. If you hit the very powerfull Abrams tank many times with RPG's it will also sustain damage to its external equipment which force it to be taken out of the battle and repaired.
I agree with Rommel. I let him speak for himself(Krieg ohne Hass,Verlag Heidenreimer Zeitung pp382-384): " General von Rundstedt,a soldier of great format,planned to concentrate the available Panzer and motorised divisions in the middle of the french space,in order to achieve a great own superiority on the battlefield by a fast march of these units.In normal circonstances this plan would have been the best solution in spite of the very weak occupation of the coast and would have led to succes with 100% certainty.However Fieldmarshall von Rundstedt could have no idea of the extent of the anglo-american air superiority and the ensuing operational-tactical limitations. With an advance of so many Panzer and motorised divisions the respect of the timings would have been an absolute necessity because, in view of the weak coast defenses,this advance would have to be executed as quickly as possible. With my african experience I doubted-and as events showed with reason,that the timely execution of this plan would be possible . Before el Alamein we had sufficiently been able to study the effects of the anglo-american bombingtactics on our motorised units.In France it was to be expected that the airforces used on the day of the invasion would be a multiple of the bombingunits the allies disposed of in northafrica.Contrary to the desert,in France only a limited number of roads could be used which led over rivers and cities.Therefore the enemy airforces could have greater effect than in the desert. I specifically pointed out the following points to Generalfeldmarshall von Rundstedt: a)The anglo-amercan fighterbomber would by day and by night with flares fly over the roads for advance and interdict all traffic b)The allied bombingsquadrons would destroy all cities and bridges when this would promise the blocking of a road.Important roads would fall out totally this way c)Motorised troops would already sustain heavy losses by airattacks d)Because of this timings could never be respected.Large reorganisations would be necessary.With 2-3 divisions you can reorganise quickly ,reorganising an advance of 10 divisions is much more difficult and takes a lot of time,especially when the units are not used to this. e)After approximately 10 to 14 days the offensive group would have arrived on the battlefront and have reorganised the troops.Meanwhile the americans could have overwhelmed the weak coastal defenses,advance deep and supply their bridghead.The attack by the units strongly decimated on the march then cannot have any success anymore.(Obviously one could have split off a few units and send them in forced marches to the front but then the compact offensive force,the main advantage of the plan of Fieldmarshall von Rundstedt,would have been done away with). Therefore I kept to my plan,which in the circonstances,could be nothing else than a compromise."
On 09.11.1942 the Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost counted with an impending attack from the Kletskaja bridghead. Two days before Oberst i.G.Schöne chief of the liaison staff to the Rum.3rd army had already sounded the alarm.The liaison staff had a clear image of the strength and objectives of the enemy forces assembling in the bridgheads over the Don and expected an attack any moment.The 6tht army was informed via Armygroup B that an attack was expected on 08.11.On the evening of 08.11.1942 the sixth army started to take the situation seriously and the Panzerjägerabteilung 671,Schwere Artillerie Abteilung 849 and a flakbattery were sent to XI Korps to be assembled in such a waybehind the left wing of the Korps that they could be used to support the eastwing of the rumanian AOK 3.These were further strenghtened in the next days and placed under the command of Oberst Leppert. Oberst Schöne was ordered to Starobelsk for a personal report on 09.11 and it was through this that Heeresgruppe B saw the danger on the Don.The OKH was immediately informed and took countermeasures within its capabilities;It ordered the building of Kampfgruppe Simon principally from parts of the 62 I.D.The armygroup ordered general kommando XXXXVIII Panzerkorps and 29 I.D mot to move to the Don under its own responsability-Hitler still had to authorise this.The rum.1.pzdiv.and 29 I.D. Mot were to be subordinated to 48th Panzerkorps. The authorisation was first refused for this by OKH but later in the night 48th panzerkorps was released as the 22.Pz.div. which was in reserve behind the italian 8.Armee.The Generalkomando 48th panzerkorps arrived on the forward HQ of Rum.third army in thelate afternoon of 10november and wo it immediately took over command of rum.1.Pz div. and Panzerjägerabteilung 611.On 11 november the 22;Panzerdivision and Gruppe Simon were subordinated to the Panzerkorps. The 6.Armee was informed on 09.11 of the measures ordered.On 10 november 6.Armee was asked if the Panzerjägerabteilungen of 14.and 24.Panzerdivision could be forwarded to the 48th panzerkorps. 6.Armee could not bring itself to do this but built itself a reserve.A panzerdivision staff was to be released from Stalingrad to be a command staff behind XI Korps.Somewhat later it was decide that this should be the staff of 14.Panzerdivision.the 24.Panzerdivision was informed of the soviet preparations in the area of Kletskaja and ordered to be prepared for a fast move of the division. On 12 november Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost considered the forces against the rumanian 3rd army as ready for attack with the objective of cutting the railroad to Stalingrad and force the retreat of the german forces in Stalingrad.The danger of attack against the hungarians and italians with Rostov as objective was also seen.The danger of a surrounding of the german forces between Don and Volga was not seen. It was only on 18 november that the danger was seen of a simultaneous attack against the rumanian 3rd army and the the rumanian VI corps. On 17 november Fremde Heere Ost considered the attack preparations as mostly complete. The orders of Armygroup now followed fast.On 12 november first measures were taken for bringing on Generalkommando XVII Korps(General Hollidt)to the left of the rumanian 3rd army.In the course of 12 november the situation grew so urgent that a fast movement of 14.Panzerdivision was ordered to be subordinated to 48th panzercorps except the panzergrenadierregiments which were in stalingrad and had to follow later. When the situation report of Abteilung Heere Ost of 12 november became known the deadly danger for 6.Armee was seen and the immediate release of al parts of the 14.Panzerdivision was ordered so that they could be forwarded to the Panzerkorps.More parts of Gruppe Lepper were subordinated to XXXXVIII Panzerkorps.AOK 6 took away parts of Werferregiment 51 from XIV Panzercorps and subordinated them to XI Korps. On 18 november the mass of XXXXVIII Panzerkorps was assembled but it were weak units of which the battlereadiness was limited.The rumanian 1.Panzerdivision was not all battleready.The 22.Panzerdivision had only 42 tanks ,the 14.Panzerdivision had no infantry.There was also a lack of fuel and ammunition which had negative effects on training.The strength of the corps was one and a half panzerdivision.General Heim told the Armygroup that it should not think the corps had full Panzerdivisions. The Armygroup also ordered the use of a greater number of alarmbatallions was ordered on 12 november under the orders of the artillery commander 312. The batalions were assembled near Stalino and subordinated to 48th panzercorps on 17 november. Kehrig criticizes 6thArmy for not preparing 16.Panzer and the two motorised divisions to move quickly and not overseeing closely the measures ordered for 24.Panzerdivision.Even if 6;Armee did not see the full extent of the soviet threat,it could not think that it could deal with attacking Stalingrad and prtotecting its left at the same time according to Kehrig.
The stellungsbesetzungsliste in Lehmann's book clearly shows that Peiper always remained in command of the panzerregiment.Kuhlman never formally commanded the regiment.When the strength of the batallions or Abteilungen in a regiment drops so much that they have temporarily to be amalgamated,the regimental commander ceases to effectively command the regiment but the regimental commander stays in formal command.In the action on the 14th january Peiper commanded the armored battlegroup which consists of the Panzerregiment,an Abteilung of self propelled artillery and the SPW batallion. He is also mentioned in command of the armored battlegroup the day before.There is also a mention of him with the panzerregiment on the 7th of january.As first general staff officer of the division Lehmann knew best where Peiper was. Peiper was certainly always still in command of the armored battlegroup until he left on his leave. The strength reports in Lehmann's book clearly show that the panzerregiment was never destroyed.Its operational strength dropped as is normal in intensive operations(20 tanks on the 11th january;19 tanks + 21 mechanized guns on the 15th) but many of the non operational tanks were in short term or in long term repair repair. In the detail of the actions there is no evidence of any underperformance of the panzerregiment,on the contrary. Two commanders got the Knights cross and Peiper himself eventually was proposed for the Oak leaves. When one looks at the chapter in Schneiders book on the tiger company of the Leibstandarte one sees no sign of any disasters or underperformance either.One simply sees that most total losses of Tigers were due to having to blow them up when they had to be left behind and you also see that because of mechanical failures the operational strength of the tiger company was always low. In the divisional history of the first panzer division which was also involved in the fighting in november-december 1943 you will see the same story of mounting losses in vehicles and experienced officers because of the heavy fighting. In conclusion Westermeyer has clearly shown nothing at all.There was no underperformance of the LAH panzerregiment which suffered no more losses than any other unit suffered in the same heavy fighting. Take away the malmedy massacre and Peiper's SS runes and nobody would ever have written a book about him because he is simply one of the many german regimental commanders..Nobody would ever have bothered to attack his credentials as a regimental commander.
