Section 2 : the campaigns up to 1941 ......... For the russian campaign in 1941 it was believed that the former principles could be adhered to , namely that the maintenance system was to based chiefly on the installations in Germany. Additional improvements had undoubtedly been made on the basis of what had been learned up to that time.Three large spare parts depots were to be moved up to the army groups on the eastern front. Improved special vehicles, machines and equipment had been developed and introduced for the maintenance and recovery of tanks. In general, however, the command assumed -and the political leaders emphasized this assumption- that the climax of military operations would have been reached by the fall of 1941, that it would be possible for most of the forces to return to Germany before winter, and that the remaining tank units would have opportunity during the winter to withdraw from active service for a long time and to be reconditioned in suitable areas. The course of the campaign was to show that this basic assumption was erroneous. ........ Section 3 : the collapse of the former tank maintenance system in the fall of 1941
After the beginning of the russian campaign , the need for maintenance and thus also the need for spare parts soon increased by leaps and bounds. In addition to the normal wear and tear the damage caused by enemy fire and mines increased considerably as a result of the close-combat fighting practiced by the russians.The climatic conditions of the country(heat and dust as well as severe cold) created new technical problems. The lack of suitable quarters for the installation of workshops within the country and later the unexpected damage caused by the winter, as well as the complete commitmant of all the field units in combat, led to an enormous number of mechanical defects which had to be repaired. Despite the efforts of the field maintenance services the number of tanks which were fit for service were reduced to a dangerously low figure. The supply requirements of the army in all fields (ammunition, engine fuel, hospital trains, etc....) far exceeded expectations . On the other hand , in spite of detailed preparations, it was impossible for the railroad service to furnish the rapidly advancingand far-flung armies with the necessary transport space. Since, as had been expected , the field units captured very little rolling stock, the railroad tracks had to be converted from the wide russian gauge to the standard european gauge. The systematic destruction of railroad bridges and maintenance shops for locomotives by the retreating army was considerable. Transport difficulties became so great that the transport problem presented an additional obstacle, together with the enormous demand for maintenance services made by the troops and the limited resources available in Germany . A fundamental change was necessary. The existing maintenance system had outlived its usefulness. The maintenance which up to then had been performed in Germany now had to be carried out largely by the field units. For this purpose the following measures were necessary: 1. The maintenance personnel of the field units had to be greatly reinforced and their efficiency improved . 2. The troops had to be furnished with more effcient maintenance equipment , machines and special equipment, some of these things had to be designed for the first time . 3. Additional and modern maintenance services had to be organised for the purpose of taking over part of the repair work which hitherto had been carried out in Germany . 4. The production of spare parts in Germany had to be increased considerably in order to satisfy the increased demands of the field units. 5. The supply organisation in the field of tank maintenance required a basic change . The supply staffs from the division up to the army groups had to be reinforced with specialists. 6. The decentralisation of the maintenance services -that is what this reorganisation amounted to -required as a result a great number of executives with high technical qualifications to direct the maintenance services of the field units , which had now become more efficient , and to deal expertly with mintenance matters in the staffs. 7.The agencies in Germany , which had hitherto organised the maintenance services , had to transfer these functions in part to the field commands of the field forces, which required a corresponding reorganisation of this command. .........
Section 4 the reorganisation of the tank maintenance system
The above mentioned measures were generally introduced during the period from the fall of 1941 to the summer of 1942. At the same time, new types of tanks had been designed and the existing models had been improved so that they would be equal or superior to the surprisingly good tanks of the russians. The race for improvements in design , in wchich the british and americans took an increasingly large part, was destined to continue up to the end of the war. Because of the limited capacity of Germany's armament industry, it was simply not possible to scrap older tank models during the war and replace them with better types . The result was that the number of tank types increased and this adversely affected the maintenance services(spare parts, repair machinery, tank recovery equipment, the organisation of new kinds of maintenance services) and the latter also became more and more complicated. While it was comparatively easy to reinforce personnel and make improvements both with respect to training and material in the maintenance services in the field, some of the abovementioned measures , which went beyond these improvements, met with many obstacles. As soon as it was realised in the fall of 1941, that the maintenance service in Germany was of hrdly any valure for the field units and that the field units would have to do most of their maintenance work themselves, the fairly large quantity of tank spare parts which had been stored in Germany were quickly shipped to the field units. The spare tank parts which were stored at the permanent repair installations in Geramny now had to be quickly loaded on trains and moved up to the troops. Whereas up to then damaged tanks had been sent to their repair shops and spare parts depots, the procedure was now reversed. In view of the large number of different types of tanks this was no minor task. This new procedure presupposed personnel who were fully acquainted with this work, especially at the headquarters of the field units.However such personnel was not available. The result was, that the trains carrying tank spare parts were dispatched at random to the three army groups at the Eastern front. The outcome of this was that the trains were misdirected, consequently causing great confusion. Thus, for example, the southern army group received spare parts for tanks types they did not possess, but which were urgently required by the northern army group. This situation had to be remedied at once. The headquarters of the field forces,therefore ( army headquarters , army group headquarters, Army General Staff Supply and Maintenance branch) had to obtain an exact personal knowledge of the tanks and spare parts required by the individual units in all theatres of operation, since direct cooperation between the front and the zone of interior was no longer possible.The correct understanding and evaluation of these requirements presupposed carefully trained personnel in the staffs and the units which handled these matters. At the beginning of the war all vehicles of the motorised units were supervised by field officers who possessed a certain knowledge of automotive engineering; they were called 'army mechanisation officers'. The development of mechanisation ,however, required a more and more thorough knowledge of the care of motor vehicles from the technical point of view. Especially now, after the first part of the Eastern campaign , when a maintenance service and a system for procuring spare parts had to be organised as rapidly as possible and with all possible means. In many case, the knowledge of the army mechanisation officers was not sufficient for them to give the troops the necessary technical instructions which were exepcted of a trained specialist. At that time a situation had arisen in the services in which the army mechanisation officer , a man who had been given practical training as a motor transport officer, "commanded" the unit, to be sure, but the specialist( unit engineer, maintenance technical sergeant or shop foreman) was the real soul of the work. A new solution was then found by having the hastily trained army mechanisation officers,whenever necessary, replaced professionally trained engineer officers(officers with college training, graduate engineers), who up to then had been employed almost exclusively in the technical repair shop services as 'unit engineers'. This reorganisation was strongly opposed by the army mechanisation officers, but proved to be the correct solution. In 1942, the corps of automotive engineer officers was basically reorganised. The former army mechanisation officers , the former 'wartime administrative counsellors' of the motor transport transport service, and the former engineer officers were brought together in the officer corps of the 'motor transport troops'.They filled all staff and line positions which required a knowledge of automotive engineering i.e. positions at motor pools, in maintenance companies , spare part depots,etc... and in addition held the position of regimental or batallion motor transport officer in the armored forces. In this connection, an effort was made to give a wider sphere of activity to officers with a college education. Former army mechanisation officers without the proper qualifications were transferred to other service arms. Up to the end of 1941 there were no motor transport or tank specialists at the headquarters of the chief of army supply administration himself , or at the Arùy Group headquarters. There were not even any army mechanisation experts there. The chief of army supply and administration met this emergency in his own staff by reoganising his office force. A special section designed by the letter "I" was formed for motor vehicle and tank maintenance and placed under an engineer officer.Beginning with the spring of 1942 the Army Group headquarters made similar arrangements.In addition, a field agency of the Berlin Ordnance Inspectorate was set up at the Headquarters of the Chief of army supply and administration for the purpose of establishing close liaison between those two offices...... It was now possible for the first time to attack the problem with respect to material. The most important thing in this respect was to prepare a spare parts index which would give an accurate picture of the various types of tanks in a tank unit , its spare part requirements , and the shipments received by it. This was the only way which made it possible for the chief of army supply and administration to order the right parts in Germany and prevent shipments from being misdirected. The organisation and operation of the soare parts index required a simple, reliable and fast-working message system;. Within the area of an Army Group, for example, a special radio wave length was reserved by the tactical command for the tank message service, and this measure at the same time provided the commander in chief immediately with an accurate estimate as to the latest status of his tanks, i.e how many were ready for action and how many were undergoing repairs. Furthermore, it proved necessary to send requests for spare tank parts directly from the requesting unit by the shortest route to the agency appointed to deliver the parts, instead of through major supply channels.However, since the large number number of requests for spare parts could only be partly satisfied, such parts as were available had to be allocated according to the proposed employment of the individual tank units, as well as for training purposes. Beginning with 1943, task was taken over by the Inspector General of Armored forces, acting with the approval of the chief of Army Supply and administration. This reorganisation, which was carried out by the Army general staff, made it possible to work rapidly and on a large scale, so that the 1942 offensive in the direction of the Caucasus and lower Volga received adequate support as far as tanks and the tank maintenance service was concerned. The intelligent cooperation between the offices of the Army General staff , especially that of the chief of army supply and administration, the repair installations of the field forces and the maintenance services under the chief of army equipment produced good results. In the course of time the new system had to be improved and supplemented. The limited capacaty of the railway transport service in Russia was the cause of many heated arguments over the few available transport trains between the offices concerned. During the severe railway crisis in the winter of 1941/1942 it was sometimes hardly possible to get the few available tank part transports onto the rails. When the transport situation gradually improved in the spring of 1942, new difficulties arose. The tank maintenance service now became increasingly a question of material, for now, after the transport crisis had come to an end, it became evident that it was impossible to manufacture as many spare parts as were needed.
Section 5 The manufacture of spare tank parts
Up to the end of the war it was impossible to overcome this new and severe crisis, which was deeply rooted and already had existed prior to the war. It is instructive to examine the causes of this crisis. When a new type of motor vehicle is introduced, , replacement parts must reach the market at the same time. It is obvious that those parts which are subject to greater wear and tear should be manufactured on a larger scale. Every auto mobile company works according to this rule, since otherwise it would soon lose its customers.This simple rule was not observed in the manufacture of tanks in Germany. This failure, however, was not caused merely by the lack of competitive spirit nor an unwillingness to satisfy the customer , but was also due to technical difficulties. The demands made upon a tank are immeasurably greater than those made upon a private automobile and the wear and tear of individual parts cannot be accurately determined in advance. Prior to the war , and also for some time during the war, the ordnance inspectorate in the general army office of the army high command was the agency in charge of procuring tanks.The ordnance inspectorate procured army equipment of all kinds both that which was the initial issue of the troops and that which was needed for subsequent supplies. On the basis of the plans for the activation of new troop units which were submitted to the ordnance inspectorate , the latter estimated the requirements for all types of equipment , drew up corresponding procurement plans and forwarded them to the ordnance office. The ordnance office then placed the orders with the corresponding industrial firms.After the equipment had been delivered and accepted by the testing agencies it was stored in ordnance depots and ordnance branch depots. From these the equipment was distributed to the troops , for example to newly activated units in case of mobilisation.The prompt procurement of tank spare parts by the Odnance Inspectorate also came within the scope of this general task. The spare tank parts lists formed the basis for these requisitions ? Whenever a type of tank was designed the appropriate branch of the Orndnance Inspectorate contacted the manufacturer in charge and dispatched technical officers and technical sergeants to the plant , who immediately began drawing up the spare tank parts lists in collaboration with the designers . the spare tank parts lists were subdivided according to the various parts of the tank: motor , gear, tracks,suspensions, hull, turret, electrical parts,etc .... Since the spare tank parts lists were of great importance for the troops, they had to be made especially clear(numbering,illustrations,etc...) The lists had to be understandeable to an ordinary maintenance man. Great difficulties arose even while the lists were being prepared because of the frequent changes of design in a series during construction. Nevertheless, in most cases it was possible to bring out the spare tank parts lists simultaneously with the completion of the tanks. One of the most difficult tasks was to estimate the number of spare parts necessary for the original issue and subsequent supply , because when designing and constructing a new tank no records were as yet available abou t the relative wear and tear of its parts.An estimate first had to be made in collaboration with the manufacturer of the probable wear and tear(worn parts, defects in material,..). The procurement plans were prepared by the Ordnance Inspectorate in the lighjt of these considerations and in consideration of the number of tanks in the series.After the procurement plans were completed, they were forwarded to the Ordnance Office with the request to place orders for the parts with the industrial firm. From the very begining, the number of spare parts delivered was by no means equal to the actual used.
I Russian AT defenses as encountered in actual combat
II Offensive tactics of german panzer units
How the german army countered
the enemy resistance can best be portrayed by actual examples. One must,
however, differentiate between the time when all branches of the german army
still enjoyed superiority, and the final phase of the war. In the summer of
1943,the offensive towards the north-launched from the Bjelgorod area to
complete the encirclement of Kursk-was carried out under strict observance of
all tactical principles. A major factor was the all-out support rendered by the
Luftwaffe in the form of air reconnaissance. The entire area of the attack was
photographed by low-flying aircraft, and the interpreted photos were distributed
to all commanders for information and study. Aerial reconnaissance was conducted
continuously day and night. Nevertheless, the enemy constructed his defenses
during the night and camouflaged them so well,that it was difficult to detect
them in daytime. The german estimate of the enemy situation was based on radio
interception ,ground reconnaissance ,and information obtained from
deserters. The preparations for the tank attack were facilitated by the use
of aerial photographs. Every battalion commander could study the photographs
with his company commanders for details of the terrain and identified enemy
positions ,and thus determine the possible routes of attack.Liaison officers
from the supporting Luftwaffe units were attached to the Panzer units. These
liaison officers,at the request of the Panzer commanders, could call for stukas
to attack antitank positions. Communication with bombers proved to be difficult,
because the radio equipment was inadequate for communications between tanks and
bombers. The attack was met by stubborn resistance. Led by Tiger tanks, the
Panzer units moved and fought in a wedge formation which had proven itself to
this day. The new heavy Tiger tank proved its worth in this first encounter with
antitank front. The Mark IV tank however, was too weak in this phase of the
attack. It was the smooth coordination of all heavy weapons that mad it possible
to take one position after another. From this and other engagements we
learned the following lesson: tanks must return the fire of the antitankfront
with well directed concentrations. In order to make practical use of this
finding, the formation and tactics were changed. The wedge formation had been
commonly used in the attack. But now tank units were committed in a bell shaped
formation. The most suitable composition of that formation was as follows: the
heavy tanks were in the center; to the left and right and deployed to the rear
in a large arc were the medium tanks, followed by light tanks which were to take
up the pursuit. This formation served the following purpose:1. to lay effective
fire on a wide front;2. to provide sufficient flank protection.
Furthermore,it is absolutely necessary that observers for all heavy weapons
accompany the tanks in the attack ,so that, upon orders of the tank unit
commander, coordinated fires may be quickly and effectively delivered on
identified targets. Radio communications between tank unit commander and the
commander of the bomber unit is necessary and of the greatest importance.
Engineers in armored vehicles must also follow very closely the leading tank
element in order to clear the way through the minefields. Difficulty
developed in supplying the tanks on the field of battle. When tanks are involved
in a major engagement for a period of days, supplies must be delivered to
them. Moreover they have to be supplied quite frequently, since consumption
of gas and ammunition is heavy. In most cases it was impossible to bring up
supplies with the customary truck convoys, because the enemy inflicted too heavy
losses on them. It was always necessary to use armored personnel carriers for
this purpose. The above mentioned and other operations were always successful
when the well prepared enemy defenses were attacked by a force in which all arms
were coordinated to the most minute detail.
New methods based on
previous experience which could no longer be implemented.
During the
final months of the war a decline of German military strength was noticeable.
New methods were sought and found,to carry out the assesigned missions despite
the deficiency. One method employed very successfully,although with reluctance
was the night attack. This type of attack was chosenin order to compensate for
the lack of equipment through the element of surprise. A terrain sector
suitable for this type of operation and, most of all,favourable weather and a
moonlight attack were selected for the execution of the attack.. Prior to the
attack, we managed to give all battalion and company commanders a daylight
briefing by pointing out to them the assembly area and the point selected for
the penetration. The assembly area was occupied during the evening. The noise of
the movement was covered up by artillery fire. The question of how to maintain
direction during the attack created some difficulty. It was the first time that
this method of attack was used,and gyro compasses were not available. Luck
came to our aid in this situation. A road which lead into enemy territory in the
direction of the planned attack was used as a guiding line. The tanks took up
the well tied bell formation along both sides of the road. As for the proper
interval to be maintained, the tanks were to keep within sight of each other.
Engineers were either mounted on the tanks or followed closely in armored
personnel carriers. The objective of this attack was to break through the enemy
defenses during the night in order to reach postions to the rear of the enemy
lines by the early morning hours and thus break the backbone of the enemy
defensive system. The attack was launched at 0200. The night was was suitable
for the operation and offered sufficient visibility. The enemy was taken
completely by surprise,and it was possible to clear lanes through the mine
fields without enemy interference. Enemy tanks which had taken up forward
positions as outposts were destroyed. When the enemy opened fire the tanks
advanced, with all machineguns blazing,and overran the antitankfront. The enemy
fire was aimed too high. Thirty two Attacking tanks destroyed 65
antitankguns without the loss of a single tank. By noon the enemy bridgehead was
eliminated. In the last months of the war all tank attacks were successful,if
spirited engineers and infantry followed the tanks in order to remove
obstacles.
Summary
Combat experience proves that largescale tank
attacks are successful if the following principles are applied:
A.
Thourough use of all reconnaissance methods on the ground and in the air B.
The tank unit designated to achieve the breakthrough must be supported to the
greatest possible extent by heavy tanks at the point of the main effort.The fire
concentrations of the tanks must be swift and effective. Tanks must constantly
be kept in motion. C. Observers of all heavy weapons supporting the attack
must accompany the leading tank elements,in order to direct effective fire
rapidly, whenever called for.Radio communication between the tank unit commander
and the bombers must be available. Tanks and airplanes crews see the terrain in
a different perspective. D. Engineers,mounted on armored vehicles,are to
follow the tanks. E. The tank unit that achieved the intitial break-through
must be followed by light tank units,so that the success can be fully
exploitedin depth. F. On the field of battle tanks must be supplied by
armored vehicles. G. Tanks must be equipped with smoke shells to blind the
antitank crews,and with coloured smoke shells to enable unit commanders to mark
the direction of fire. H. Tanks must be equipped with night sighting
devices(infrared rays)for night actions.
If all these principles are
adhered to,every attack cannot but be successful"
The whole deep battle concept betrays that it has
been written by an officer belonging to an army that is convinced it will have
the numbers on its side. In the abscence of a serious numerical superiority,
setting up a three echeloned attack force on a sufficient length of front will
only be possible by creating serious weakness elsewhere which will allow the
defender to either shift forces without risk before or after the attack to the
threatenend sector or even attack the enemy weakness and turn the tables on him.
There is no guarantee in this situation of breaking through an enemy front and
even less of defeating the opposing mobile forces. In addition, there is no
need for three echelons. If there is weakness, the mobile forces can do the
breakthrough and everything that follows themselves. Even when opposed by
strong defenses armor commanders can still decide to have the mobile forces do
the breakthrough on a very small front as passing over infantrydivisons is too
slow. THat the german army did not have a doctrinal answer to deep battle is
a theory without merit as the first prerequisite to defeat it would have been
not to be seriously outnumbered. In the situation as it was, limiting the
damage by slowing the red army and bleeding it was the only possibility. In
order to do this no new doctrine had to invented. In the 20 s and the 30 s, all
the operational thinking of the german army was about situations where it was
seriously outnumbered. Mansteins proposals to Hitler in 1943 were in sync with
this. Where the conduct of the defense at the tactical level is concerned,
nothing new had to be invented either. Zone defense had already been applied in
ww1. Not that this meant more than slowing an attack down in the existing
conditions in 1943-1945. But it was better than what Hitler imposed on his
commanders.
P 082
Against the incessant russian attacks along the entire front throughout the year , the field forces almost invariably were given the same order: tactical and strategical defense without taking into consideration the situation of the adjacent front. In that way we intended to bring about position warfare-although we lacked improved defensive positions- and tried to wear down the enemy with purely defensive tactics. However, in spite of all efforts, the front did not become stabilized, and although all orders called for defense , loss of ground continued to be unavoidable; the enemy forced us to make extensive withdrawals. In retrospect this procedure was called elastic defense. The fact that the withdrawals were effected under pressure and in most cases too late, and, not having been planned, resulted in a considerable loss of equipment, filled the troops with a feeling of bitterness, and all the more so, since each time they broke out of an encirclement. The lowered combat efficiency became apparent in the subsequent battles , and the execution of defensive operations became more and more difficult in view of the weakened units.
Even isolated counterattacks did not change the situation. To be sure, they were frequently successful , owing to the fact that after each penetration or breakthrough, the enemy found himself in open terrain and without artillery support, and was inferior to us, as usual. However, in view of our policy of rigid defense, the superior number of attacking forces dictated time and place of commitment of our available strategic reserves , with the result that we could not gain the initiative; our forces were constantly tied down in the frontlines and had no chance to disengage in time , in order to prepare counterattacks. If we had withdrawn in time from areas which subsequently were
lost anyhow, we might have been able to make available large forces in good condition to regain lost ground and at the same time destroy the enemy forces.
The overall result of defensive tactics were the following : considerable loss of ground, heavy casualties, large losses of equipment and overtaxing of the troops. On the other hand, we gained time , decimated the enemy , and maintained a continuous front. The Russians had not succeeded in achieving any strategic breakthrough in spite of gaining a large amount of territory; the final decision which they were obviously trying to bring about at any cost in 1943, had been postponed.
Thus, defensive tactics had not produced any better results than delaying tactics; the same results could have been attained at a lower cost if delaying tactics had been planned carefully.
2.Reason for the failure of defensive tactics
a. Superiority of Russian artillery and their heavy concentrations on our inadequate positions ;
b. Our numerical inferiority, lack of reserves, inability to echelon our forces in depth, and overtaxing of the troops because of lack of replacements;
c. In sufficient artillery and ammunition;
d. The fact that the rigid, dogmatic orders, issued to the entire eastern front , called for defensive tactics without taking into consideration local condition or the time element; frequently these orders could not be executed owing to insufficient combat strength , weapons and ammunition, and the inadequacy of fortified positions; such orders were rescinded too late or not at all, which finally
undermined not only the authority of the order but also the confidence which the troops placed in their commanders.
3. The enemy
The enemy attacked incessantly, without any marked main effort but with rapidly changing objectives along a wide front. It would seem to be the aim of the Russians to prevent development of position warfare, to interfere with any stabilization of our front through constant spoiling attacks, and to contain our forces to prevent a balance of strength. If instead they had endeavored to achieve a strategic breakthrough , they would have needed a large scale concentration of forces; no doubt they could have successfully achieved such a concentration.
Our defensive tactics and our tactics were of advantage to the enemys strongest and most effective weapon, his artillery.
Time and again, our forces , withdrawing for short distances only, had to organize their defenses hastily. That enabled the enemy to advance quickly , and to move his supplies and communications speedily. He did not have to operate in open terrain, hampered by inadequate communications, his greatest weakness. Despite his considerable advance , he had thus avoided the danger of stretching his lines too far from the base of operations, a danger which generally threatens the success of any offensive.
The enemy will keep on using the same tactics and continue his incessant attacks along the whole front. It remains to be seen whether he will in the future concentrate his forces to a greater extent than heretofore and perhaps develop marked strategic concentrations.
Most likely, the enemy will continue his tactic of launching spoiling attacks on a wide front because he will be aware of the fact that he is at a disadvantage in mobile warfare after a breakthrough. The numerically supperior enemy can endure the wear and tear of combat longer than we can; no doubt that will make it possible for him to continue lauching numerous attacks simultaneously on a wide front.The russians are not pressed for time and need not mmake any daring decisions. if they are consistently victorious they will be able to calculate when the time for the final blow has arrived. The russians will continue to rely on their artillery and will make their plans accordingly. In the future their air superiority will become an additional factor. We will play into the enemy's hand if we continue to use defensive tactics and expose our forces to his numerical superiority and his artillery, without seeking an opportunity to engage him ijn mobile warfare, his greatest weakness.
Anyway, the 3rd Panzer Army had to look forward to confronting the enemy pincer attack with the available forces, of which half were fixed unwantedly in the Vitebsk bend. According to the opinion of the Pzn AOK from this resulted the necessity , to give up the sticking out bend and while abandoning Vitebsk retreat in atimely fashion in the Tiger position. Through this the front of the Panzer Army ,while taking into account the many lakes, would be shortened by around 70 km in the new position. The widt of the divisional sectors which resulted from this would have made possible the making available of one to two divisions as Army reserve , the taking out of sufficient infantry reserves to feed the defensive battle, a doubling of the artillery defensive power and the antitankdefense and any necessary concentration in the defense.
......In this position it was the firm conviction of the Panzer AOK, that the 3.Panzer Army would have been able to see through the defensive battle for a longer time without outside help. At least one can suppose that the soviets would not have broken through the Tiger position , as was succeeded on 22 june on both sides of Witebsk. Therefore, time would have been gained. And the high command could also have convinced itself , that the judgment of the Pz AOK about enemy strength and objectives was correct. In timely fashion reinforcements could have been supplied to the Panzer Army. Though it is true that it would have been more correct to make available from the beginning for the defense in the Tiger position a fuly mobile reserve, therefore a mot. or Panzer division, because only with such one could operate successfully against a broken through mobile enemy. In the to be defended Tiger position all advantages were on the side of the Panzer Army. As a very favorable defensive position in almost its entire length by its natural position it leaned against many long lakes and the Düna. In months long labour this position had been built up. It was only twothirds of the length of the Vitebsk bend , practically however considerably much shorter because of the many lakes in the front. A pulling back of the front in this position on 21 june , the day before the firmly expected major attack, would have messed up all preparations of the soviets. It would have been achieved that the image the enemy would have had about the situation of the front would not be correct anymore at the monent when he advanced to attack. The soviets would not only have had to redisposition artillery and infantry, which in itsself would have postponed the attack on the Tiger position by several days and would have have shaped the the general attack plan in a non unified fashion. They would aslo have had to go over to a different attack method in view of the chain of lakes and the Düna in front of their new front.Finally, in thier attack against our rear guards in the old position, they would have strongly exposed themselves. All this would maybe after all have made the high command think about what was to be expected from the enemy.
