Aus einem Soldatenleben pp291-292
' But if one wanted to create a general staff of the Wehrmacht one would have to make the commander in chief of the army a sort of generalinspector and put the command of the groundforces in the hands of the general chief of staff of the Wehrmacht. Under the existing conditions for Germany , Wehrmacht and armycommand could not be separated because such a separation leads to the interfering into the business of the other without taking responsabilities.
.........
Even today I am convinced that my proposal was the practically best solution in the conditions existing for the Reich in the second world war.Anyway, it was unfortunately shown that the command of the Wehrmacht did not satisfy its mission. Though one could not foresee that Hitler would make the grotesque attempt to combine the tasks of Head of State,Minister of Defence(Keitel represented only an executive organ)commander in chief of the Wehrmacht and Army in one hand. Even a man with the unlimited fullness of power of a dictator had to falter on this concentration of attributions . Apart from the fact that he - in the abscence of operational ability -was not prepared to follow his military advisors. The next to one another of Wehrmacht command staff and general staff of the army has in addition to that in consequence of the separation of OKW and You make a bold assertion wArmy theatres led to a fatal dissipation of forces and an unavoidable collision of both organisations. This would also have happened if the OKW had not been pushed away by Hitler in the role of a Secretariat ,which only had to transform the expressions of his will into orders.'
Fragment from a conversation between the Chief of Armygroup North and Zeitzler in january 1944 (Heusinger P295-296)
Chief of AGN : Does the Führer at least not see that it had been better that he would have listened mor to your proposals concerning the operational decisions of the last year and a half.
Chief of the general staff : He invents all possible justifications in hindsight to justify his decisions. So he alleges today that ,if he had not held Stalingrad, the Kaukasus army would have been lost. Or for example,the attack against Kursk had decisively weakened the Russian summer offensive. You cannot get through to him.Now I fight for the vacating of the Crimea and the Dnjepr bridghead Nikopol. He does not want to give up the Crimea because of Turkey,Nikopol because of the ore. I fight with for the giving up of the Tcherkassy bridghead. He wants to set up an attack from there to regain Kiev. Time and time again I ask for the setting up of rearward defenslines.He beleives it will break the willt to resist of the troops. I point out the overlong frontsectors of the divisions. He recklesly pretends that they were not shorter in the west in 1915/1917. And when I refute that with documents, he throws them wordlesly on the table. With your Army Group it was first the Finland,soon the loss of prestige at giving up the Leningrad front,the significance of the oilslate of Narwa for the U Boats which he invoked for his decision to stay.
Chief of AGN : That is to despair.
Chief of the general staff: Even that would not be bad if one could discern a global planning of the war effort. But there nothing to be seen from that. We fight in Russia,in Italy, soon in the west,-on the seas and in the far east,without putting the different theatres unsder a general line,without strategic plan. We fight now here, now there,but without coherence. Nobody feels respnsible for global planning. In a year everything will be over.Believe me ! I am starting to give up.
Now I fight desperately for an improvement ,but I can not do this for long anymore.
Chief of AGN : Wo should do it then? Then everything will sink into chaos. No, you should stay as long as something can be saved.
Chief of the general staff: I told the same thing to Heusinger when he did not want anymore a few weeks ago. But the time will come when I cannot give away my honest name anymore.
Conversation between Heusinger and the chiefs of staff of the Army Groups in june 1943 (Befehl im Widerstreit 256-257)
Chief of the operations section: The war stands for us under the sign of lack of forces. Over time we cannot defend the area we gained. But Hitler believes he does not need to give up anything,be it from reasons of war economy,political or military. And,no doubt he will also fight to the last for Italy because of Mussolini.
Chief of AGC : Then he must draw the consequences in the east. With such a depletion of forces we cannot stay put in a winding front. Hitler has to seee that. We have proven by the BÜffel movement that shortening the front can be successfull.
Chief of the operations section: Certainly,but he will not admit it openly. He thinks he can shorten the front by the attack at Kursk and the shortening of the Kursk bend.
Chief of AGS : But is it not already too late for this attack.
Chief of the operations section: I fear this too. Until the 10th june I was in favour of it. Now the risk seems too high for me. I would prefer the to operate from the backhand. Hitler also does not feel at ease. But the fieldmarshalls did not field any more serious reservations. -Zeitzler had warned . We cannot wage these internal struggles alone.
Chief of AGC: Which fights do you mean?
Chief of the operations section : Especially the one about the organistion of the top. Hitler must create a commander in chief East. That is the minimum requirement. Zeitzler has already done preliminary work but without support he cannot carry it through. Do me a favour and push your commanders in chiefs to do something before it is too late.
Chief of AGS : Hitler lets them speak. He almost drives over them.
Chief of the operations section: As long as the fieldmarshalls allow it. It is time they show their teeth and threaten to resign.
Chief of AGN : That does not help. Then more willi,ng men will take their place.
Chief of the operation section: Unfortunately you are right. In spite it seems important to me to make clear to the Führer that Fieldmarshalls are not corporals. We have to wait for a favourable opportunity. I will give you a sign. I hope that we chiefs continue to collaborate as closely as possible.
Chief of AGC : About that you certainly cannot complain. What we arrange with you underhand must of course not be known to anybody.
Chief of the operations section: I thank you for that. It is not possible any other way. Hitler hates the general staff since the time of Beck because he holds for politically untrustworthy. Schmundt wants to strengthen the role of the adjudants to create a counterweight against us. But Zeitzler still resists this.'
Again discussions limited to days and hours which in addition came much too late and at which both sides also played with hidden cards, should replace the carefull preliminary work of a common staff which was still lacking. The foundations as well as the result of the discussion -which was only attended by Jodl from the Wehrmachtführungsstab- where in this case also especially burdened by the fact that the Italians put the taking of Malta above all other objectives whithout however being prepared for this alone with it its own forces or only at a given point in time ,while on the german side one did not even agree in the own camp: Rommel urged-without knowing how it stood with Malta-on the renewing of the offensive to the Suez Canal because otherwise an english attack would forestall him; Kesselring thought that one could,yes must take Malta by surprise together with the running out of the air offensive; Hitler finally,who as earlier , so also now did not want to believe in the success of a landing on Malta,tended much more towards the attack towards Egypt for that reason. Maybe becoming temporarily undecided , or maybe for apprearances sake , he agreed to a compromise proposal which planned to stop Rommel's army at the latest at the Libyan-Egyptian border to be prepared for the landing on Malta around mid july,at the latest mid august, in both months at full moon.
Already ten days later,soon after the 10th may when Kesselring reported his mission of destructing the island installations as accomplished, Hitler gave Göring the free hand to transfer parts of Luftflotte 2 to the east , and declared besides that one had to take into account the possibility of the transfer of further air assets wheN there was the slightest noticeable danger in the west or Norway.
These and repeated other 'very sceptical' utterances about his own decision, made a definitive clearing of the issue seem the more urgent to the Wehrmachtführungsstab- only three weeks after the arrangment with the italians-as meanwhile the selected german assault troops with the corresponding assault means were pulled together on Sicily.
As frequent in case of such indecisiveness, Hitler at first only decided to get General der Flieger Student, experienced in airdrop operations, to the headquarters in East Prussia for an oral report. In his presentation on 21 may Student showed himself firmly convinced of a success and was unreservedly supported by the chief of the general staff of the Luftwaffe Jeschonnek,although the disapproving attitude of Göring could not be unknown to them.
The Kriegsmarine and the german and italian offices in Rome-where meanwhile a Malta staff manned by both allies,a first in the war, had had gone to work- urged in the same direction.
All that did not hinder Hitler, still in the presence of Student and highly infuriated by the opinions which went against him,to throw awy all plans and arrangement unceremoniously.
For Jodl, who had had maintained a deliberate restrained attitude until then, it was because of this too late, at least to have the for and against examined again in his staff, let alone that the Italians would be heard or even informed before this decision which was most important for their Mediterranean theatre. Without further examination,Hitler brought only forward as new argument that later when Rommel was at the Libuan-Egyptian border, the logistic support could be conducted past Malta to Tobruk; therefore one did not need Malta and the assaultlanding should-for the deception of the Italians-only be prepared mentally.
With this OKW order of 4 may which had been issued subsequent to the arrangement with the Italians at Berchtesgaden, became invalid in its essential parts, although the preparations, also to deceive the Italians,were continued.
In opposition to the dynamic striving of the german command which kept looping far to the Middle East after the intial successes in the east and the south, Rome insisted on its demand , at first to thoroughly secure the base in the Mediterranean and with this simultaneously the Italian colonial empire. In the area of the local command, these contrasts worked further, because the Italians were,after the earlier experiences ,not prepared seek to success once again in unlimited storming forward as long as the logistics were not secured. In the german headquarters on the other hand one trusted firmly that with the supposed routing of the british 8 th army, the tactical conditions were given for a successfull advance into Egypt.
One also considered the logistics better secured as ever before, when Rommel declared that he could base his support for the general needs of the troops on the big british supply dumps , for ammunition and fuel on the near port of Tobruk, for the whole transport over land on the high numbers of captured trucks and besides that on the small railroad into Egypt.
If one got to Alexandria and the Suez Canal , driven the same way by success as before, then Malta would, lonely behind the front , fast lose its former importance.
On the other side, the Italians were in no way prepared for the jump to take away the island. The preparations were far advanced, Mussolini wrote on 21st june, however demanded simultaneously not less than 70000 tons of fuel for the collaboration of the Italian navy. Already alone for that reason, not taking into account the interference by the enemy ,especially the airforce on Malta again stronly reinforced by flying over from aircraftcarriers, it had to be highly doubtfull, even excluded that the best, but also last time which the Italian high command now wanted to see in August could really be used. But otherwise,so Mussolini's letter declared, one must wait for the assaultlanding until next spring.
The comparison of the given possibilities shows in full clarity that the command of the Axis powers in those late days of june 1942 did not have to choose between Malta and Suez but only between the halting or moving forward of Rommel's army. However, halting meant , also when one put the objectives less far forward, the giving up of the full exploitation of the victory and thereby a gross violation of one of the most important foundations of german tactics. By this one would give freedom of action back to the enemy and lose the intiative oneself sooner or later. It should by the way not be saying too much, that the german commander who already twice, in the spring of 1941 and in january 1942 , had enlarged a probing attack in a fully fledged offensive, would also in this situation and in the exhiliration of victory , no matter what order reached him, alone out of himself have found ways to push through his will. Actually Rommel, who could not act differently,had already early on the 22nd june, ordered the continued pursuit to Side Barrani , 90 km beyond the Libyan-Egyptian border. Mussolini now showed himself extremely worried for the first time that 'one would not know how to exploit the success to the utmost' and seemed more and more inclined to put his confidence more in Rommel than the own advisers. Hitler's answering letter therefore hit open doors, to become the last cause for the Commando Supremo, to give up further resistance . Even strengthened by intercepted US reports from Cairo on the strong prospects of Rommel and by radio messages from the interned french warships in Alexandria to their Admiralty, according to which the clearing of the harbour by the british was imminent, the Italian Hig Command from 23rd june on, gave in quick succession its new orders for the pursuit against the Suez Cana.
An excerpt from Befehl im Widerstreit, Heusinger Rain Wundelich Verlag 1950 PP 81-83
