That the fullfilling of the duty towards the state, also in its new form cannot be equated to an approval out of inner conviction of the democratic and republican idea ,should be understandeable. The officers and at least the oldest soldiers came from the army and navy of the Empire . The ties to the past were too strong, that  they could fully change overnight . From the republican minded elements no army could have been build which would be prepared and capable to defnd the Republic against its enemies. ...
Before all the republic could not be served by officers who were prepared to change their conviction like a shirt . It had to be left to time to enable the gradual transition from loyalty from a feeling of duty, to the one which came from inner conviction. ...
It was only regrettable that the parties that supported the republic in the first place did not understand how to level the  road from the loyalty out of a feeling of duty to one out of inner conviction. Even when men like President Ebert and Richswehrministers Noske and Gessler recognized the loyalty and dutyfull work of the soldiers and protected them, even when several prime ministers recognized the miltary neecssities, this was not enough. In the parties that supported the Republic , a mistrust predominated which was not justified, even when some faux pas in the military area offered a pretext. Distrust is the last thing with which a state whatever its form, can gain its army for itself. Who needs the soldier as defender of the fatherland and as protection of the authority of the state, should not consider him as a 'necessary evil'. It was unfortunately indisputable that the Richswehr could only find real understanding for its interests at  first at the parties right from the center which again brought in the reproach of disloyalty to the Republic. 

A quote from Seeckt:"
Whether we like the actual form of the state or not  ,whether we think it is the right one, that is not important. Today it is about the state itself. The dangers that threathen him are great from the interior and exterior. ....
Personal feelings must now be subordinated to the battle  against the enemy , the personal opinion must subordinate itself  to the great idea of the saving of the fatherland from the downfall."
And one from Manstein, both from 'Aus einem Soldatenleben'.
"The Reichswehr had conserved from the past the prussian idea of  'serving', which today seems too much to have made place in large circles for one of the 'earning'. With this we come to the essence what is to be said about its position in the Weimar Republic. The individual may hang to the past, the notion of 'service to the Reich' was for him and for the whole what was decisive. With this attitude the Reichswehr won gradually ,if not the favour of certain parties,  the respect and the confidence of the people ...The Reichswehr was not a foreign body in the people, nor a state in the state .It wanted to be the shield of the Reich in the service of the people. .  

 

60 -

a quote from 'Aus einem Soldatenleben', Manstein Athäneum Verlag 1958 pp127-129
/
'Under the leading minds of the generalship and the general staff, which I got to know and judge this way, I would particularly like to mention as an outstanding figure later chief of the general staff Beck,. Not that that he came forward as such immediately in his outer appearance. His great modesty which penetrated his whole being and made him put hin person behind the cause ,  was a hindrance to this. This quality,as at all the honesty of his character were paired with great operational ability , an unerring clearness of judgment, a sense of duty which never failed and a varied education. In all this he reminded his great predecessor , FM Graf Moltke, whom the general staff thanks its reputation in the whole world.
As him, Beck was certainly not how one imagined a shining soldier. He did not have the carefreeness with which the later chief of the Heeresleiting Generaloberst v. Fritsch won the heart of the troops.  As Moltke, Beck personified a type of highly intellectual  scholar, more than that of a soldier. His decisions were not based upon -as with the then chief of the Heerezsleitung v.Hammerstein- what Napoleon called the coup d'oeuil. He did not make off the cuff decisions. He examined the for and against exactly, before a decision was made and could not be seduced by wishfullthinking.
Many have scolded him as a ditherer and it was feared he would be a Fabius Cunctator in war. It has been reproached that he was against technical development or did not  have enough understanding towards it and particularly hindred the development of the tank weapon.
Yes, he frequently poured water in the wine of stormy innovators. But this was done out of a sense of responsability, from the Moltke principle "first examine, then dare", not that he would in any way have been backward.
If Beck had a fault, then it was was this, that his high sense of duty lead him to personally examine or weigh each question thoroughly. So he, who was an excellent teacher for the general staff , could during the travels, not even dismiss out of hand the most erroneous decisions. His sense of justice and his fairness moved him mostly to even then discuss the fore and against. This trait had as a disadvantage that he far overtaxed his capacaty for work.
It has not been given to general Beck-as his great predecessor-with whom he had so much in common, to give the proof of his generalship. But I have no doubt that Beck-on the condition that he had to do with a head of state or commander in chief who was accessible for his counsel- would also have withstood the test of the fieldcommander. Certainly, he had always put the thinking beforec the daring .But , after all in him glowed the godly spark of boldness; nobody would have more consistently exec uted a decision once taken-nonwithstanding all frictions and coincidences,which war brings- than Beck,because he would beforehand have considered all possibilities with a clear mind.
As a human being,General Beck was one of the most noble appearances. That, just because of this,he would have been inferior to a brutal person like Hitler, is understandeable.' 

While Mussolini returned to Rome from his waiting position near Derna on the 20th july and Chirchill could state on the next day that Egypt was out of danger, the german commander began, with the same emphasis which he used only a month before for the continuance of the offensive, now to urge  breaking off the battle and retrezat in the position on the border. Rommel felt the reversal of the situation so strongly that he even took into account for the first time the loss of the whole of Italian North Africa if his proposals were refused and substantial reinforcements did not arrive. 
His proposals met with the firm refusal of the german and almost even more of the Italian high command . Both were unwaveringly confident to conserve the intiative and to reach the objectives in a new attempt, when only first the necessary reinforcements had arrived. In the abscence of other possibilities the Commmando Supremo and OKW had decided together at the end of july that in the first place the forces assembled against Malta would be sent as fast as ppossible to Egypt.
The operation staff Malta already on 7th july been instructed by Cavallero to put aside the attackplans against the island and instead  prepare a crossing to Tunis.
The Commando Supremo now feared , after the pursuit into Egypt had stalled, even more than before it started that the british could start a landing operation in  French North Africa and from there advance into Tripolitania .The last prospect to take away Malta was hereby done away with 
In concordance with the orders meanwhile received from the Commando Supremo, at the end of july Rommel also showed himself  convinced of the necessity to r
resume the offensive shortly  , during a visit by the author on his commandpost 12-15km westly of El Alamein,   There was no talk of retreat anymore. 

Siegfried Westphal Erinnerungen Hase & Koehler 1975 pp 159-1960

Mid april  Rommel proposed, in a memorandum to the OKW, to take Malta in order the create preconditions for better securing the supply over sea. Thereupon he wanted to proceed to the attack against Tobruk. Whether after the fall off the fortress, the attack should be continued into Egypt ,would depend on the situation that would occur. We expected a new British offensive from the beginning of june. To forestall this, the Panzergroup had to attack end may.Consequently ,the attack on Malta had to happen early enough so that a rearranging of Luftflotte 2  from the target Malta to the objective Tobrouk could be realised. If the preparations for the on Malta could not be finished in time, then it was bearable to attack Tobruk first. But Malta had to be taken immediately afterwards.
Temporarily Rommel hesitated to decide on the attack on Tobruk on the end of may. Actually all-including General Gause-advised him to wait untill the fall. In the blazing heat of the African summer the british would not attack, in september we would be better off from the viewpoint of logistics and forces. The only supporter of a possible early attack was I. Rommel was undecided which happened seldomly with him. Then the alllies unexpectedly decided him. An emissary of Bastico, his chief of staff Count Barbasetti arrived. His beard was an honour to his name. With a torrent of words he tried to convince Rommel of the inpracticability of a summer offensive. He brought forward the same arguments as the german supporters. However, he made a psychological error when he said it was 'irresponsible' to proceed already to the attack on Tobruk. That was too much for Rommel. To suppose irresponsability in him who was consumed day and night in the fight for the holding of  Libya , went too far. This visit decided the issue. His sense of contradiction had been called out.
Hitler did not have much confidence in the success of an attack on Malta, in which besides parts of Luftflotte 2 german and Italian paratroups would have the decisive role. Even so, he and Mussolini approved this intention. From the beginning of april to middle may geram bombers attacked the island almost daily with strong forces. Soon it turned out that the preparations for the Malta venture could not be ended before june. The attack on Tobruk therefore got priority.
When after the taking of Tobruk our main forces had reached the Egyptian border, the german airforce would turn on the objective Malta because it could only support one operation effectively.

11-01-2011 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann