Horst grossmann(CG of 6. Infanteriedivision) writes the following about Model:(Rshew Eckfpfeiler der Ostfront p 36-37 ,Podziun Pallas)'A word about the new commander of the 9th army General Model.He looked small but wiry.His slim head was covered by blackgray hair.From his clear,in spite of the eyeglass,free and good blue eyes one could infer a good heart.The determined trait around the mouth and the distinctive chin showed a hard will.The quick ,short but elegant movements of his hands showed an impulsive rousing temper.The admirable way of speaking to his troops gave him the love and the confidence of the fighter at the front.With sympathy he lay beside the worndown soldier smeared with loam and listened to his needs and concerns,also about the family at home.His never resting care was aimed at the wellbeing of the soldier.From them he had to ask the utmost in the heavy fighting at the front.In the Storch,the car,on a sledge,on skis,on horseback or on foot.he visited the troops.His physical and mental agility was unique.There was no critical point where he did not appear at the decisive hour.He risked his own person ruthlessly and hereby he gave a shinig example.He was more in his HQ than at the front.' The tearing apart of units was practiced all the time by Model.It started with his taking over of command of the 9th army and took place at the level of the division and the regiment.The objective was always to bring the necessary reinforcements to the centers of gravity when insufficient reserves were available.Reichhelm names as an example the taking away of the machinegun companies of one regiment in favour of another one and the moving of whole regiments from one division to another.Operationally this allowed Model to achieve defensive victories all the time,which would not have been possible otherwise,but at the same time created a demoralising effect on the troops which felt connected to their unit and under the affected commanders there was more and more an attitude of refusal.Model was not alone in this method.Guderian described von Kluge as a master in the tearing apart of units.The question was wether othter means were available.The negative consequences of this approach were clear to Model and he repeatedly tried to limit it.In annexe 7 to the detailed principles of combat for Heeresgruppe Northukraine from 8 april 1944 one reads the following 'During long defensive battles the commander must decide on big solutions.It is always to aim at gradually exchanging a full division for a weakened one instead of throwing into battle splinters of several divisions who lack the natural support of their division.Never may units under regimental strenghth be taken out of them and thrown into battle as reserves'.[81]
Model and Rommel were in the same category of great german commanders so I will maintain that I will not choose one over the other.They fought in different circonstances and that determined the way they fought.Model was not inherently a defensive commander and was not against mobile warfare.The circonstances(among them terrain)did never allow him to do the big mobile operations. Model did the best he could within the framework of Hitler's orders.He had to try to defend a line as long as possible but had the common sense to give it up in time with or without Hitler's authorisation..This was hard on the subordinate commanders who would have preferred a more ordered retreat but the fiction of the fixed defense had to be maintained even if in practice there was no question of it anymore.In his book 'Mittlere Ostfront Juni 1944' Niepold calls this 'defense limited in time';you defend as long as you can but retreat to avoid breakthrough or destruction.Model excelled at this. As Model was not afraid to disregard Hitler's orders he did better than some other more meek commanders would have done in the same circonstances and even Manstein was among those. Tanks are there to do counterattacks and that includes the tigers even with their restrictions.These counterattacks must however only be launched against enemy weakness.Tanks are not to be wasted by using them in pennypackets behind the infantry.The use of Tigers in small numbers behind the infantry was borne out of necessity but a mistake also because infantry commanders were in many cases not capable of properly using them.The antitankweapons are there to block the enemy.Tanks are only to be used in an antitankrole when it is unavoidable in an emergency. Models brother thinks that he decided to become an officer only at the end of his studies.In the middle class society of thet time becoming an officer was 'a la mode'.Models parents knew a number of officers.Among his schoolmates were numerous sons of officers.Three days after finishing school,Model entered Infanterie-regiment 52 as a Fahnenjunker.Basic training was very unpleasant for Model and he considered to change direction and study medicine.It seems one of his sergeants told him:'I do not know whether this profession is right for you.You lack the hardness to be a soldier'.[3] In 1938, the year he became a major general (Generalmajor), he lead a testfiring of the Mörser 18 on mocked-up Czech fortifications which did not impress Hitler.[7] As other army officers at the time he was a supporter of the Nationalsocialist government; his time in Berlin also brought him into contact with senior members of the Nazi regime.Closer relationships with Goebbels and Speer developed during the war.[8]
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. If Hitler had not intervened in the dispute between the panzrcommanders and von Rundstedt concerning the decision to stop on the Aa he would have had zero responsability in the matter.But he did so he shares the blame with von Rundstedt. The diversion of efort during Barbarossa was Hitler's idea and the OKH was probably right when it defended the position that the taking of strategically important areas presupposes the defeat of the red army.An advance towards Moscow was the means to put the mass of the red army to battle and defeat it.Without the divergence of opinion betwen Hitler and the OKH a better result could probably have been obtained even if mannstein is probably right when he states that the plan should have taken into account the possibility to aim at the destruction of the ed army in two campaigns in view of the ratio of forces and the large theatre of operations. Even if some in the OKH were(understandably)overoptimistic about the chances of an attack against the USSR ,the decision to attack the USSR was a political decsion made by Hitler for which he is 100% responsible whatever one thinks about his decision..
Hitler was only criticized for his decisions and those were many.He made all strategic decisions and from a certain point intervened in small operational details. I maintain that the optimism of Hitler and the OKH concerning the attack on the USSR was understandable in the circonstances.I therefore reproach that to neither because I do not judge in hindsight. Follows an interesting quote about Hitler from 'Heer in Fesseln ,Siegfried Westphal 1950':"....Instead of timely giving up terrain that clould not be held he decided the appoval of such actions-if at all-in almost all cases too late.So,again and again irreplacable losses occurred which avenged themselves bythe burning out of the troops and the ulterior breakdown of whole fronts. Over all decisions and measures of the command from the fall of 1942 seemed to stand the motto'too late'.Directives that would have shown a longterm planning,were not given.Instead the activity concentrated more and more on controlling and bossing around the command of the front in all details.The priciple only to give missions to subordinate commanders,to order them what their missions was,had been thrown overboard long time ago.Hereby the autonomy of the subordinate commanders which had been maintained for many decades ,had been eliminated.There was almost nothing anymore in the area of troopcommand in which the OKW did not intervene on the orders of Hitler.Every day he wanted to know many details which could have no importance for his reflections and decisions. Operations and therefore the taking back of the initiative which was lost because of the enforced defense were given up.Because the forces were lacking to open an operation by attack this had to be started from a rearward movement,when that could be decided.But such suggestions put the commander in chief in a rage"generals always want to operate.They shoudl stay where they are and nothing more.",was his favorite answer.Because of the depth of the occupied russian area ,the temporary giving up of a lage area did not play a role.Only in a war of movement could one show the art of command to its best advantage. Besides the bravery of the german soldier it was the only pluspoint to compensate in some way the numerical and material superiority.The operation was above all the only chance to achieve what had to be achieved,that is defeating strong forces of the enemy.All such proposals were rejected.The exhausted and for years overextended troops had to cling on the ground once gained and robbed of its last valuable substance not tot be surroundd and destroyed. So the concept of the high command under Hitler was characterized by excessivity and stubborness.Strategic principles ,experiences which had lead the german army formerly and at the beginnening of worldwar 2 to great successes,were ignored.The laming of the initiative of the high command coincides with the moment where Hitler snatched it to himself in all details.Like Napoleon he became the victim ofhis own success."
On balance,shortening the front benefits the one whose front is largely overextended and has insufficient depth and insifficient reserves because of that. After Overlord there came a point when the front could not be held anymore and a retreat is then preferrable to being broken through and surrounded,even if the endresult of that retreat is a longer line.
The 12th ss panzerdivision attacked piecemeal because its units did not arrive at the same time and waiting was not an option.The concentrated trust by Panzerlehr,Hitlerjugend and 21rst panzer did not happen for the same reason.Again there is no basis in fact to level reproaches at the Hitlerjugend division. Allied air superiority ws a serious problem when moving the panzerdivisions.
The splitting up of units was continually practiced by Model and took place on the regimental and divisional level.The objective was always to give necessary reinforcements to the centers of gravity,when no reserves were available.From an operational viewpoint this allowed Model to achieve defensive successes,which would not have been possible otherwise.According to Newton the sending of theatre or operational reserves into the line where the fighting was toughest, was meant to preserve the units Model saw as organic to his own command.
The flexibility of german leadership had everything to do with the delegation of authority to the lowest level.Officers and NCO's had to be able to act independently ,without or even against orders.This is the socalled Aufragstaktik.It was never teached.It was something which developed in practice from the time of the prussian army.General dr Franz Uhle -Wettler gives an interesting explanation of it in his book "Höhe und Wendepunkte deutscher Militärgeschichte von Leuthen bis Stalingrad(chaptor on the battle of Crete,pp334-344),Ares Verlag 2006 . Bravery is not enough for an army.It has to be made effective by tactics and initiative. However,Auftragstaktik is not the only key to succes and cannot be applied in the same way in every situation.General Niepold makes the following statement in his book Mittlere Ostfront Juni 44 p 256:'Obviously,for a heavy breakthrough operation or in the defense many details must be ordered so that only only the freedom in the way the order is executed, remains.One can therefore say:The freer the area of operations and the weaker the enemy resistance ,the freer the Auftragstaktik can be; the stronger the enemy and the smaller the scope of action,the more the auftragstaktik will have to move out of the way for the binding order .'
As war progressed the qualitative edge of the german army was eroded and then the steadily worsening numbers make the difference. From 1943 on the german army lost the initiative on the eastern front and from then it had to undergo events which is a major disadvantage.Hitler's stifling of the flexibility which was a strength of the german army made it even easier for its enemiesThe red army was never better than the german army. There were still areas where the german army had a qualitative edge but enough to compensate the steadily worsening odds. Anybody that thinks he could do better than the german army given the odds and the framework of Hitler's ideas on defense can always try. This statement about blaming Hitler for everything is repeated over and over again without any substance ever been given.Anybody that states this has to say which general in which book on which page.Should be simple..Accusations of falsification of records also have to supported by proof.'Siurvving members of the german genral staff'?Who were those?What did they specifically do? The rusian juggernaut is not a myth.It is simple fact.It is rather funny that Richard S talks like Hitler because he never believed in the russsian juggernaut either.Intelligence assesments about russian strength were waved away.In the abscence of a superiority in numbers which got larger and larger,the red army could not have obtained the successes it had from the summer of 1943 onwards because it had no qualititve superiority.Stalingrad was in itself only a temporary setback because the german army had to take a huge risk with a long vulnerable flank and Hitler got too obsessed about taking Stalingrad which was one objectieve too many.Concerning Leningrad he had had the good sense just to surround it; The major disagrement between Hitler and his generals concerns defensive warfare where Hitler insisted on defending every meter of terrain and most generals wanted to do a flexible defense. Most generals who were fired,were fired because of this type of disagreement (for example Manstein and Guderian) Those generals that did write books will talk about this type of disagreement at some point in their narrative and defend their(correct )point of view.It is incorrect to state that german generals blamed Hitler for everything that went wrong.Those that wrote books obviously defended their point of view in the disagreements they had with Hitler but not more than that..He was only responsible for what he decided. As the best antidote against statements ABOUT what german generals wrote,is what they EFFECTIVELY wrote two quote of Manstein are given hereafter: Mannstein lost victories p 313"The abovementioned defects had to seriously diminish Hitler's capacity to play with success the selfchosen role of highest military commander. Anyway,they would have been evened out,if he had been prepared to use the counsel of an experienced and jointly responsible general chief of staff,respectively,if he had been able to bring himself to give real confidence to such a one.After all,Hitler also brought some essential qualities for the role of a commander:a strong will,nerves which held steady even in the worst crises,an undeniable sharp intelligence and,as said,besides a certain aptitude in the operational field,the capacity to recognize the possibilities of technology.If he had understood to complete his lack of schooling and experience in the military field,specifically strategic and operational,by the abilities of his general chief of staff,he would have been able to bring about a usefull military command in spite of the abovementioned defects.But precisely this Hitler was not prepared to do ." Manstein lost victories p618:"On the one side stood the view of the dictator,who believed in the power of his will,by which he thought he could not only nail down his own armies where they stood ,but also stop the enemy.Of the dictator who also had to shy away from the danger of risk,which entailed the possibility of the loss of prestige.Of the man whom with all the aptitude still lacked the basis for real military capabilities. On the other side stood the view of military commanders,who by education and training still held fast that warfare is an art,whose essential elements are a clear judgment of the situation and the boldness of the own decision.Of which the success could only be found in mobile operations because only in these could the superiority of german command and troops be shown to its full advantage. Justice obliges to recognize that the conduct of the operations the armygroup had in mind,would have demanded from Hitler the taking of big risks in other theatres of war and other sectors of the eastern front and accept strong political and economical disadvantages.,However,it would have been the only way, in 1943 to achieve an exhaustion of the soviet offensive power and open the way for a political draw in the east."
To illustrate how geman staff officers were trained a quote from Rommel 's chief of staff Siegfried Westphal(Erinnerungen Hase & Koehler 1975 pp38-39):'After these digressions back to the general staff training.....In tactics you had again and again to judge a given situation in a war in detail to conclude if the own combatmission was still valid or was overtaken by events which had ocurred meanwhile,and made a new decision necessary.The most important was,to put yourself fully in the 'soul' of the enemy,from whom only logical actions were to be assumed.The central question was:what can the enemy do which is the most dangerous to me?What do I have to do to thwart this objective of the other side and ruin it.This resulted in the decision and the orders.In most cases the present mission was overtaken by events and a new decision was to be made.This way of setting of missions did not aim at an education to disobedience,but only a training in logical thinking.Only in case of a judgment of the situation based on a correct asessment of the enemy ,could a decision be made whoch would lead to an appropriate action. Never could one assume the enemy would make a mistake.If he did then that was all the better." Another quote from Westphal on the autonomy of german oficers(Erinnerungen p35):"...i got the strict order to wait with the staff and the signalsplatoon on a given spot until the general came back.I asked if,I did not have to follow after a given time and made several proposals for this.It was said again:'wait'.When,after a long wait ,which severely tested my patience,the general came back,,I was severally rebuked for executing the order. I was told, :a cavalry oficer must never wait for orders but always act independently .Although I thought I was right, I learnt a lesson forever from this and during the war I always acted independently and it did me well." It remains ironic that detractors of the german army are forced in the uncomfortable position of taking Hitler's position and considering the red army's numbers a bluff.The german soldier in his foxhole on the eastern front knew better. It remains a fact that german generalsdid not blame Hitler for everything.They had specific disagreements with him that have been sufficiently illustrated here. Doing better than the german army did without the framework of Hitler's orders is not difficult.What the effect on the endresult of the war would have been,is an interesting matter.If one of the detractors off the german army thinks he can do betterr given the historical odds and within the framework of Hitler's order,he can always try.To voice an opinion it is not necessary to test the idea in a wargame although it is usefull if there is a suitable one..
Being a detractors of the german army and also an admiror of the red army seems to be a dangerous combination.Now we have the 'allied armies are not inferior gimmick'.It is a historic fact that has never been in dispute that the armies Itay,Hungary and Rumania put to the disposal of germany in 1942 were badly equipped particularly in antitankweapens and badly led.Bravery of soldiers does not change that.It is not a coincidence the red army attacked the rumanians in november 1942.and afterwards also the hungarians and italians.They were the weak link.As the german army could not replace the losses it had sustained in 1941,it had to resort to using the armies of its its allies to protect the big flank created by the offensive in the south.This was a big risk and proved fatal. We are also again confronted by the 'german generals fasfied the recors'gimmick.This is ludicrous.Some german generals simply wrote texts for the army historical division about how the german army improvised on the eastern front during ww2.Interesting reading for anyone interested in tactics. The socalled 'deep battle concept' is not really different from the blirzkrieg as envisaged and practiced by Guderian.The 2nd phase of the campaign against France is a good example of that.Infantrydivisions broke the enemy defensive line and then the panzerdivisions went deep and never stopped advancing to prevent the enemy from forming a new defenseline.It worked.During operation barbarossa panzergenerals like Guderian wanted to keep moving forward without waiting for the pockets of Russian units to be cleaned up.Destabilizing the enemy is essential to prevent him from setting up a new defenseline.But the panzerdivisions were made to stop and wait.Later,the weather also intervened and saved the red army.It is all vey well to say that mobile forces have to strike deep but the weather(for example mud)can put a stop to that and that goes for every army.There is also the problem of supplying the mobile units.On paper everything is simple.Reality is different.The flexible german style of leadership is certainly more suited to the fluid situation in mobile warfare than an inherently more rigid communist army. Deep battle or blitzkrieg or whatever you call it is not undefeatable.Confronted with an opponent as strong as you who also has large armored reserves and good leadership proficient in armored warfare ,it will fail.It is not obvious that you will succeed in breaking through your opponents line if it is very deep or he chooses to do tiùmely retreats to avoid breakthrough .The opponent does not have to play your game,on the contrary..If you do achieve breakthrough your armored forces can be cutoff and annihilated by strong enemy armored reserves.The germans at Kursk either did not break the enemy line or were stopped by enemy reserves.In 1942 the red army suffered a heavy defeat in the second battle of Charkov.After Stalingrad Manstein defeated the red army again by counterattacking from the flanks with a large force of panzerdivisions.. The german army was simply defeated by superior numbers.In the second half of 1943 the weakening german army was slowly pushed back without suffering disaster.In 1944 the weakened and largely outnumbered german army on the eastern front was an easy victim for deep breaktroughs because of the lack of depth of the defense and the insufficient armored reserves.Hitler's orders made things easier for the red army. It is and remains a fact that a german army with equal numbers in men and equipment and the capacity to replace losses will not be defeated by an inherently rigid communist red army. Better leadership will make the difference.
Model was taciturn and not harmonious,a personality at odds with itself. His sense of duty and his temper fought his heart which was soft by nature. Outwardly,his hard will was almost always victorious over his heart-internally,in spite of the raw shell he remained the officer with heart and reason;the heart prevailing in all decisive issues. It was not given to many to recognize the merry and carefree human, because even to those that were close to him he expessed himself seldomly or not at all. His often hearty laugh must have convinced even many outsiders and made this 'curt general' particularly sympathetic. Model did not have many friends as he lacked the leisure for this. He was also very attached to the circle of officers he had created around him and again and again drew to him. He had an admirable way of adressing his soldiers-even though his intonation was brash-he gained their trust quickly by the manner of his personal questions which brought out with a clairvoyant look the particularities of the activities of each individual, recognized their needs and not last of all ,always knew a way out. Towards his officers he had a compelling way to seize each by his responsabilities in such a way that nobody could do nothing else than do more than his duty. His appearance in a circle of people ,be it officers or men or other occasions, never gave rise to solemnity. He was immdediately right in the middle, oversaw everything with one look and captivated those present with his gift to adress people,quicky grasping the situation.
Shortly after the collapse the Army Group had been taken away from FM Busch, this time less because of the wellknown 'scapegoat' method of Hitler as because Busch was ill and had to make place for FM Model his estwhile army chief from the campaign in the west. The last one had in the past months as wellknown specialist for retreats from 1943, first at Army Group North then Army Group North Ukrain, mastert similar but not so catastrophic situations as now with center; and brought to a stop the fronts which were flowing to the rear. Now fate put him before his examination. The crisi like situations which he fore months had to restore with sole responability,had brought himself to command with very hard hand and without compromise. On the same line was his clear taking of position for Hitler as he needed an ineer hold for his tottering fronts. He had no other choice. Whether he was a follower of Hitler and nationalsocialist in his heart is doubtfull.In the very close contact in and outside of business in the months of july to september the general of transport never heard a positive remark by his commander,but often biting criticism.His nationalsocialist conviction visible to the exterior was for him a psychological means to an end. Personally, he was of small stature,but tough and with a poisinous biting rudeness,whose object were mostly generals and general saff officers;towards the soldiers he was kind and fatherly. When the general of transport,after an extremely insulting reprimand recieved without guilt,had asked to be relieved by the chief of staff General Krebs,this one soothed him and recounted:"What do you want, he threathened his old chief with a courtmartial yesterday.But the man can do incredibly much and is at the moment our only hope here." Doubtless,the monstrous responsability which rested on his shoulders, had somewhat shifted the limits which FM Model usually put on his temper.After a severe reprimand he once said to the author , stil in the same reproachfull tone: "And you also have your birthday today." Then he invited him to supper and was the kindest,imaginative and sovereign host. Then he sought communication with the outside world and ordered the Ic to send the radio messages: the Führerhauptquartier was asked whether the promised reinforcements would come soon;the Hungarian Reichsverweser got thanks for the use of his cavalrydivision and his opponent Zhukov he gave advice over the fronts where he should attack the next day (Whether the smart Ic Oberst i.g. Worgitzky sent these messages is unknown). FM Models means of command were mobility and control of the numbers. According to a cleverly devised system, using all transport means, he daily visited at least six commands, from the forward command post at the front to an army command. His questions were short and concise and his rage big when the answer showed the ignorance of the questioned. Because of his continuous physical and mental presence, above all on crisis points, he aroused respect in all his subordinates which was often greater than the impression of enemy superiority. Again in the HQ in the center of the method of his general staff thinking, planning and commanding stood the numbers which represented time,kilometers,menweapons,etc... These numbers became the foundation for his judgments and plans. Thus he became the defense specialist. The offensive with its many indeterminate quantities and unpredictable phenomenons suited him less.
Joint command is niet realistic and would never be done. Model in command in the real alternate scenario. Fundamentally , it would not change much as the odds would still be the same and Model would have been bound to holding the same objective with insufficient means . The only advantage Model would have, would be that he could easier get away with retreats with or without authorisation.
