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^{Manstein lost victories p618:"On the one side stood the view of the dictator,who believed in the power of his will,by which he thought he could not only nail down  his own armies where they stood ,but also stop the enemy.Of the dictator who also had to shy away from the danger of  risk,which entailed the possibility of the loss of prestige.Of the man whom with all the aptitude still lacked the basis for real military capabilities.
On the other side stood the view of military commanders,who by education and training still held fast that warfare is an art,whose essential elements are a clear judgment of the situation and the boldness of the own decision.Of which the success  could only be found in mobile operations because only in these could the superiority of german command and troops be shown to its full advantage.
Justice obliges to recognize that the conduct of the operations  the armygroup had in mind,would have demanded from Hitler the taking of big risks in other theatres of war and other sectors of the eastern front and accept strong political and economical disadvantages.,However,it would have been the only way, in 1943 to achieve an exhaustion of the soviet offensive power and open the way for a political draw in the east."}
Siegfried westphal Erinnerungen p10:"Nobody has to be suspicious that I will try to prove by circuitous roads,that the German Reich could have ended the war with a stalemate or in certain circonstances even have won the war with better political or military command at the highest level.I have already pointed out this impossibility in 'Heer in Fesseln'. The general superiority of the opposing side in all aspects and it's determination to defeat the nazi regime were too great.I only want to explain things as I lived them.I do not want to diminish the merit of anybody in even the smallest way or make anybody's fault bigger If I want to stay with the truth-and that is my firm decision-then I also have to show the errors committed.We are all human beings with human flaws.Mediocre decsions not adapted to the situation or even false decisions could therfore not fail to appear and must not be hidden.By the way,everibody has the right to make mistakes".

General Raus does speak about achieving a victory by shortening the lines and staying generally on the defensive untill the red army was sufficiently attritted before resuming the offensive(Newton panzer operations p346-347).What he means by victory is not clear.It could mean the stalemate as envisaged by Manstein. His opinion is certainly very sensible and the only option available.The red army's wastefull tactics could  certainly be exploited and even the USSR did not have unlimited supplies of men. He was against the Kursk operation as it was planned.You attack weakness,not strength.
Even those who do not agree with Raus or any other general should show respect for the opinion of a real general who commanded real troops in a real war.Some modesty is called for.Forumusers  have not worn the boots of a high commander in a real war.Most are amateurs with an interest in military historry who have maybe played general in a wargame.Internetgenerals are not real generals.Worse,there are those who try to chase anybody from this forum who does not share their dognas.I will not flee.
Another gimmick used by the purist is saying that the german army disregarded Hitler's orders and therefore his stand fast orders do not matter.
This is very far from the truth.A man like Model certainly did whatever he wanted but he was an exception.There are enough examples of the contrary.In 1945 for example Generals Harpe and Reinhardt had correctly estimated the russian offensive to begin on the 12th january 1945 and had requested authorisation to fall back on the second line to shorten the line and create reserves.As usual Hitler refused .They should have disobeyed but they did not with catastrophic consequences.
And yes,the german army could do flexible retreats and it did them .Timely retreats to avoid breakthrough or to prevent encirclements after breakthroughs were done(the falling back from line to line by the 9th army after Kursk for example).The prurist clearly undestimates the capacity of  german infantry to retreat(they moved at night and were prepared to fight in the morning)and again ignores what was effectively done.Reading german divisional histories is very usefull to know what really was done.
Planned retreats to shorten the mine were done(Büffel Bewegung).
However many retreats after breakthroughs were done too late because getting authorisation took too long.Pockets were created that could been avoided(for example the tcherkassy pocket).The destruction of AGC would certinly have been avoided if authorisation had been given to shorten the line before the attack.Garrisons of useless Feste Platze were lost(Tarnopol,Vitebsk etc..)
On the subject of AT defenses two quotes from Guderian in 'Panzerleader' :
p.297"6.Antitank defense will devolve more and more on the assault guns,since all other anti-tank weapons are becoming increasingly ineffective against the enemy equipment or else are expensive in terms of casualties.All divisions on the main batle fronts,need to be supplied with a certain complement of these weapons;the secondary fronts will have to do with a high command reserve,while the divisions are for the time being equipped with self propelled anti-tank guns.In order to economise on personnel and material,a gradual amalgamation of the assault gun batallions and anti-tank batallions is necessary." 
p319:"On december 7th(1943) it was decided that the full production of the old Czech 38 ton tank to be witched to tank destroyers(the Hetzer)...This tank destroyer was to be the basic weapon for the anti-tank batallions of the infantry divisions,and was thus the belated answer to my proposal made on march 9th. ....
I was now at last in a position to carry out my ideas on this score,but it was too late;Only one third of anti-tank companies could be equipped with the new weapon by the time the russians launched their 1945 winter offfensive." 

Lets have Manstein himself speak about his original idea 

Lost victories  p 476:"The pure defensive could therefore not be our business.Rather,we had to-within a strategic defensive- show these factors to their best advantage which still formed our superiority against the enemy: the better and more flexible command and the higher battleworth and also the higher mobility(at least in the summer)of our troops.
We had to-even when we in general were now on the defensive- at least try to deal the enemy powerfull blows,which would not only inflict heavy bloody losses but would also cost a high number of prisoners and all iin all could at least lead to  make him ripe for a draw;Also within a strategic defensive we had to again come to mobile operations,,in which lay our strength. Be it that we used favorable opportunities the enemy offered us or brought about ourselves...."
Lost victories p480-481:"The idea of a backhand strike which was proposed to Hitler several times by the CG AGS in the months february-march 1943 was based on the suspected enemy objectives. A fighting retreat should be done in front of the expected attack against the Donets area to let the enemy armies advance  to the west into the line Melitopol-Dnjepopetrowsk.At the same moment strong forces should be gotten ready behind the north wing of the army group .With them the expected  attack there should be crushed to then advance south/southeast in the deep flank of the enemy armies advancing through the Donets area against the lower Dnjepr and destroy them on the coast.
.....
If this first partial strike succeeded ,were important enemy forces destroyed,then maybe a second strike aimed to the north against the enemy center could follow.....
Such a backhand strike had two preconditions.The high command had to be prepared to lay the main focus on the eastern front and within this on the south wing.On the north wing  of AGS a srong superiority should be secured on the expected enemy forces ,where the operation to succeed.For this it would have been inevitable to rigourously uncover secondary theatres of war,even with the danger of difficulties there.Being safe on all theatres ,had to put into question even a partial success in the east.We also would have had to fall back on forces from AGC and AGN,at least mobile reserves would have to be created there,if need be by timely undertaken shortenings of the front(in the first place by the clearing of the already endangered Orel arch of AGC)...."

Was certainly a better idea than attacking the Kursk salient.A Typically Mansteinian idea.The only problem was that it meant giving the determination of the time of the attack to the red army which could be after an allied landing in Europe. 

A discussion about the feasability of flexible defense for the german army has as much sense as a discussion about the feasibility of a manned mission to the moon in the sixties.None because both were effectively done.Making statements to the contrary cannot change historical facts.
Some armchairgenerals are clearly...armchairgenerals in the negative sense of the word.The reality of what happened on the terrain does not bother them. 

To do a flexible defense you do not need more resources.You will have to do more digging because you will have more defenselines.At the end of the day,you will lose less men and less equipment  .Timely  retreats are always better than retreating too late ,getting surrounded and in the best case breaking out with at least massive loss of equipment.
These retreats can also be part of plan to lure the enemy deep and use armored forces against his flank or rear to inflict at least partial reverses.
And infantry can certainly retreat in face of enemy mobile forces.Movement is done during the night,ready to fight in the morning.That is what german infantry divisions did many times when falling back.
A flexible defense   also means the application of zone defense in which the first line will be given up in favour of a second line further back in the zone to escape the enemy artillery fire.
Simply trying to hold one long too thin line at all cost is never an option.Leads to destruction by enemy artillery,breakthough and encirclement.
Anything other is better.
All the alternatives were efectively done and could have been done on the whole front if Hitler had allowed it.There was no material impediment to that .Would always have  reduced losses considerably and at least slowed down the red army.Bleeding it enough to reach a stalemate was not excluded. 
Some quotes from F.W. von Mellenthin in 'Panzerbattles' as the opinion of a real commander is always more important

The opposition now starts to misinterpret 'flexible defense' to suit its own purposes.
As said before zonedefense is only one aspect of an elastic form of defense.If even after application of local reserves the main defense line cannot be held then timely retreat will be necessary (preferably to a next prepared defense line which one should always possess) .Otherwise zonedefense is only a more elastic form of fixed defense. Timely retreats are an integral part of flexible defense as stated before.These retreats can also be intentional to lure the enemy in a trap.
Amored reserves are used to counter attack broken through enemy armored formations.Within a strategic defensive you do not have to possess the capacity to do this everywhere along the front because restoring the line at all cost is not the objective.That would also only be another form of 'hold fast doctrine'.It is about inflicting heavy losses where you can and by whatever means.You use opportunities that the enemy offers you or you create them yourselves. To do this it is better to be strong in one place and inflict a heavy defeat on the enemy there than achieve nothing anywhere by spreading your armored reserves thin.
That is why Manstein wanted to concentrate everything on the south of the eastern front in 1943 and inflict a massive defeat on the red army there,accepting risks anywhere else.There was enough space to work with.Losing terrain was therfore not an issue.It is always about the enemy army and nothing else.
The Manstein proposal was certainly much better than attacking the Kursk salient.Would have been interesting to see how that played out.
So yes,the german army could practice flexible defense in the real sense of the word within a stategic defensive along the whole eastern front.That is never a problem and always saves a lot of men and equipment.At the end of the day,at the minimum the red army would have been seriously slowed down .

Some clearly WANT to misunderstand what a truly  flexible defense actually means.It means being prepared to give up large chunks of terrain if necessary to shorten the line to create defensive depth or to free forces for use elsewhere .It means you are prepared to intentionally retreat to lure an enemy in a trap.It means not absolutely wanting to regain a line by counterattack.Counterattack is only optional.Even an elastic zone defense is not really flexible defense if counterattacks to regain the line are a dogma(this was the main flaw in the elastic defense executed during ww1)It means you will not defend a line longer than is prudent.It means you will withrdaw  units in time in case of a breakthrough to avoid pockets.
 Because of Hitler's stand fast orders a  flexible defense in the real sense of the word was seldomly executed by the german army.At most an elastic zone defense minus was executed where it was a dogma to regain the line.Constructing a second line and retreating on it were mostly out of the question.And there ware also the mostly useless feste platze.
A truly flexible defense intends to inflict as much losses on the enemy as possible while preserving the own troops and equipment.
Holding terrain at all cost is not an option.


Army group South certainly did not have freedom of movement after Kursk.
Manstein can explain that better himself.Lost victories p511-512:" When,which was obvious,the soviet leadership sought the decision in this campaign against Army Group South,then on the german side there was no other choice but to strenthen itself here at much as possible for this decision.The fight had to be conducted in such a way that the opponent did not achieve the decision.
Two things were necessary for this:
In the area of Army Group South the running of the battle had to be based on the operational requirements and aim to exhaust the offensive power of the enemy,however not try to hold certain areas at all cost.
On the german side the main focus of strength within the general conduct of the war had now clearly to be to the east and within the eastern front looking ahead toAGS.
In both respects the leadership of the Army Group has had to fight an incessant fight with Hitler during the campaign of 1943-1944 for the recognition of the operational requirements.
 For political and  reasons of war economy,Hitler insisted on holding first the Donets area ,later the Dnjepr bend (and at the same time at Army Group A the Kuban and the Crimea).  
As a result, AGS was nailed fast with its right wing at first in the Mius,Donez,later in the Dnjepr bend ,the holding of which had to be a mistake from an operational viewpoint.
As she stuck out far to the east into the enmy front,she gave the opponent the possibility of an attack from two directions,whereby our armies had the sea in the back.Above all ,the front of the Armygroup was lenghtened in a fatal manner by these sticking out bastions.Forces had to be committed to their defense ,which could simply not be missed on the northwing of the Armygroup.On this however,and not in the Donets or in the Dnjepr area lay the operational decision.If the Soviets succeeded in destroying the northwing of the Armygroup by bringing into action  an
 overwhelming superiority then the objective of surrounding Amygroups South and A on the Black See would have been attained. This would be the  more decisive ,as more forces were committed for political or economical reasons on the non decisive south wing of the Army Group.
The question was very simply wether the economical and political viewpoints were to be decisive for the military command on the german southern wing. Practically speaking,as the situation now was, wouldwe give up the Donets and the Dnjepr area or should we sacrifice Amygroups South and A by the attempt to hold these areas at all costs. .....
We wanted clearly to know(request from the Armygroup at OKH)wether

either the Armygroup had to hold the Donetz area,also at the risk  that it would be cut off by a breakthrough in the direction of the Dnjepr.That would only be possible if the OKH were capable of preventiing this forseeable development on the northwing of the Armygroup by supplying of forces or by the intervention of AGC. 

Or if it mattered that the russian would bleed out in the course of this summer .In this case,if need, be a step by step retreat would have to be executed in the Donets area to free sufficient forces for the north wing.

The answer we thereupon got through the chief of the general staff was "the Führer wants both"
In the question of the main focus of forces it has to be said that who is not prepared to, if need be,give up areas to save forces will not be in a position to be strong enough at the decisive point."

Seems pretty clear to me.After Kursk the situation was again that AGS could not defend its front which was much too long. A step by step retreat to bleed the red army retreat was the only option.If Hitler wanted to hold the Donets area at all costs then he had to make some hard decisions to free a lot of troops elsewhere.He was unable to do that . 

To prevent the noticeable 'panther psychosis' in the Armygroup,the name Panther position has been omitted.The program to build positions has in no way been reduced as a result of this ,but has been strengthened.With all means stopping positions are built speedily on the decisive sectors. Then follows the building of further fallback positions and the linking pieces between the indvidual blocking positions."

A typical answer of an armchairgeneral who does suppose to much and disregards what effectively was done.For an infantrydivision on the defense the choice is not between retreating and not retreating.There are situations in which retreat is imperative and then waiting too long only leads to disaster.It is always usefull to have at least one fallback position.Breakthoughs and encirclement have to be avoided.A planned and ordered retreat is always the best solution.And retreating at night was done all the time by german infantrydivisions.The retreat of the ninth army after Kursk is a good example of that.
And the infantrydivisions of AGS had to retreat too.A volontary step by step one on the southern wing to shorten the line ending up on a well prepared line on the Dnjepr. would been better than what effectively happened.
And AGN was surrounded in Courland because of the collapse of AGC combined with Hitler not wanting to give up the baltic states.

Every army can practice deception and every commander can be deceived if the enemy puts a lot of effort into it..Red army followers try to make people believe that the red army had a copyright on deception.Obviously not as history proves.Deception is an inherent part of any major military operation. All commanders including great ones can even make mistakes and have.
The greatest german commander of ww2  that Manstein was ,was obviously going te be asked for advice. It should be clear that most of the highest commanders of the wehrmacht that could still be called upon after ww2 were at the retirement age.At most they could give advice.Their active service was over.Their reputation was such that they were asked.And as is wellknown the US army had some write down their kwowledge which was oviously very useful because those that served on the eastern front kwew the red army  very well.. 
Manstein's reputation as the greatest german commander of ww2 is certainly not going to suffer because of some unsourced accusations by one or more red army followers on this forum.
 .As Manstein seems to irritate some,another interesting quote about the situation after Kursk.
Manstein lost victories p513 :"Instead,during the campaign of 1943/1944 the german high command was concerning the uniting of sufficient forces on the decisive points of the eastern front ,always straggling the red army. As a result,It was  not possible for the command of the Armygroup to prevent successes of the superior enemy,but at the most limit its operational consequences.
She stood under the handicap to be on the one hand limited in its operational freedom of  decsison by the attachment to the Donets area and on the other hand not disposing of enough forces for the operational decisive northern wing.It was forced ,to fix an important part of its units on the operational false spot,to hold the Donets area and later  the Dnjepr bend;At the same time it had to throw its reserves continually from one wing to the other ,to restore the situation at least more or less at one spot,or to counter a dangerous crisis,without at the same time being able to prevent that the enemy meanwhile comes to successes on other spotsthanks to his superiority."

Well said.AGS  only reacting and trying to limit the damage.More was not possible in the framework of Hitler's orders.And Manstein did certainly limit the damage.AGS  was not destroyed.  He was never deceived about the red army's intentions.He knew where the decisive point was.  

The latest attack on Manstein can best be answered by a quote from his foreword to 'lost victories':
"I have tried to present the self experienced,self thought and self decided,NOT IN HINDSIGHT,but as I saw it AT THE TIME.
Not the researching historian but the acting human speaks.Even when I have tried to see the events,the people and their decisions in an objective way,the judgment of a co-actor will always be subjective.Nevertheless I hope that my writings will not be without value,even to the historian."

The opposition clearly does not know when to quit.Again we are faced with a lot of assertions we are supposed to accept at face value even if they are inherently incredible.It is time to throw the A bomb.
Fitst of all we are supposed to believe that the german army  had the large amounts of fuel and ammunition needed to lauch the Kursk offensive AND the defensive fighting that followed in the months afterwards but not for Manstein's first idea in which the Kursk offensive is omitted and just the defensive fighting(including volontarily giving up the Donets area) is done plus a strong armored counterattck into the red army's flank.Incredible.  
We are are also supposed to accept that the german infantrydivisions on the southwing of AGS could not do a step by step retreat to the Dnjepr after the stopping of the Kursk offensive because infantry supposedly cannot do that..Also ridiculous,if alone because the retreat to the Dnjepr was effectively done under much more unfavorable circonstances in september 1943.
Obviously it is pure coincidence that the german army could supposedly not do the things that would have at least slowed the red army down a lot.Such statements can only be made by somebody who is either very pro red army , very anti-german ,or  who suffers from a serious lack of knowledge of military operations or any possible combination of the beforementioned .
Concerning the blanket accusations of falsehood levelled at german commanders,they are first denied and then suddenly reiterated and supposed to be proven a  long time ago.
And then there are  the attempts at intimidation.A clear sign of mounting frustration.
Concrning examples of retreats by german infantry I  put some quotes out of 'Panzeroperations'by Steven Newton concerning the retreat of XI corps in the summer of 1943 to illustrate how german infantrydivisions executed a step by step retreat. 
p214:"With these considerations determining the conduct of operations,I decided-Hitler's order nonwithstanding-to fight a delaying action in successive positions until the withdrawal reached Kkarkov and then to hold the city".
p237:"On the northern front we held positions south of Belgorod for one day and abandoned it before the Russians deployed their forces.Continued resistance in any one position would have led to heavy casualties and the annihilation of the isolated XI corps."
p240:"During the night of 9-10 august ,XI corps made an unobserved withdrawal to a hastily prpepared postion about ten kilometers to the south,the salient of which had already been occupied by advance detachments.Weak rear guards ,left behind in the former position ,led the Soviets to believe that the line remained fully manned. The next morning,when russian infantry attacked the position after a heavy artillery bombardment,they found only the rear party maintaining contact.Our troops ,who had been thoroughly exhausted by the previous day's fighting and the subsequent night march were able to recuperate during the morning hours.By noon the first enemy troops cautiously approached the new position.It's gun emplacements and strongpoints were well camouflaged;soviet ground and air reconaissance failed to locate them.The 106th,198th,and 320th infantrydivisions held this line,the latter having been pulled back from its positions along the Donets to rejoin the corps.
Russian attacks resumed during the afternoon with increasing violence.......
By the evening of 10 august the russian attacks had lost some of their sting.Having learned from experience over the past few days  ,the Soviets  made probing attacks after dusk dusk to maintain contact with XI corps in case of another German night withdrawal.We gave these probes a hot reception and-after all such attacks had been repulsed-withdrew unmolested to the next prepared position.By the time that the infantry arrived to occupy the new line, the bulk of the artillery and antitank guns were already in position and ready to fire.Forming another solid block ,XI corps maintained unshaken by renewed enemy onslaughts.
We employed the same delaying tactics during the following days.The withdrawal to successive positions exhausted the troops ,but the casualty rate stayed low.The russians disproportionately high losses ,which forcecd hem gradually to relax their pressure on german lines....."
p248:"In he meantime the overall situation of Armygroup south had deteriorated to the to the point that Field Marshal von Manstein ordered a withdrawal west of the Dnjepr river.During this retrograde movement ,we employed the same delaying tactics that had been successful during the withdrawal from Belgorod to Kharkov.Again and again,delay on successive points forced the Soviet to make time-consuming preparations for battle and to suffer heavy casualties leading to the progressive exhaustion of their corps and divisions.The russians recognized our intentions and attempted every day to frustrate them by forcing an armored breakthrough.Above all,the enemy wanted to capture major cities comanding the road net needed for speedy manoeuvers.In view of the rainy weather ,the possession of hard surface highways became a decisive factor to both sides since the mud prevented any movement of the roads.We took this factor into account and concentrated our antitank defenses in and around important towns.....
p249:"With a change in the weather,the ground dried.The infantry divisions  were able to move faster,and the daily rate of the withdtrawal was increased up to thirty to fifty kilometers.The pursuing soviet armor did not manage to renew its pressure until XI corps halted for several days at the Krementchug bridghead.Russian striking power had been impaired by several weeks of battering against our delaying actions on successive positions ,until the energy of the enemy counteroffensive had finally spent itself." 

.

Near Kiev Manstein was not surprised.From a purely operational viewpoint he always considered his northwing most important because a break there could lead  to the surrounding of AGS.However,for reasons of war economy and political reasons,he had first to hold the Donets area and later the Dnjepr bend and the Crimea.After the retreat to the Dnjepr,from a purely operational viewpoint he would have fallen back on the Bug in the south and given up the crimea to free reserves for the northwing.
And repeating again and again in a very arrogant way that Mansteins ideas could not be executed, does not convince for reasons already mentioned.It is all about not WANTING to accept that there were better alternatives which would undoubtedly have lead to a better result for the german army.Any UNPREJUDICED person with a minimum of insight in military operations can understand that.

The attempt to let others(red army oficers by pure coincidence) accuse Manstein of dishonesty turns out to be a dud.Just proves russian generals were not averse to spinning reverses they still could suffer in 1943/ 1944.For example,the denying of the presence of mud near Kiev in november 1943  is rather funny as all histories of the german divisions involved in the counterattack mention the serious mud problem.

Concerning Manstein's memoir in general I am going to put the quote out of the forword again: "I have tried to present the self experienced,self thought and self decided,NOT IN HINDSIGHT,but as I saw it AT THE TIME.
Not the researching historian but the acting human speaks.Even when I have tried to see the events,the people and their decisions in an objective way,the judgment of a co-actor will always be subjective.Nevertheless I hope that my writings will not be without value,even to the historian."

Sounds pretty clear to me but not to everybody it seems.

It is nice to see that again the feasibility of a flexible retreat is denied while it was effectively done.A sign of the stubborness of the oppositionThere are examples enough of flexible retreats(Büffel Bewegung,retreat of the ninth army in the summer of 1944,the retreat to the Dnjepr,the flexible defense of AGN in 1944....)
These statements only confirms why the word 'armchairgeneral' is mostly used as an insult.
So yes, the german army could have executed the retreat to the Dnjepr on the southwing in july/august instead of in september.
And yes,the german could obviously omit the kursk offensive in favor of a retreat to the Dnjepr(and give up the Kuban bridghead) combined with a massive counterattack.Costs less resources than what was effectively done.
And no,the german army did not have to omit any operation on the eastern front in 1943 because of lack of resources.Proof of the contrary has not been given.
Obviously the opposition always denies the feasibility of anything that would been more favorable to the german army than what was effectively done.It does that in every discussion;
And making sneers at Manstein for supposedly having been deceived a second time when he wrote his book intentionally disregards that he wrote it on the  basis of the knowledge he had when the events took place.
And the US army  officer who wrote a text about red army deception to which a link was placed here did not make sneers at his german counterparts.The sneers at german intelligence officers are the sole responsability of one user.
The piece just proves that an army can always deceive if it puts enough effort into it.That is also one of the reasons why it is such a disadvantage not to have to initiative.

^{Deep battle or blitzkrieg or whatever one calls it is not undefeatable.Theories always sound good.In practice there is an opponent on the other side and he does not have to play your game,on the contrary. Confronted with an opponent as strong as you who are who also has large armored reserves  and good leadership proficient in armored warfare ,it will fail.It is not obvious that you will succeed in breaking through your opponents line if it is very deep or he chooses to do tiùmely retreats to avoid breakthrough ..If you do achieve breakthrough your armored forces can be  blocked,or  cutoff and annihilated by strong enemy armored reserves.The germans at Kursk either did not break the enemy line  or were stopped by enemy reserves.In 1942 the red army suffered a heavy defeat in the  second battle of Charkov.After Stalingrad Manstein defeated the red army again by counterattacking  a large  force of panzerdivisions..The red army only could achieve successful deep breakthroughs when faced with weakness.}
In 1944 and 1945 the german army had become an easy victim.
And it is not a coincidence that some intentionally misinterpret flexible defense to make it supposedly not workable against deep breakthroughs.

A quote from Mittlere Ostfront Juni 1944 by general Niepold pp256-257 to illustrate retreats effectively done by the german army in the summer of 1944
"It was shown  how the Army group in the 2nd phase of the battle,in defiance of the inevitable retreat ,.pressed sharply that the troops set themselves up again and again in postions wich were near to each other and continued the defense.It came to incessant fights by the armies,corps and divisions for the timely order for retreat before enemy break ins in the abscence of reserves could widen to unstoppable breakthroughs.
In general  it was about the appropriatedness of this tactic of retreat in short jumps.
Fieldmarshall Model said:'One can not retreat too fast.The artillery can only have its effect in defense.The point of view of the army to conduct the fight in a delaying action is false.'...
Whether one calls it defense or delaying action,the position was tenaciously held as long as possible with infantry to give  time to the artillery and the antitank weapons to have their defensive power have its effect.However,one protected oneself from breakthrough and destruction by  retreat at the last minute.Even when one continually had to give up terrain under pressure from the enemy,still this type of combat can most aptly be called ' defense limited in time',also when the troops had to retreat to a new position every day between the 6th and 16th july.
Because the mass of the divisions fought and moved on foot,only a retreat from line to line was possible.One can not enough appreciate the performance of german infantry which fought by day and marched by night.The real delaying action can only be done by armored troops,then and now." 
A quote from 'Von Minsk bis Lyck Die 12.panzerdivision' p 108-109,General  Niepold on the same subject

You may think you are military expert but you are not. I can only be educated by real military experts like Generaloberst Herman Hoth who gives an explanation concerning the notions 'strategy' and 'operations' in his book 'Panzeroperationen'. I quote:  
"The transition from strategy to operation is vague.The definition by Clausewitz-that strategy is the doctrine of the use of the battles for the purpose of the war-seems too narrow and dogmatic to us. The main area of the strategy is as Clausewitz  explains,the warplan. It determines the purpose and objective of the war, measures the forces to be used accordingly , seeks to ascertain the center of force of the enemy, the capacities, character weakness of the enemy people and the willpower of its government, takes into account the impacts on other countries, to deduce out of all these often mutually contradicting elements the center of gravity of the enemy power. As one sees, the mainpart of strategy is subject to political points of view. It can not be different. Then "poltics have engendered war". False judgments in the warplan or indeed the lack of a warplan must have fatal consequences , which cannot be compensted by military means. Justifiably it has been criticized that Hitler had no clear idea in 1940 how the war should be continued and ended after the quick defeat of France.  The opportunity to attack England over the channel directly after the capitulation of France  with the combined force of Army,Navy and airforce could not be used because no preparations had been made for a landing operation.
The strategy and therefore politics not only determines the planning of the war but also effects the whole course of the war. Because war is only decided by the final victory ,strategy has to take care that the final objective- in general the defeat of the enemy- is kept in sight,that the collective push for the center of the enemy power is not weakened by secondary enterprises, that the main battle is sought which promises the decisive victory ,that the success in battle is pursued with extreme vigor.  
We now come  in the border area between strategy and operations and also in the area that has always been the subject of the competence struggle between politics and the conduct of war. The soldier who fully recognizes the overweight of the political in the strategy, will tend to say that political viewpoints have to stop at the border of the 'operation'. that in the lacking of the political element is really to be recognized the  distinctive mark of the operational area. But things are not so easy. The halt ordered by Bismarck to operations in Bohemia in 1866 and hit such tough resistance from the military thinking King seems justified today to us. Another example maybe helps us further. When Hitler in the autumn of 1940 provisionally renounced pursuing the decision against England and decided to attack the USSR,, this happened for political,ideological and military grounds. The decision falls within the general conduct of the war in the area of strategy. The directives for the execution of the war against Russia(Barbarossabefehl) contained the war aims , the missions for the three parts of the armed forces and also political and economical viewpoints. These were also of a strategic nature, even as the proposals of the OKH formed the foundation for the directives. Of an operational nature on the other hand  was the 'Aufmarschanweisubng für Barbarossa', which the OKH published on  the  31st  january 1941 on the basis of the Barbarossa directives.
Thus, the strategy is the area of the supreme direction of the war.....
We now try to clarify the notion 'operations'. It usually encompasses events on a single theatre of war on the basis of a plan of campaign or operational outline. Its first result is the directive for deployment. It contains the strength and the formation of the forces made ready for the campaign ,the operational objective that should be attained by the campaign , probable strength  and formation of the opposing army, the missions for the subordinated army groups and army reserves which should according to Moltkes doctrine mostly not go beyond the first clash with the enemy .
From the deployment evolve the operations ; that is the march of the readied forces to the battle. The textbook example for this are the campaigns of Moltke in 1866 ,1870/71 but also the wideranging movements in the US civil war. Particularly the campaigns in France pointed the way for generations of military commanders in Germany. By fast and bold operations which culminated in decisive battles ,the war was ended before politics fell on the soldiers out of fear for the intervention of foreign powers. On the basis of these war experiences the idea of bold operations which were alone decisive took more and more root in the german army. In Berlin however the old victorious comander fights with his doubts if the future war which engages whole armed peoples in mass armies  can still be ended the same way as the wars of 1866 and 1870/71 ; he looks for other means to make the probable enemy willing for peace. The first world war confirmed the reservations of Moltke,on the decisive western theatre the trenchwar gave few room for operations. The objective to free the command of the war from these restraints  and give it back the operational freedom , lead in Germany shortly before the second world war to the formation of panzer formations with operational and not tactical missions. " 
When a famous military leader explains his ideas about strategy,operations, tactics etc.. in a book or article, that has the same value as a doctor wrting about medicine or any other famous practitioner talking about his trade.
On 24.11.1942 Manstein advised Hitler that "The breakout of 6th Army to the southwest is still possible and the safest way.Staying put means ,in view of the fuel and  ammunition situation,running an extreme risk. I can in spite of this ,for the time being, not join tha postion of Armygroup B  for the breakout , as long as there is a prospect for sufficient supply,at least with antitankmunition,infanterymunition and fuel. This is decisive". <ref>Kehrig, Manfred ''Staingrad'', Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags- Anstalt, 1974 page 564.</ref> On 28.11.1942 Manstein advised Hitler "..If therefore the forcing of a decision should not be possible and only a limited link to 6th Army woould result,then I consider it necessary,to use this to pull out 6th Army from the encirclement with the objective of achieving an operationally capable organisation of forces in the general line Jaschkal-Kotelnikowo-Don-Tschir-Usinko ".<ref>Kehrig, Manfred ''Stalingrad'', Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974 page 575.</ref> Wintergewitter, launched on 12 December, achieved some initial success and von Manstein got his three panzer divisions and supporting units of the [[57th Panzer Corps]] (comprising the [[German 23rd Panzer Grenadier Division|23rd Panzer Grenadier Division]], and the [[German 6th Panzer Division|6th]] and [[German 17th Panzer Division|17th Panzer Divisions]]) within 30 miles of Stalingrad by 20 December. However, the corps was halted at the town of [[Aksay, Rostov Oblast|Aksay]], and strong Russian forces eventually pushed them back.

On 19 December 1942 von Manstein had ordered [[Friedrich Paulus|Paulus]] to execute the attack to linkup with the [[57th Panzer Corps]]. Erich von Manstein did not however order the abandonment of Stalingrad, only to be prepared for doing so. At the same time he advised Hitler "...Because for reasons of weather and available forces the supply by air and with this the maintaining of Sixth Army ,is not possinle, as the 4 weeks of encirclement have proven, the 57 th Corps clearly cannot establish a land connection with sixth Army, I now consider the breahthrough of sixth Army to the southwest as the last possibility , to conserve at least the mass of the soldiers and the still mobile parts of the army" .<ref>Kehrig, Manfred ''Stalingrad'', Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974 page 598.</ref>  
Some state that Manstein could have ordered the abandonment of Stalingrad but they disregard that this could not be done without Hitler knowing it. The [[German Sixth Army|6th Army]] never executed the attack because it considered it did not have enough fuel and ammunition to do so.<ref>Stalingrad, Manfred Kehrig</ref>

In them he presented the thesis that if he had been allowed to operate by Hitler,maybe a draw could have been achieved on the eastern front
"The first question which had to be answered was this,whether there could be  still a thought of achving a bearable solution in the east at that time. Surely not anymore in the sense of thely fighting down of the soviet power. But was there not still the hope of achieving a remis?A solution which would have meant the prospect for the Reich of maintaining itself
That militarily-with correct operational commanding-a remis could still be achieved in the east at that time,,was at any rate at the Ob.Kdo der H.Gr.Don(which meanwhile had been renamed in Armygroup South)our conviction." .<ref>Mannstein, Erich ''Verlorene Siege'', Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe, 1983 page 474.</ref> "
"Both could have been foreseen,rspectively avoided if the german command had clearly concluded from the general situation in the spring of 1943 that everything had to be done now  to achieve in the east a remis or at least the exhaustion of the soviet offensive power. When henceforth it had been prepared to act in accordance with this conclusion with regard to time and forces. Manstein p.505.
'On the one side stood the view of the dictator,who believed in the power of his will,by which he thought he could not only nail down  his own armies where they stood ,but also stop the enemy.Of the dictator who also had to shy away from the danger of  risk,which entailed the possibility of the loss of prestige.Of the man whom with all the aptitude still lacked the basis for real military capabilities.
On the other side stood the view of military commanders,who by education and training still held fast that warfare is an art,whose essential elements are a clear judgment of the situation and the boldness of the own decision.Of which the success  could only be found in mobile operations because only in these could the superiority of german command and troops be shown to its full advantage.
<sup>Justice obliges to recognize that the conduct of the operations  the armygroup had
Befehl im Widerstreit pp 265-268

hief of the general staff: The strong russian attacks in the area of Charkow and against the Orel bend continue unabated. Specifically at Manstein on the northwing of AGC the situation west of Charkow has stronly aggravated .I see a strong danger for the link to AGC.
Hitler :Manstein is a good commander when he has ample forces. He does not understand how to find solutions in crisises.
Chief of the general staff: I think that the situation forces to make comprehensive considerations. May I start with the basic principle of the russian operations. Without doubt the objective of their offensive is, to break through in the direction of Kieve,separate AGS and AGC and then push AGS against the Sea of Azov. THe forcal point of the Russians is clearly against the northwing of Manstein.
Hitler: Both Armygroups will at least prevent that link between them is lost. The Russian can do everything and we are not even capable to cut off this miserable Kursk salient.
Chief of the general staff: The attack started too late. 
Hitler: The command only started the business halfheartedly.-What can happen now to support the front. From where can we take foreces. Jodl?
Chief of the Wehrmachtführungsstab: The east must fend for itself. The west has been combed clean, Italy needs every man,because otherwise Sicily cannot be held. Maybe we can release forces in Norway.
Chief of the general staff :  They would come too late. I see only hte possibility to give up the Donets area and this way rrelease forces for the Kiev area.
Hitler: Obviously,vacate and vacate. then we will soon end up at the border of the Reich.. Anbd the russian gets his land without losing a man.
Chief of the general staff: If we remain in front then we are in danger of losing our troops. We would only do the russian a favour,we play his game.
Hitler: What should become of the Kuban bridghead?
Chief of the general staff: We will have to give that up in any case. It does not serve the purpose you want to achieve as we cannot go on the offensive anymore.
The russian knows that too and does not see in it a threat anymore.
Hitler: Do not think you will gain forces this way. They will all be needed for the Crimea. And what do you think of the effect on Turkey. The gentlemen ignore the political consequences.
Chief of the general staff: We cannot sacrifice divisions for Turkey.
Hitler: Zeitzler,you are much impressed by the Russians. One needs the nerves to see such crisises through. Wenn I give up the Donets area, then I can put an end to the war in a few months. Then we do not have enough coal anymore. 
Chief of the general staff: Speer has told me that it is not so bad. Anyway,lately we have not been able to get much coal out of the Donets area because of the railway situation
Hitler: How does Speer get these informations? Towards you? That is what I still lacked, that he involves himself in the military command.
Chief of the general staff: I asked him for it.
Hitler:  Do not come with vacating again,Zeitzler! We will hold the Donets area.
Chief of the general staff: Then we at least subordinate to Manstein the whole front to the sea of Asov. It cannot be that still large parts are subordinated to Armygroup Kleist to the north of the sea of Azov. The command must be in one hand.
Hitler: So mister Manstein can do what he wants. He will vacate the whole of the Ukraine,only to operate. How I can feed the german people is indifferent to him. Zeitzler,we must keep the matter in hand ourselves. Otherwise Manstein will face us with the fait accompli.
Chief of the general staff: We could impose restraints on him.
Hitler: I know how that goes. Than the reports will be made in such a way hat only remains the solution he wants. I have experienced that enough. If only I could rely on the reporting. All only think of themselves and their sector. The commanders in chief do not care about the global situation. We will see how we will cope.
Chief of the generalstaff: Than please authorise at least that a defenseline is built on the Dnjepr. It is urgently needed.
Hitler: Good,I agree . But take care that the front does not hear about it. And have calculated how long it takes to transport two divisions of AGN to the area of Kiev. And see to it that the setting up of new units in the Heimat somewhat quickened.
Chief of the Wehrmachtführungsstab: But they were destined for Italy.
Hitler: One has to see where they are needed more urgently. But Zeitzler, you should get the vacating of the Kuban bridghead and the Donets area out of your head. Pay attention,tomorrow things will look completely different.
On the way home.
Chief of the general staff:Atleast he has authorized the Dnjepr position. This toughness is to despair.
Chief of the operations section: it costs us decisive time everytime. The troop has to pay for it. When we do not give freedom of action to Manstein,we will not come out from the dependence on the enemy.
C
ef of the general staff: Nothing new to me. But make that clear to the Fûhrer!....

An excerpt from an article by Major i.G Middeldorf in Wehrwissentschaftliche Rundschau Oktober 1953 on 'Zitadelle'
 :" The reasons for this failure will be cited briefly in the following : 
It is certain that in 1943 gave a certain free cover in the west. But did one absolutely have to strike from the forehand? From the study of the postwar literature it emerges that the urging of the western powers on the basis of the strategic situation would have forced the Russians absolutely into the attack in the summer of 1943. Then however the russian would have been forced into the wearing down fight through a deep system of defensive positions.From the experience of the two world wars such an operation attrits the attacker in an uncommon measure even with a strong expenditure of material . In the consequent battle in the open our Panzerdivisions would have come into play against the weakened enemy under much more favourable circonstances and in their proper mission.
When striking from the forehand however they were used from the beginning- because of the lack insufficient number of infantrydivisions- f or the fight in the defense positions which is foreign to their nature, before they could deploy in the open space.  Beyond this they had to cover their their long flanks themselves, so that the already slim attack wedge became even slimmer and therefore decisively lost in striking power.  The commanding generals of the Armygroups had in agreement with the OKH time and time again insistently pointed out this sore point of the operation. The 19 mobile units would have suffised for a great victory if they had been only deployed in the open space at their full striking power. 
The choice of the timing also had a negative influece. The Inspector General of Panzertruppen had considered a pause beyond june as urgently required for the refitting of the Panzerdivisions. From the viewpoint of the front beginning to mid june was the latest time to execute the operation as planned. Hitler did not do the first neither did he take the second counsel. Anyway,beginning july was the most unfavourable time,especially because it lacked surprise. Time had worked for the enemy in every respect. What still could be risked in the first half of june became a mistake in july.  "</sup>

30-11-2009 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann