Inhoud blog
  • northern shoulder
  • AGC logistics
  • Ursachen des zusammenbruch
  • tank maintenance 2
  • TANK MAINTENANCE
    Zoeken in blog

    Beoordeel dit blog
      Zeer goed
      Goed
      Voldoende
      Nog wat bijwerken
      Nog veel werk aan
     
    Archief per maand
  • 11-2013
  • 06-2013
  • 03-2013
  • 02-2013
  • 12-2012
  • 02-2012
  • 04-2011
  • 03-2011
  • 01-2011
  • 09-2010
  • 08-2010
  • 03-2010
  • 12-2009
  • 11-2009
  • 09-2009
  • 03-2009
  • 02-2009
  • 08-2008
  • 07-2008
  • 06-2008
  • 04-2008
  • 03-2008
  • 02-2008
  • 09-2005
    Foto
    Inhoud blog
  • northern shoulder
  • AGC logistics
  • Ursachen des zusammenbruch
  • tank maintenance 2
  • TANK MAINTENANCE
    Laatste commentaren
    Zoeken met Google


    wittmann's blog

    27-06-2013
    Klik hier om een link te hebben waarmee u dit artikel later terug kunt lezen.AGC logistics

    Foreign military studies 1945-1954 Manuscript  P 190 continued

    "b. Means of transportation

    1. The railways

    The capacity of the Russian railways depended on the amount of the existing trackage and on the availability of equipment and of station and yard facilities, which could not be judged according to Central European standards. The fact alone that there was not enough Russian rolling stock available made it necessary to convert the tracks from wide to standard gauge. Only by these speedily applied measures was it possible to move the supply trains from the zone of interior to their final destination without the time-consuming transshipment at the border, which would have caused much delay. The daily average of rail shipments into the Army Group Center area , was as follows:

    July                24    trains   10.700 tons

    August          22,7 trains   10.215 tons

    September  26 trains       11.700 tons

    (No records could be found for the months  October - December 1941 

    With the coming of winter  and the growing activity of partisans, the capacity decreased steadily, reaching its lowest point in December 1941 and January 1942.

    2. Truck transport

     a) According to T/E , the organic truck load capacity available to different types of units was as follows:

      infantry divisions      90 tons(plus 180 tons of horse drawn capacity)      infantry corps  30 tons                                         motorized divisions   240 tons                                    panzer (or motorized corps) corps      60 tons

    panzer divisions          360 tons

    Panzer and motorized divisions and corps have an additional 50 tons of POL transport capacity

    b) Depending on the number and types of divisions to be supplied and their tactical missions, the armies were allocated a varying number of non-organic truck columns . At the time the various armies became operational  , their non-organic truck transport was as follows:

    Fourth army                    4440 tons    22nd june

    Ninth army                     2970 tons    22 june

    Second army                  1645 tons   beginning of july

    Second Panzer Group  5000 tons    22 june

    Third panzer group       3240 tons   22 june

    Fourth Panzer Group    3320 tons   beginning of September

    c)  Army High Command allocated  to the Supply Field Agency of Army Group Center a heavy transport capacity of 25000 tons; during the summer of 1941 this amount was increased by approximately 5000 tons

    C. Supply phase lines (22 June- 31 December 1941)

    22 June During the initial phase of the military operations the supply proceeded without difficulty

    25 June  Army depots were moved forward to the line Oboz Lesna(north of)-Lida-Alytus. As the distance from the depots to the two supply sub-districts increased it became necessary , especially for the armored formations , to establish new depots in the Minsk-Molodeczno area. Suitable locations were

    30 june found on 30 june, and immediately afterwards the depots were setup .

    15 july  By mid-july the new base section was enlarged and other depots were installed further east at Bobruisk , Borissov, Lepel, and Polotsk and consolidated in the “Dnjepr supply district”.

    The establishment of this supply district extended the operational radius of the infantry divisions up to Smolensk , and that of the armored formations as far as Moscow. To reach these objectives however, the daily tonnage moved by rail would have had to 
    average 6.300 tons and that trucked by heavy transports 30.700 tons.However, these requirements could not be met.
    15 July On 15 july the combat forces were carrying on an average 75 percent of their basic load, sufficient POL to travel 120 miles, and seven days rations. The second and ninth army depots were almost empty. On the other hand, the Dnjepr supply district had in storage ammunition for approximately five days of combat, POL for a movement of about 25 miles and half a day's rations for about half a days rations for [u]all[/u] units in the Army Group area.The flow of supplies was steady but slow.By the establishment of the Dnjepr district and the conversion of tracks to standard gauge greater quantities of supplies could be shipped directly to the supply depots.It was now possible to shift the base area, a measure that had meanwhile become urgently imperative.In view of the overall situation ,the plans for future operations, and the condition of the road and rail net, the following plans were adopted to assure a normal flow of supply:
     1) Efficiently operationg depots had to be moved forward
    along the Army Group's main axis of advance in the direction of Moscow via Smolensk. To implement this
    policy the Orsha depot was established on 22 july and the Smolensk depot on 2 august.
    2) On the southern wing the depots were  established along the axis Slutsk-Roagachev . First the Bobruisk depot was set up, then the one at Mogilev
    3) Along the northern wing , where road and rail communications were particularly defective, the Polotsk depot was initially the principal supply point.The Nevel and Vitebsk depots were subsequently established further to the east and southeast.

    10 August : The heavy truck transport - since 4 august no longer employed for hauling supplies from Sub-districts 1 and 2 -was capable of covering a total distance of about 250 miles, which was roughly the milieage between the railheads and Moscow.
    During the months of August and September the Dnjepr supply district was further expanded so that it developed into an efficient base section.The depots were distributed over an area of approximately 250 miles.The supplies stored in this area were needed to feed the autumn offensive. By the beginning of august the Dnjepr Supply District depots contained , POL for 45 miles, and four days  rations.
    The two Panzer Groups had the following at their disposal:
      1) Second Panzer Group - 50 percent the basic load of ammunition , POL for about 155 miles and four days rations;
      2) Third Panzer  Group  - 133 percent of the basic load of ammunition , POL for about 110 miles , and fourteen days rations.
    By mid august the over-all supply of ammunition for the entire Army Group was increased to 133 percent of the basic load.
    September : The Gomel and Roslavl depots , which were closest to the front , were given priority for supplies arriving within the Army Group area. At  the same time every effort was made to expand the Smolensk supply district.
    10 September : On 10 september , the armies , including the Panzer Groups , had at their disposal , on the average, more than 75 percent of the basic load of ammunition and four consumption units of POL , good for a distance of approximately 185 miles.
    The Army Group Center average, including GHQ units and reserves , was 133 percent of the basic load of ammunition and one consumption unit of POL, ennough to cover of approximately 45 miles."   

    27-06-2013 om 14:31 geschreven door wittmann  

    0 1 2 3 4 5 - Gemiddelde waardering: 0/5 - (0 Stemmen)


    Archief per week
  • 28/10-03/11 2013
  • 24/06-30/06 2013
  • 04/03-10/03 2013
  • 18/02-24/02 2013
  • 11/02-17/02 2013
  • 03/12-09/12 2012
  • 20/02-26/02 2012
  • 28/03-03/04 2011
  • 14/03-20/03 2011
  • 10/01-16/01 2011
  • 06/09-12/09 2010
  • 02/08-08/08 2010
  • 01/03-07/03 2010
  • 28/12-03/01 2010
  • 30/11-06/12 2009
  • 14/09-20/09 2009
  • 23/03-29/03 2009
  • 02/03-08/03 2009
  • 23/02-01/03 2009
  • 11/08-17/08 2008
  • 07/07-13/07 2008
  • 02/06-08/06 2008
  • 28/04-04/05 2008
  • 17/03-23/03 2008
  • 18/02-24/02 2008
  • 28/01-03/02 2008
  • 26/09-02/10 2005

    E-mail mij

    Druk op onderstaande knop om mij te e-mailen.


    Gastenboek

    Druk op onderstaande knop om een berichtje achter te laten in mijn gastenboek


    Blog als favoriet !

    Foto



    Blog tegen de wet? Klik hier.
    Gratis blog op https://www.bloggen.be - Meer blogs