The reality is that the majority of german soldiers did their job fighting a war.Some want to create another impression.
Those that try to criminalise the german army as an institution have a political agenda or are biased.You can go on any internetforum and find lefties attacking not only the german army but also other armies in other wars.The methods used are always the same.There are also biased persons who apply totally different standards on the german army.
Convictions by tribunals without legal preexisting basis where normal rules of evidence were not applied do not make much of an impression.


This user always uses the same tactic that consists in not accusing individuals but always the whole german army or whole german divisions.Because he lacks the evidence to support these claims he resorts to guilt by association.Here he does it again by pointing out that the dirlewanger brigade fought together with wehrmacht divisions and therefore the whole wehrmacht is guilty of what it did.Because heer units were ordered to take one or the other artifact,the whole army is guilty of looting.It is interesting to note in this context that many artifacts in western museums come from 'looting' in the past centuries and they will certainly not give them back.
This posting again shows that the author is on a crusade against THE german army.If he would limit himself to say that this or that german soldier committed warcrimes,I would not even read the posting because the subject is completely indifferent to me.If the german army as an institution is attacked then I react.
It is a matter fact that on any internetforum you will find leftists attacking any army that is not that of a leftist regime of warcrimes.The methods this user uses against the german army are used by them to criminalise the german army in ww2,the us army in vietnam,iraq, afghanistan etc...The second category that tries to criminalise the german army are people with anti-german bias.
The statement about the sixth army order and its relevance to the stalingrad campaign is obviously wrong because Reichenau was not in command during the stalingrad campaign,he was already dead by then and the army was commanded by Paulus.
As Reichenau was a convinced nationalsocialist the wording of his order is not surprising but certainly not caracteristic for the mentality of most german generals that were not ardent nationalsocialists.
The content of the order is not shocking either.Reichenau does not want armed people in civilians clothes to be treated as prisoners of war.That is rather obvious.
In view of the logistical problems of the german army,not feeding non combatants that do not work for the german army from army kitchens ,is also common sense.
Not putting out fires in buildings that were put on fire by the retreating red army except when to be used to house german troops and the statement about the destruction of communist buildings is harsh but not shocking.If the red army puts buildings on fire then obviously the german army will only put them out if it needs the buildings itself.
The hard treatment of people that aid or abet partisans is perfectly understandable in view of the way these communist partisans fight.

A lenghty quote from Heer in Fesseln,Siegfried Westphal(Rommels's chief operations officer) Athenäum Verlag 1950 PP 193-197:
"One can only judge personalities if one knows them oneself.For these reasons and only for these the following must be limited to the german side.
Here Rommel comes forward the strongest.His name was proverbial for all the Germans and Italians,who fought under him.Above that,even now each former german soldier thinks of Rommel when the desert is mentioned ,as the master of this warfare.What is the reason for this ?The answer is simple:his personality and his actions.Because this man was a personality,who even without experience in the desert was made for his mission in Africa and mastered it long enough.It was his strong merciless will also against himself that made the army ,nonwithstanding all difficulties,capable of great achievements which were also recognized by the other side.No other than Rommel could have asked so much of his soldiers.They followed him because they knew that he did not spare himself because they saw him each day in their midst and because they felt that he was a born leader.In all his aiming for success he never forgot that it had to be obtained with as few losses as possible.A word that he often used was:"He preferred that soldiers in a situation without issue would be captured instead of killed for no reason".For that reason he ordered the commanders of Halfaya and Bardia contrary to Hitler's directives,not to fight until the last man but to cease resistance when it would only cause useless bloodshed.
of this war.
Obviously,he was not free of flaws. Where there is much light,the shadow does not lack.So he shot many times far over the objective in success and forgot the limits drawn by logistics etc...He was often unjust when a measure ordered by him did not bring success that he had promised to himself.He sought the fault not in the circonstances but in the faulty execution.There was no army on both sides where the courtmartials were so 'unemployed' as in Rommel's army.In the whole time of his command in Africa he never signed a sentence of a courtmartial even if he threatened it so much in anger.Rommel was not free from ambition and a certain personal vanity.A contradictory mindset and willfullness made it not light to work with him for subordinates and those above him.And he was not a diplomat.He said what he thought and
sometimes irritated the allies in one of his outbursts when he had something to reproach.
Concerning his military capacities he was ironically called the fieldcommander of the first line.One wanted to express that he who had not gone through the school of the general staff,was overtaxed with the command of an army.Certainly,he made some serious errors of command, where the too early start of pursuit in november 1941 and the advance towards El Alamein after the fall of Tobruk have to be remembered.But the largest part of his actions speaks not only for extraordinarily tactical capacities but also for a general military aptitude far above average.For all those who worked for him ,it remained again and again amazing how fast he judged the big picture and got the essential point out of it .Therefore he is rightly considered as one of the most outstanding soldiers of the second world war.He was an upright and brave man.Behind a raw exterior hid a soft heart foreign to unnoble thoughts....
In his soldiers life rich in success but also in concern and danger Rommel proved to the bitter end,when the cup with poison was given to him,that he was a knight without fear or reproach."


It is low on concrete details which is not surprising  .More details can be found in other works .  
And you 'forgot' to quote the following statement by Halder in the preface:'

On the positive side belongs the tempo and performance of field forces under the

leadership of Rommel, forces which were without a doubt far

above the average in initiative, spontaneity, and soldierly zeal'

If you go with Halder(and that is what you stated)then you have to go with him all the way.


.
 
One german staff officer put it like this:" 
:
"After it became clear that the attack on Moskau had failed,a big decision had to be made and a retreat had to be executed on a line which could be held in winter.And to be precise,the retreat had to be done in one move.
The point of a retreat is to break away from the enemy.
The purpose of this type of combat-the retreat is a type of combat,not something fatal,flight or shame- is to break off the battle and to remain master of your will,independent from the will of the enemy.....
 Only big jumps can shake the pursuer.
To break away fast from the enemy in all circonstances and gain space far back to preserve the own combat power  is more important than fighting for every square meter of ground.Hitler the Supreme commander of the german Wehrmacht ,did not know the word retreat and probably was even proud of this .He made the typical error of a layman,to see the objective of combat in gaining and holding terrain.
.....
In this retreat the troop had the feeling of a continuous wavering between standfast and retreat,deep retreat and small jumps.The way the german retreat from Moskau was executed,AGC got into mortal danger .
AGC was not destroyed  thanks to the german individual soldier and NCO.....
Their heroic fight under such conditions is proof that  the troops would not have run away when the retreat would have been allowed earlier and further.
It would have been executable with  fewer losses and would have come to a halt further to the east and without  the deep bends in the front at the 4th army and between AGN and AGC which were continual crisispoints in the new year ." 

The last man to be out of his depth in Northafrica was Rommel.In view of the fact that the terrain was very favorable for mobile operations he was the right man to command Axis forces.There were not many in the german army that could have performed at the same level of competence.
Rommel seems to be the favorite target for some.In itself a sign of greatness becaus greatness attacts contrarians.And there will always be those like me who will defend him eacxh time.

Rommel was very aware of his logistics as is illustrated by the following quote from  Krieg ohne Hass(Rommel's writings published by his wife and general Bayerlein) ,Verlag Heidenheimer Zeitung 1950 p 276:'A sufficient supply of weapons,gasoline and ammunition is the prerequisite for any army that wants to be victorious in a battle.The battle is fought  and decided before the actual fighting, by the quartermasters.
The most brave man is useless without guns,the best gun is useless without ammunition,and guns and ammunition are not much use in mobile warfare if they cannot be moved by vehicles with suffiicient fuel.The supply must quantatively be at more or less the same level as what the enemy has and also in quality'.
Another quote from Rommel on the same page about air superiority:'Another prerequisite for an army,which wants to see through  a battle,is at least a balance of forces in the air or a situation almost equal to it.When the opponent has air superiority and exercises it with high intensity,then from this result the following limitations and disadvantages for the own command:

his agressive mindset.I will illustrate this with the following statement by Rommel in 'Krieg ohne Hass p399-400':'Our fundamental and most important advantage over the enemy in Northafrica was the following:my troops were suited for a further training from modern viewpoints when they arrived
 on african soil in the beginning of 1941.My officer corps,particularly the younger commanders and general staff officers had a modern attitude and did not have the conservative burden of the british officer.From the beginning we endeavoured to make the troops a tool for fastest  impovisation and to introduce a fast handling of manoeuvers.Officers who did not have enough initiative to bring their troops forward or came up with prejudices,were mercilessly fired by me and sent to Europe,when it was the only  possibility.With general staff officers of lower rank it was less important for me wether they had strategic knowledge-because how often did they have to think strategically-but they had to bring a good tactical equipment to cope with the many tactical problems which the african war confronted us with. By all means I tried to establish a close communicationlink with the combat units and found out that a battle headquarters in the area of the front equipped with radios and protected by bodyguards was the most advantageous.Absolutely,we demanded great modesty and continuous personal example from each commander and by this an extraordinary esprit de corps was created in my troop.Never was there a breakdown of morale in the german fronttroops,never capitulation from apathy or fatigue.In the worst siituations the troops conserved discipline,without this havig to be enforced.'
General von Mellenthin says the following about the briish generals in Panzerbatles p 179:'I do not propose to discuss British generalship;their commanders committed many grave blunders and suffered some needless and sanguine disasters. Even the best of their generals were not as dashing and versatile as Rommel,and I don't think the British ever solved the problem of mobile warfare.In general the british method of making war is slow,rigid and methodical;they trust to their sea power and the vast resources of their empire and dominions.'   

An interesting quote which shows Rommel's ideas about mobile warfare in Krieg ohne Hass pp118-122:'Northafrica was the theatre of war in which war played in its most modern form.The fight was carried on both sides by fully motorised units for whose use there were unimagined possibilities in the flat desert without obstacles.Only here the basic principles of armored warfare as they had been taught theoretically before the war could be fully applied. Only here pure tankbattles of big units were fought.Even when temporarily the war stiffened into infantrywar,in its most important phases 1941/42 ,during the cunningham offensive and in the summer of 1942 it was based on the principle of full mobility.In practice,this was militarily new territory because our offensives in Poland and the west were against an enemy who  operationaly had to give strong consideration to his non motorised infantry units,which particularly in a retreat leads to a catastrophic limitation in tactical freedom of decisionmaking. Often,this fact forced the enemy to decisions which were not likely to stop our advance.The infantrydivisions of our enemy were simply overtaken and outflanked by our motorised units.Then the operational reserves of the opposing force had to have themselves worn down in tactically often unfavorable positions to gain time for the retreat of the infantry units. 
Non motorized units only have any worth against an armored and motorized enemy in stronly built positions.When this position is broken through or outflanked then during a retreat they are helplessly at the mercy of the enemy and can in the most extreme case resist to the last bullet in their position.On the retreat they cause tremendous difficulties because they,as mentioned before,force  the use of the motorised units to gain time.I had to ondergo this experience myself during the retreat of the Panzergroup from the Cyrenaica in 1941/1942,because almost the whole of the  italian and strong german infantry units had almost no vehicles and and had to be transported partially by  columns in shuttle transport.It was only thanks to the bravery of my motorised units that the german italian infantry units could be covered because the fully motorised british were in sharp pursuit.
The defeats of Graziani were also mainly due to the fact that a large part of the italian army was not motorised and helplessly at the mercy of weaker but fully motorised british units in the open desert.The weaker italian motorised units could not successfully oppose the the british but nevertheless had to go into combat to protect the infantry and be destroyed.
From the pure motorised form of warfare in Libya and Egypt  resulted laws which are essentially different from those of other theatres of war.They will for the future which belongs to fully motorised units,be decisive.
The surrounding of the fullymotorised opposing enemy in flat desert terrain wfich can be driven well has the following consequences:
a)The surrounding of a motorised opposing unit is the most unfavorable tactical position for this which is possible because one can work with ones weapons from all sides on the surrounded enemy units.The surrounding from three sides is also an acceptable tactical situation.
b)The enemy will be forced to give up the terrain occupied by him because of the bad tactical position resulting from the surrounding.
The surrounding of the enemy and his resulting destruction in the cauldron can only seldomly be the immediate objective because a fully motorised troop which stays organically intact will if the terrain allows ,anytime be able to break out of the improvised surrounding.Because the commander of the surrounded unit will thanks to the motorisation be in the position to create a focal point on a weak spot and there break the ring of the besieger.This was shown again and again in the desert.
This means that the following opposing units can be destroyed in a cauldron:
a)a non motorised enemy or an enemy that has to consider non motorised units.
b)an enemy that is badly lead or whose command aims to sacrifice a unit to save others.
c) the enemy whose forces are already broken and show signs of breaking up

Except the cases mentioned under a) and b),the surrounding of an enmy and his subsequent destruction in a cauldron can only be aimed at when he has been so weakened that he has lost his organical coherence.The combats which aim at the wearing down of the enemy's resistance fall under the notion,battle of attrition'. The material  wearing down and the breakdown of the organical structure of the enemy army must be the immediate target of the planning in the motorised war.
The batle of attrition is tactically executed with a high measure of mobility.
Hereby mainly the following viewpoints are to be considered.:
a)one aims at the concentration in time and space  of the own forces while those of the enemy are to be split and destroyed at different times 
b)of extraordinay sensibility are the supply lines because by them the supply of fuel and ammo has to happen ,the prerequisite for the battle.   
One protects the own ones with all means and atempts to destroy or better to cut off those of the enemy.Operations in the enemy supply area will force the enemy to break off the battle at other places because the supply is the prerequisite for the battle and most be protected in the first place. 
c)the armored troop is the backbone of the motorised army.The tank is everything,the other unit sare only additions. The battle of attrition against the enemy amor units has therfore to be born as much as possible by the antitank units.The own panzer units have to inflict the last blow.
d)in the shortest possible time the results of reconnaisance must reach the command and this must make decisions and transform them into deeds as fast as possible.The greater reaction speed decides the battle.Therefore it is to be demanded that commanders of motorised units must be as close as possible to the troop and be in close contact with them.
e)Speed of the own movement and organisational intactness are decisive in the battle and merit special consideration.When disruptions occur ,one has to take care of speedy reorganisation. 
f)Of great importance are the covering up of the own intentions to create surprise...
g)Only when the opponent has been smashed , can in exploitation of success the attempt  be made to overtake and destroy large parts of his  ruined units.Here also speed is everything.Under no circonstance may the enemy be given the opportunity for reorganisation. Fast regrouping for the pursuit,fast reorganisation of the logistics for the offensive units is necessary.'       

'...that with a daily consumption of 100 tons(food and fuel), I need to bring forward 100 tons. Now ,the distance is 1600 km. With a daily distance achieved of 300 km, I need 11 days for 3200 kms and two days for rest and maintenance,thus 13 days and correspondingly a column volume of 1300 tons, The trucks also need fuel . For 100 km 30 liters fuelconsumption. For one vehicle for one trip 960 liter =1 ton. As a truck has 3 ton load capacity 1/3 more. Thus loadcapacity 1300 ton + 400 tons = 1700 tons.
There was not taken into account munitions,water,medication,...and especially spare parts for trucks. I put these theoretical considerations here to show the difficulties a supply over longer distances has without railways. Fortunately there are modern solutions.
My columns have achieved enormously . ...Monthly achievement: 900.000 t- kms. Hereby 2/3 of the columns was used. With t -km I count only the kilometers which were driven loaded. When one reflects that trucks are only driven with a load of 2 ton in the desert, then one can correctly pretend that our drivers know every night what they have achieved.'

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Westphal Erinnerungen pp 145-146
Rommel and I each f lew in a Storch over the new position. The image that presented itself from air could render the observer timid. The emptiness of the fututre battlefield was depressing; one saw a few groups of freezing Italian soldiers, from time to time also a few guns. That was all except a high number of supply vehicles. Now one saw correctly and very vividly how big the losses of above all the allies had been. With this small bundle we could impossible withstand a new British large assault. When we saw each other again after the landing, Rommel thought that I did not look very confident. He also did not look overly happy. From now on all our endeavours were aimed at how we could meet this dilemma.
The IC Major von Mellenthin submitted an overview,which I had aske, about the predicted strength of the enemy in front of our frontline on the 20th january and its projcted gradual growth until the end of february. At a comparison with our strength, until  25th january, a light superiority resulted for the Panzergroup. From then on the ratio of forces changed more and more in our disadvantage. Therefore, according to my opinion, we had to attack before the 8th army had closed up from depth. At first, Rommel did not tend to accept my proposal. I asked him to sleep on the matter. Next morning he greeted me with the words 'Topp, it will be done.' It was clear to us that the could could only succeed , when the intention remained secret. Otherwise it was to be feared that Bastico or the Commando Supremo informed by him or also the OKW would have a run in with us. The Commander in chief South also had to remain out of the game at first , When many knew about it, there was the danger that the enemy would be informed by imprudent talk. The whole plan rested on absolute surprise. In addition, Rommel was considered by Cavallero Iin Rome and also by the German offices there, as a man that had to be 'braked'. This prejudice originated from the very first beginning whe alledgedly drove forward too carelessly and therefore too far to the east. That Italian North Africa would have since long been completely lost if Rommel had remained on the defensive according to orders, one had forgotten or maybe not understood. Only the chief of staff of Bastico, Gastone Gambara was taken into our confidence, because we needed him. He lent us fuel and trucks. 

i  have to mention that Rommel had sent Gause again to Europe, to intensify the logistics. He returned at the beginning of february. 

Erinnerungen page 193-194

"It would be a truism to state thar FM Rommel was the soul of the german-Italian warfighting in Africa. His soldierly work in the desert has made his name worlsfamous. However, he was not only the soul but also the motor of the fight in Africa. From a passion which burned inside him, he  consumed himself. The weakness of the heart which showed itself with this modest man in 1942, is to be solely attributed to the activity which continually overtaxed his organism.The resposability for the theatreand his troops was a heavy burden on him, it robbed him many times of his sleep. T o the premonition of the fate that threatened us in Africa, came the oppressing care for the Fatherland. Then FM Rommel deep down had a soft heart. From nature very sensible, he frequently surrounded himself with an armour .
Decorated with the highest prussian war order as an infantry officer from Württemberrg in WW1, he remained in his thinking and acting a front officer, even as a high commander. The front,the fight , the longing to be with his soldiers in the battle were the only motivations which drew him magically from his command post to the front. The influence which his daily appearance at the front exercised, was of the greatest use for the cause. The troop was attached to him who still asked so much from it. It swore on him who gave it nothing and drove it restlessly forward. Between it and him existed this atmosphere which cannot be analysed, which is a gift of mercy for any military commander, is so seldom and therefore maybe makes it that. The Italian soldier also worshipped his German commander in chief in the same way in an unusually high measure. Without a doubt Erwin Rommel was  the German army commander of ww2 who was the closest to the 'ordinary man'. His crtics have called him the commanbder of the first line. By this it was to be stated that he who had not gone through theschool of the general staff, was not an army commander after all. This judgment is unjust. He certainly had also committed mistakes. But outstandingly soldierly disposed , he soon got used to the command of large units. He grew- for all who were continually around him clearly visible- more and more with his mission. When something was new to him at first as for example the possibility of supplying over a seaway one did not dominate, he soon recognised this core matter in the full gravity of its importance.
It needed strict orders from Hitler to move the sick fieldmarshall from his theatre. His only consolation was that his soldiers awaited another fate as their comerades in Stalingrad. The 'Africans' felt that. They understood him. No other German general could have done better than Rommel . He is and remains the German master of warfighting in the desert."