Jan Bauwens
TRANS-ATHEISM
(Original title: Trans-atheïsme. Serskamp 2003; ISBN 90-17181-9)
Weblog under construction
Part 1: A short review on the central issue of this text.
This work consists out of three parts. The first part is about physicalism. In our very perspective, physicalism is being excavated because of some fundamental objections. In the second part, an alternative view to physicalism is being established in the form of a metaphysics and ethics inspired by Christianity. It is our conviction that this alternative is immune to the objections mentioned. In the third part, eventually, we consider the mystery of salvation in Christianity. Let us first say something about physicalism and, after that, something about the alternative view that is being presented here.
In the course of the nineteen-twenties, some neo-positivists gather in the so-called Wiener Kreis, the Circle of Vienna. They reject metaphysics while pointing at the fact that they all contradict each other and, as a consequence, that they are unable to deliver some true knowledge. Metaphysical statements do not contain any meaning thats their conclusion. The philosophers of the Vienna Circle judge the criterion for the being significant of statements to be the one of a principally experimentally logic-deductive determinability. In brief: a statement is being said to be significant (i.e.: it contains something, it says something, it has some meaning) on the condition that one is able principally and by the means of physics and of logical deduction to determine whether it is either true or false. While metaphysical statements do not admit this specific determination, they cannot have any content: they are meaningless, empty of any meaning or sense or content. Conspicuous examples of meaningless statements are, e.g.: God exists and God does not exist. In physicalism, the concept of meaningfulness and the one of experimental determinability are equivalent, i.e.: in no way separated.
Yet this criterion is very problematic. We could synthesise our remarks by the objection that physicalism has a strongly reductionistic character. This follows from its inductive, objectivistic and materialistic approach of things. We will now direct our attention to these three points first.
Our first remark concerns the unjust use of induction by physicalism. Firstly, we will see that the thought-failure of induction can be overcome by the means of a specific distinguishing of concepts from beforehand which factually is what is being done in a Christian worldview. The essence of our first remark can be synthesised as follows: while reality is essentially more than a mere construction, the physicalist criterion considering the significance (or the relevance) of judgements to be equivalent to their own (principally) experimental verifiability cant but lay claim to that aspect of reality that is being known from a constructivist perspective. Though concerning the essence of reality, the physicalistis criterion of significance as such has no relevance whatsoever.
Let us now ask this question: in which way does physicalism commit the sin of induction? We repeat that in physicalism a statement is being considered to be significant on the condition that it is possible to determine by the means of an experiment whether a predicate is either true or false. As we know: each experiment is a reconstruction (of a specific part) of reality. But one cannot reconstruct a thing unless that thing as such already is a construction. And now the question arises whether reality as such is indeed a mere construction. As its criterion concerning signification shows, thats the conviction physicalism leans on. Yet as we think, one has not a single base to make that statement.
What makes that followers of physicalism suppose reality to be a mere construction? For this supposition is problematic while, in considering reality as a mere construction, one is denying an essential part of it: one is neglecting the stuff out of which the constructed thing is being built up; one is overlooking the given reality of the building material of the (supposed) construction. In these, we even didnt touch the question of a constructor. It is definitely true that mans work can be reduced to a whole of constructions, which are components put together and, inevitably, those components have to be there first, because man cannot just make things out of nothing: his activity always presupposes a given reality consisting of these building materials; the whole human reality is a construction out of given materials. But how ever could one derive from this that reality as such would be a mere construction? One just cannot do so. It is understandable that, by an act of projection, one induces ones own, human worldview into reality, yet this is logically unacceptable. Nevertheless this is exactly what physicalism does. In physicalism it is being stated that a tree principally can be constructed while it is also being taken for granted that a tree is a construction or a compilation.
Is it possible to avoid the induction mentioned, or is it even an obligation to do so? Indeed this is a possibility as well as an obligation; let us show why. The mentioned induction can be avoided by the a priori making of a difference between, on the one hand, things that have been constructed and, on the other hand, things that have been given. This differentiation is significant even when it continues to be impossible to define things given positively and in an exhaustive way. Yet because this differentiation is significant, it also has to be made. In Christianity, the given things are being named: created things or, shortly: creation. Things which did not result from any kind of construction by the means of a given matter, came into existence seemingly out of nothing: they have been created. The activity of creation is being ascribed to the creator, God.
Now the question arises whether also Christian thought is guilty of induction. For in Christian thought, the given reality is being ascribed to the divine creation. Though, this would be a rash judgement for the following reasons. In physicalism, induction cannot be apologised while it is made prematurely: in physicalism one disregards the making of a difference between things constructed and things given. Yet this differentiation has to be made because it is possible to do so. In Christian thought this differentiation is being made. Further on, one is free to ascribe a positive reality to things given, at least on the condition that one does not demand from the given reality (as well as from the reality of the One who is giving it) to be a knowable one. In this way, it is justifiable to give to things that have not been constructed just the name of given things while we can find ourselves in the (grateful) possession of them. For we know that the disregarding of the positive character of the things given would at once result in the neglecting of the positive character of the things that have been constructed out of them, and this of course would be absurd while things constructed are being considered to be knowable things. Moreover, also the author of the constructed things being man himself makes a part of the domain of the given things a domain which, simultaneously, is real and unknowable.
Still one remark has to be made here. Reality is more than just a construction, even if it can be considered as a mere construction e.g. by a physicist. A chair is more than just its shape, but a designer may consider a chair as if it was a mere shape. So, a Christian perspective does not imply a consideration of reality as if it was a mere construction to be just insignificant. The significance of such a specific consideration may already follow from its fertility, as physics are an extremely important domain. Nevertheless, Christian thought implies that a mere physicalist perspective on reality will never be able to exhaust the core of reality, while reality is embedding much more than its constructive character, even when e.g. by necessity or by considerations of mere practical value we can easily reduce our perspective to that very part of it.
Aside from the mentioned problem of reductionism, our second remark concerns the objectivistic character of the physicalist world-view. In two words: restricting itself to the epistemic perspective, physicalism disregards the hidden yet fundamentally imperative character of indicative judgements (and their imperative character merges into their ethical character). After an analysis of the problem of objectivism in physicalism, we must come to the following conclusion: indicatives have to be considered as being a specific subclass of imperatives; classical argumentation has to be considered as being a specific subclass of testimony; and the epistemic domain has to be considered as being a specific subclass of the domain of ethics.
(to be continued)
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