"Because the rapid success effecting a breakthrough was the main condition for the success of the operation, the Generalkommando proposed, taking into account the battle worth of 277 th VGD and 3rd parachute division and the difficult terrain, that at least part of the Panzer divisisons should be used in the breakthrough. This was the more advisable as the right neighbour would not attack in close contact which would create a 15 km gap.This request was denied. In spite of that, the Generalkommando prepared a battlegroup of each Panzer division(1 batallion reinforced by assaltguns) behind 277 th VGD and 3 rd parachute division.
Sixth seventh of the attack area consisted of very rugged terrain of medium altitude, in the northern Eiffel mountains. Only the most southern part( one regimental sector) was open, slowly rising towards the enemy positions. Only one good road led through the central part of the attack sector. The other future 'Rollbahnen' consisted of field and wood tracks with weak bridges and steep upgrades and downgrades. The good road parallel to the front from Hollerath to Losheimergraben was in no mans land and had been completely blocked since the west wall engagements of 1940. The conditions made it necessary to have each battle group of the Panzer divisions take along sufficient supplies, since it was impossible to bypass on these roads. This could not be done because of lack of fuel. Corps headquarters therefore decided to concentrate on the opening of the Hallschlag-Losheimergraben-Büllingen road by the 12 th VGD. This was done with the full realisation that the commitment of the 277 th VD in the northern sector would endanger the northern flank of the corps. For its protection the battle group mentioned above was kept ready. Since the 3rd parachute divivion arrived too late, it was committed in the southern sector, which was favourable for road traffic.
Thus, the infantry divisions subordinate to the corps were distributed to the attack as follows:
277th VGD on the right
(behind it a battle group of 12th SS Panzer
12th VGD in the center
3rd parachute divivion on the left
(behind it a battlegroup of 1st SS Panzer) "

03-11-2013 om 16:03 geschreven door wittmann  

Foreign military studies 1945-1954 Manuscript  P 190 continued

"b. Means of transportation

1. The railways

The capacity of the Russian railways depended on the amount of the existing trackage and on the availability of equipment and of station and yard facilities, which could not be judged according to Central European standards. The fact alone that there was not enough Russian rolling stock available made it necessary to convert the tracks from wide to standard gauge. Only by these speedily applied measures was it possible to move the supply trains from the zone of interior to their final destination without the time-consuming transshipment at the border, which would have caused much delay. The daily average of rail shipments into the Army Group Center area , was as follows:

July                24    trains   10.700 tons

August          22,7 trains   10.215 tons

September  26 trains       11.700 tons

(No records could be found for the months  October - December 1941 

With the coming of winter  and the growing activity of partisans, the capacity decreased steadily, reaching its lowest point in December 1941 and January 1942.

2. Truck transport

 a) According to T/E , the organic truck load capacity available to different types of units was as follows:

  infantry divisions      90 tons(plus 180 tons of horse drawn capacity)      infantry corps  30 tons                                         motorized divisions   240 tons                                    panzer (or motorized corps) corps      60 tons

panzer divisions          360 tons

Panzer and motorized divisions and corps have an additional 50 tons of POL transport capacity

b) Depending on the number and types of divisions to be supplied and their tactical missions, the armies were allocated a varying number of non-organic truck columns . At the time the various armies became operational  , their non-organic truck transport was as follows:

Fourth army                    4440 tons    22nd june

Ninth army                     2970 tons    22 june

Second army                  1645 tons   beginning of july

Second Panzer Group  5000 tons    22 june

Third panzer group       3240 tons   22 june

Fourth Panzer Group    3320 tons   beginning of September

c)  Army High Command allocated  to the Supply Field Agency of Army Group Center a heavy transport capacity of 25000 tons; during the summer of 1941 this amount was increased by approximately 5000 tons

C. Supply phase lines (22 June- 31 December 1941)

22 June During the initial phase of the military operations the supply proceeded without difficulty

25 June  Army depots were moved forward to the line Oboz Lesna(north of)-Lida-Alytus. As the distance from the depots to the two supply sub-districts increased it became necessary , especially for the armored formations , to establish new depots in the Minsk-Molodeczno area. Suitable locations were

30 june found on 30 june, and immediately afterwards the depots were setup .

15 july  By mid-july the new base section was enlarged and other depots were installed further east at Bobruisk , Borissov, Lepel, and Polotsk and consolidated in the “Dnjepr supply district”.

The establishment of this supply district extended the operational radius of the infantry divisions up to Smolensk , and that of the armored formations as far as Moscow. To reach these objectives however, the daily tonnage moved by rail would have had to 
average 6.300 tons and that trucked by heavy transports 30.700 tons.However, these requirements could not be met.
15 July On 15 july the combat forces were carrying on an average 75 percent of their basic load, sufficient POL to travel 120 miles, and seven days rations. The second and ninth army depots were almost empty. On the other hand, the Dnjepr supply district had in storage ammunition for approximately five days of combat, POL for a movement of about 25 miles and half a day's rations for about half a days rations for [u]all[/u] units in the Army Group area.The flow of supplies was steady but slow.By the establishment of the Dnjepr district and the conversion of tracks to standard gauge greater quantities of supplies could be shipped directly to the supply depots.It was now possible to shift the base area, a measure that had meanwhile become urgently imperative.In view of the overall situation ,the plans for future operations, and the condition of the road and rail net, the following plans were adopted to assure a normal flow of supply:
 1) Efficiently operationg depots had to be moved forward
along the Army Group's main axis of advance in the direction of Moscow via Smolensk. To implement this
policy the Orsha depot was established on 22 july and the Smolensk depot on 2 august.
2) On the southern wing the depots were  established along the axis Slutsk-Roagachev . First the Bobruisk depot was set up, then the one at Mogilev
3) Along the northern wing , where road and rail communications were particularly defective, the Polotsk depot was initially the principal supply point.The Nevel and Vitebsk depots were subsequently established further to the east and southeast.

10 August : The heavy truck transport - since 4 august no longer employed for hauling supplies from Sub-districts 1 and 2 -was capable of covering a total distance of about 250 miles, which was roughly the milieage between the railheads and Moscow.
During the months of August and September the Dnjepr supply district was further expanded so that it developed into an efficient base section.The depots were distributed over an area of approximately 250 miles.The supplies stored in this area were needed to feed the autumn offensive. By the beginning of august the Dnjepr Supply District depots contained , POL for 45 miles, and four days  rations.
The two Panzer Groups had the following at their disposal:
  1) Second Panzer Group - 50 percent the basic load of ammunition , POL for about 155 miles and four days rations;
  2) Third Panzer  Group  - 133 percent of the basic load of ammunition , POL for about 110 miles , and fourteen days rations.
By mid august the over-all supply of ammunition for the entire Army Group was increased to 133 percent of the basic load.
September : The Gomel and Roslavl depots , which were closest to the front , were given priority for supplies arriving within the Army Group area. At  the same time every effort was made to expand the Smolensk supply district.
10 September : On 10 september , the armies , including the Panzer Groups , had at their disposal , on the average, more than 75 percent of the basic load of ammunition and four consumption units of POL , good for a distance of approximately 185 miles.
The Army Group Center average, including GHQ units and reserves , was 133 percent of the basic load of ammunition and one consumption unit of POL, ennough to cover of approximately 45 miles."   

27-06-2013 om 14:31 geschreven door wittmann  

10-03-2013 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

The Ordnance Inspectorate compiled the orders , the ordnance office placed them and the activation plans were in turn prepared by still other offices. All the efforts of the interested agencies to coordinate the production of of spare tank parts with the production of new tanks were of no avail. Promises were made but only partially kept. Even in peacetime the officers of the Ordnance Inspectorate in charge of procurement viewed the problem of tank repairs in the case of war with great concern. They were, however, unable to gain a hearing. Thus, it happened quite often that spare tank parts did not reach the the tank ordnance offices until the type of tank had undergone so many technical changes that the tanks had to be inactivated because of the lack of spare parts, and consequently , the spare parts no longer fitted, could not be used and simply piled up in the tank ordnance offices.
During the war the lack of spare tank parts was not at first as great as had been feared, because the campaigns in Poland,France and Yougoslavia were only of short duration and there were long intervals of time when the armored forces did not see any action.
The production of tanks increased constantly from the end of the French campaign to the beginning of the Russian campaign, but again this was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in producttion of spare parts. Moreover, the subsequent changes in design of current tank models made it quite difficult to plan the suplly of spare tank parts. Even in the new series and new types which were brought out, the production of spare parts was in no proportion to the actual need. However, one improvement had at least been achieved, namely, that at the beginning of the Eastern campaign the tank units were given a fairly adequate supply of spare parts with their initial issue. However, the deficiencies which had not been noticed up to that time became glaringly apparent in the fall of 1941 , as already mentioned before. The protracted fighting led to an extremely high degree of wear and tear on the tanks which was altogether disproportionate to the production of spare parts.The organisational improvements in the tank maintenance service , which were immediately and energetically introduced at that time, have already been described.
Efforts to bring about the urgently needed increase in the producion of spare tank parts did not have the desired effect. What was the reason this? In march 1940 Hitler appointed a "Reichs minister for armaments and munition". The latter was a civilian and directly responsible to Hitler . Military agencies could make their requests and wishes known to him. The Minister, however,only had to answer to Hitler himself. It was his duties to see to it that military requests(made by the Ordnance office) were fulfilled by the armament industry and if necessary to make use of the appropriate plenary powers to insure their fulfillment. Although the influence of the military ordnance office was somewhat curtailed by this measure it was nevertheless welcomed by the army. However, as the war went on and military requirements were increased, the Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition(later called Armament Ministry)assumed tasks itself which properly required  the judgment of military agencies, such as determining the amount of prduction orders to be distributed, and finally the responsability for construction orders for weapons, etc.... This was only possible because Hitler desired to weaken the top-level military command positions for political reasons and because of his hatred for the officer caste of the army.The result was that tensions frequently developed betweehn the military agencies and those of Armament Ministry, particularly since things went finally so far that Hitler and his armament Minister took upon themselves to disregard the responsible military agencies and make arbitrary decisions co,ncerning the development and introduction of new weapons, concerning prduction requirements, and similar matters.  
From its very inception the armament ministry was confronted with very complex and difficult tasks.Since Germany was in no position with resect to armament in 1939, to wage a major war , there was an enormous demand for physical equipment in all fields. The expansion of industrial capacity in almost all these fields(ammunition, powder, explosives, weapons, motor vehicles, tanks etc....)had not as yet been even nearly concluded. With the extension of the war, the tank production programs were also steadily expanded. Added to this was the development of new types of tanks as a result of the practical experience gained up to that time.
The production of spare tank parts, however, continued to be neglected. Unfortunately, the Armament Ministry faild to listen to the urgent pleas, which were made both by the Ordnance Office and the Army General Staff (Chief of Army supply and administration) and failed to insist that the armament plants should produce the required number of spare parts. Hitler himself urged that more new new tanks should be produced ; the responsible men in the Armament Ministry failed to realise the importance in spare tank parts in maintaining the fighting power of the troops and spent a disproportinate amount of energy in increasing the production of new tanks, as urged by Hitler. Even the severe crisis in the fall of 1941 at first failed to bring about any fundamental changes in favor of the production of spare tank parts. For the time being the organisational measures of the military agencies, as described above were the only thing which provided any relief for the tank maintenance service.
With the beginning of the great offensive in 1942, in which approximately threefourths of all ther available tanks participated, the expected wear and tear on tank material began again.It was not until then that Hitler and the Atmament Ministry could be induced , to sanction the drastic measures which had been so urgently needed for at least a yeaz in order to increase the production of spare tank parts.However, the damage could no longer be prepared. Up to the end of the war the production of spare tank parts did not reach the necesary volume.Enormous losses in tanks,fighting power, labor,confidence and, last but not least, blood, were the results. Many tactical reverses at the front andmany defeats were caused by this now irrepareable mistake.Meanwhile the Armament Ministry had tightened its control of industrial production and had increased efficiency tremendously in many fields and for this purpose had called upon the country's last , unused resources. However, it now became all the more difficult , in the fall of 1942, to free additional resources for the purpose of increasing the production of spare tank parts. In may 1942, these difficulties had already induced the Armament Ministry to try the following solution: the manufacture of new tanks was slowed down somewhat so that more spare tank parts could be produced.However, the gain of spare parts achieved in this way was in gross disproportion to the drop in the production of new tanks; for evey extra motor, gear, etc.. which was produced by this measure one less new tank was being manufactured. On the other hand, the same number was produced of spare parts which was subject to very little wear and tear , for example, the tank hulls.
Here is another example of a mistaken measure:after a long struggle , the Army finally won with its insistence that more tracks should be produced, since there was a particular shortage of these parts. The tracks were finally manufactured , and after a short time there was a two yeras supply of this highly critical item in stock , but the demand for tracks by the field units decreased considerably at the same time, whereupon the Armament Ministry complained about the foolish demands made by the army. The army in turn complained that production and delivery of this item had not begun after the tanks for which these tracks were needed had already become obsolete.However, it claimed that in spite of its requests the manufacture of these no longer usable tracks had not been discontinued in time.
.....
The following steps were introduced:
 
1. The establishment of its own spare tank plants, as for example,  a factory for transmissions in Passau and a factory for tank engines in Nordhausen . It is obvious that it would have been a very long time before these plants could have been completed and the field units could have benefited from their products. Although it was the only correct one, this measure proved unsatisfactory.When these plants began to produce-much tooo late-the production of new tanks had in the meanwhile been endangered.Enemy air attacks had destroyed the subsidiary plants  of the tank factories , so that the products of the spare parts plants had to be utilised for the manufacture of new tanks.
 2. The Armament Ministry organised socalled 'order sales' , which at times brought appreciable relief. At these sales individual parts were displayed which were definitely in short supply. Firms which immediately offered to produce such parts without prejudice to any of their own commit ments were given a higher priority. This had the advantage for them, that their workmen were protected against forced employment elsewhere and their manufactoring facilities were insured against requisitioning. In order to estimate the importance of this measure one must know that the Armament Ministry wield dictatorial and despotic powers over manpowerand machines in industry.The first 'order sale' was held on 26 october 1942.
 3. Similar results were achieved by a number of projects undertaken by the 'Economic group of machine manufacturers( a cooperative association of machine toolfirms) which -in part by direct cooperation between tank and the machine tool factories- were able to fill the constantly changing gaps in the production requirements for individual parts with the aid of the wide variety of machines in their pool.
For example, a factory was equipped with machine tool which had been released by some other plant so that it was able to manufacture tank transmissions for a tank maintenance plant in its vicinity.
The abvementioned measures brought perceptible relief after 1943. By this time,however,the high tide of the German war effort had long been passed.
.........
Despite these measures, more and more serious mistakes were made in actual practice. Thus for example, a new heavy tank, the Tiger, was sent into action at the front in 1942 although only one additional transmission, one engine,etc... for every tenth tank was manufactured for maintenance purposes. The result was, that almost all the tanks at the front were out of action in a very short time. 
In spite of this experience, the same mistake was repeated some time later in the manufacture of the new 'Panther type(43 tons). The tank was not even ready for frontline service when an order was given to manufacture the first series and the tank was put into active use.
Numerous technical defects became apparent at the front, so that the first series of 325 tanks had to be withdrawn from the front and rebuilt. Gearshifts and steering mechanisms in particular, as well as side gears, had to be replaced by improved and newly manufactured units.This work was only made possible by the contruction at short notice of a special reconversion plant in may 1943 covering an area of almost 100.000 square meters at Falkensee near Berlin , and when it was completed,, it was noticed that the engine showed serious defects. A fully serviceable engine was not constructed untill the fall of that year. To be sure, this stupid procedure , which destroyed the confidence of the troops in this new and excellent weapon from the very beginning , was also due in considerable part to pressure from Hitler and his closest associates. The Panther too, was sent to the front with a completely inadequate supply of spare parts. Valuable equipment could not be used at the front because of the lack of the simplest spare parts and deteriorated because repairs were not made in time.
The Armament Ministry tried to minimise the consequences of these mistakes by appointing a "Commissionar of the Armament Ministry  for the tank maintenance program" . His work may have brought some temporary relief  , but also resulted in an additional weakening of the overall afficiency of the armament industry. Government managementb eliminated personal initiative to great extent and began to overreach itself, thus weakening itss own structure. If the simple rule had been observed that the production of each new tank model had to be simultaneously matched by the production of an adequate number of spare parts, all special programs and alike would have been unnecessary.
In march 1943, the position of Inspector general of the Armored forces was created in the Army High Command..        

04-03-2013 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

23-02-2013 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

P 082

Against the incessant russian attacks along the entire front throughout the year , the field forces almost invariably were given the same order: tactical and strategical defense without taking into consideration the situation of the adjacent front. In that way we intended to bring about position warfare-although we lacked improved defensive positions- and tried to wear down the enemy with purely defensive tactics. However, in spite of all efforts, the front did not become stabilized, and although all orders called for defense , loss of ground continued to be unavoidable; the enemy forced us to make extensive withdrawals. In retrospect this procedure was called elastic defense. The fact that the withdrawals were effected under pressure and in most cases too late, and, not having been planned, resulted in a considerable loss of equipment, filled the troops with a feeling of bitterness, and all the more so, since each time they broke out of an encirclement. The lowered combat efficiency became apparent in the subsequent battles , and the execution of defensive operations became more and more difficult in view of the weakened units.

Even isolated counterattacks did not change the situation. To be sure, they were frequently successful , owing to the fact that after each penetration or breakthrough, the enemy found himself in open terrain and without artillery support, and was inferior to us, as usual. However, in view of our policy of rigid defense, the superior number of attacking forces dictated time and place of commitment of our available strategic reserves , with the result that we could not gain the initiative; our forces were constantly tied down in the frontlines and had no chance to disengage in time , in order to prepare counterattacks. If we had withdrawn in time from areas which subsequently were

lost anyhow, we might have been able to make available large forces in good condition to regain lost ground and at the same time destroy the enemy forces.

The overall result of defensive tactics were the following : considerable loss of ground, heavy casualties, large losses of equipment and overtaxing of the troops. On the other hand, we gained time , decimated the enemy , and maintained a continuous front. The Russians had not succeeded in achieving any strategic breakthrough in spite of gaining a large amount of territory; the final decision which they were obviously trying to bring about at any cost in 1943, had been postponed.

Thus, defensive tactics had not produced any better results than delaying tactics; the same results could have been attained at a lower cost if delaying tactics had been planned carefully.

2.Reason for the failure of defensive tactics

a. Superiority of Russian artillery and their heavy concentrations on our inadequate positions ;

b. Our numerical inferiority, lack of reserves, inability to echelon our forces in depth, and overtaxing of the troops because of lack of replacements;

c. In sufficient artillery and ammunition;

d. The fact that the rigid, dogmatic orders, issued to the entire eastern front , called for defensive tactics without taking into consideration local condition or the time element; frequently these orders could not be executed owing to insufficient combat strength , weapons and ammunition, and the inadequacy of fortified positions; such orders were rescinded too late or not at all, which finally

undermined not only the authority of the order but also the confidence which the troops placed in their commanders.

3. The enemy

The enemy attacked incessantly, without any marked main effort but with rapidly changing objectives along a wide front. It would seem to be the aim of the Russians to prevent development of position warfare, to interfere with any stabilization of our front through constant spoiling attacks, and to contain our forces to prevent a balance of strength. If instead they had endeavored to achieve a strategic breakthrough , they would have needed a large scale concentration of forces; no doubt they could have successfully achieved such a concentration.

Our defensive tactics and our tactics were of advantage to the enemy’s strongest and most effective weapon, his artillery.

Time and again, our forces , withdrawing for short distances only, had to organize their defenses hastily. That enabled the enemy to advance quickly , and to move his supplies and communications speedily. He did not have to operate in open terrain, hampered by inadequate communications, his greatest weakness. Despite his considerable advance , he had thus avoided the danger of stretching his lines too far from the base of operations, a danger which generally threatens the success of any offensive.

The enemy will keep on using the same tactics and continue his incessant attacks along the whole front. It remains to be seen whether he will in the future concentrate his forces to a greater extent than heretofore and perhaps develop marked strategic concentrations.

Most likely, the enemy will continue his tactic of launching spoiling attacks on a wide front because he will be aware of the fact  that he is at a  disadvantage in mobile warfare after a breakthrough.
The numerically supperior enemy can endure the wear and tear of combat longer than we can; no doubt that will make it possible for him to continue lauching numerous attacks simultaneously  on a wide front.The russians are not pressed for time and need not mmake any daring decisions. if they are consistently victorious they will be able to calculate when the time for the final blow has arrived.
The russians will continue to rely on their artillery and will make their plans accordingly. In the future their air superiority will become an additional factor.
We will play into the enemy's hand if we continue to use defensive tactics and expose our forces to his numerical superiority and his artillery, without seeking an opportunity to engage him ijn mobile warfare, his greatest weakness. 

Anyway, the 3rd Panzer Army had to look forward to confronting the enemy pincer attack with the available forces, of which half were fixed unwantedly in the Vitebsk bend. According to the  opinion of the  Pzn AOK from this resulted the necessity , to give up the sticking out bend and while abandoning Vitebsk retreat in atimely fashion in the Tiger position. Through this the front of the Panzer Army ,while taking into account the many lakes, would be shortened by around 70 km in the new position. The widt of the divisional sectors which resulted from this would have made possible the making available of one to two divisions as Army reserve , the taking out of sufficient infantry reserves to feed the defensive battle, a doubling of the artillery defensive power and the antitankdefense and any necessary concentration in the defense.

......In this position it was the firm conviction of the Panzer AOK, that the 3.Panzer Army would have been able to see through the defensive battle for a longer time without outside help. At least one can suppose that the soviets would not have broken through the Tiger position , as was succeeded on 22 june on both sides of Witebsk.
Therefore, time would have been gained. And the high command could also have convinced itself , that the judgment of the Pz AOK about enemy strength and objectives was correct. In timely fashion reinforcements could have been supplied to the Panzer Army. Though it is true that it would have been  more correct to make available from the beginning for the defense in the Tiger position a fuly mobile reserve, therefore a  mot. or Panzer division, because only with such one could operate successfully against a broken through mobile enemy.
In the to be defended Tiger position all advantages were on the side of the Panzer Army. As a very favorable defensive position in almost its entire length by its natural position it leaned against many long lakes and the Düna. In months long labour this position had been built up. It was only twothirds of the length of the Vitebsk bend , practically however considerably much shorter because of the many lakes in the front.
A pulling back of the front in this position on 21 june , the day before the firmly expected major attack, would have messed up all preparations of the soviets. It would have been achieved that the image the enemy would have had about the situation of the front would not be correct anymore at the monent when he advanced to attack. The soviets would not only have had to redisposition artillery and infantry, which in itsself  would have postponed the attack on the Tiger position by several days and would have have shaped the the general attack plan in a non unified fashion. They would aslo have had to go over to a different attack method in view of the chain of lakes and the Düna in front of their new front.Finally, in thier attack against our rear guards in the old position, they would have strongly exposed themselves. All this would maybe after all have made the high command think about what was to be expected from the enemy.                   
 

22-02-2013 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

The following report was made towards the end of the war by an armored batallion while in combat with Russian forces in Hungary.Originally a cavalry unit aswhich it had taken part in 1941 campaign, the batallion had participated in the 1942/1942 engagements in the Ukrain right up to Stalingrad, had then been trasferred to France where it fought from this time to the invasion up to and including the Ardennes offensive, and had finally been sent to Hungary. It had an excellent record.
This report is all the more valuable for having been written in the light of current experience, quoting numerous examples illustrating the principles of armored warfare, and giving a vivid impression of the conditions under which Germans and Russians fought at this time.The lowered training standard in repect to cooperation between armored forces, infantry and armored infantry become clearly evident.
The armored batallion was equipped with type V tanks, more commonly known as Panther tanks. 
 
I  Experiences of 1st batallion 24 th Armored Regiment A report prepared while in combat between 18 January to 14 february 1945
The following are the experiences of a batallion which, in actions fought between 19 january and 15 february 1945 destroyed, by confirmed count110 tanks,153 AT guns, 13 artillery pieces and captured 74 AT guns.
The report is intended to show the difficulties which tank crews currently have to contend with in the light of their own experience, and is to serve also as a counterpart to factual reports based only on the viewpoint  of the infantry man

II Heavy weapons and methods of combat

In the eastern theatre of war,the main opponent of the tank is the AT gun, which the Russians use in great numbers, defensively and offensively, in the latter case bringing them up very quickly and skillfully.
In the experience of the batallion, the term 'AT gun barrier' does not quite correspond to the actual situation on the field of battle, since the opponent prefers to employ this arm as facal point in AT gun pockets whichaim at achieving far reaching flanking effects.These anitank gun pockets sometimes consist of six to seven AT guns arranged within a radius of no more than forty to fifty meters.Just as the German troops at the front and those at the rear services are very extensively equipped with Panzerfausts, the Russians have, on a commensurate scale, equipped their troops with AT guns, which are rendered mobile by the use of tanks, farm vehicles or horses.Owing to excellent camouflage and adaptation to the terrain-wheels are sometimes removed to obtain a lower muzzle height- the Russians easily succeed in opening unsuspected fire at short or middle ranges. In these operations the Russians endeavor to let our advance vehicles pass by in order to strike the deep flank of our units with their fire.
If the gun of a russian AT gun has been discovered and is taken under well aimed fire, the men will quickly leave the gun, but will return to it just as quickly in an unguarded moment or during a fire lull, to resume their own fire. It is therefore of great importance to disable immediately, after a tank attack, any AT guns which have been abandoned by their crews if the tactical situation is such that they cannot be removed. Infantry men do not make much use of ATguns, captured in good order, but call for tank support, no matter what the situation is.
The tank is the weapon that is most endangered by AT gun fire.Tank personnel should therefore be the first whose opinion should be considered regarding action against AT guns of the enemy.Russians are dangerous only when they allow a German attack to approach within effective range before opening fire. Owing to inadequate reconnaissance, and because German tank units are required to attack without previously receiving clear-cut orders or orientation, we again and again provide the Russians with this opportunity. When on the other hand, it would be wise to allow an enemy attack to come within effective range, orders are given to the German units to counterattack. The result is that chances to destroy many enemy tanks are thrown away.
When during the fight for Czekesfehervar, a Russian tank attack against the northern fringe of the town was to be expected on 3 february and the batallion commander had broached this subject several times, the batallion nevertheless received the order to lauch a counterattack further north, supported by a number of Tiger tanks from another unit in order to take the reported Russian tank units from the rear. The operation began in fog, so that visibility was poor.While the German tanks were assembling further north for the attack,the Russians lauched the attack further south. They were prevented from penetrating into the town only through the withdrawal of the Tiger tanks from the assembly, while our group attacking in the north, owing to the poor visibility floundered blindly into an enemy defensive position protected by a minefield, so that the attack came to a standstill.
In mobile warfare, Russian tanks are handicapped through an apparent lack of firm control. The enemy is not able to hold his forces together during a long continued attack but is prone to disperse them. He tries to make up for this feeling of uncertainty by fast but purposeless moveement. The success of Russian tanks is due to mass commitment, weak German defense and to German counterattacks carried out without clearcut previous instruction.The Panther tank gun can pierce the plating of any type of tank. Type 85 blew with the first long range hit. In combat with the Josef Stalin, fire should be directed at the hull just above the tracks. Sherman tanks which are employed in large numbers, some with long- barreled guns,can be put out of action by hits from any angle and from any range and in most cases burn after the first hits. 
The Russians cleverly employ AT guns and tanks in the defense of towns. With dogged determination, the enemy awaits his chance, lets the opponent approach to within a short defense and disables him so far as possible by flanking fire.
Russian infantry is of poor quality  and leaves the field as soon as tanks appear. It is only in closed terrain or in tanks that the infantry proves a tough opponent, particularly if surrounded.Its unrivalled skill in the construction of field fortifications is a valuable asset.If not pursued immediately, Russian infantry recovers rapidly and is soon able to build up a new defense.
Scattered mines cause delay.They only damage the tracks and suspensions of the Panther and these can be quickly repaired.
III The assigned mission should be commensurate  with the actual combat strength of the unit involved.
In this connection it must be borne in mind that, owing to the strained tactical situation, pauses for repair have been impossible, so that the available striking power has decreased considerably in every action fought.
All tanks within a unit should be concentrated perform an assigned mission .
Time and again, this principle has been disregard and the available force split up for employment in separate directions.Then, one group of two or three tanks,owing to its numerical weakness will be held up by the first pocket of AT guns it encounters(at times unexpectedly)while a second group of tanks will be operating elsewhere under the same adverse set of circonstances.The final result of this dissipation of forces is that both attacks fail and that a number of tanks are permanently lost.
.........
Even small armored units should always endeavour to employ a part of their force in a frontal holding movement and the balance in an attack on the enemy flank.Such operations require thorough preparation and clearcut orders, and this requires time.The operation should be carried out swiftly.If the unit has to travel several kilometers,short stops are necessary to restore order, otherwise the striking power will be dissipated, the units will become separated and tactical control will be impossible.
One one occasion,while the batallion was attacking on the southwestern shore of V. lake on 18 january, the task force command made such exaggerated demands with regard to speed that by the time it began to grow dark the tanks of the batallion were all scattered and confused.
Had the enemy suddenly offered strong resistance, an orderly conduct of operations woiuld have been impossible. Even if an attack made quick headway owing to scant enemy resistance,stops to restore order should be made, otherwise serious situations and inevitable losses will occur owing to the rapid situation changes characteristic of tank battles.
A tank attack which a unit is forced to undertake in bad weather causes losses out of all proportion to the gains. On 3 and 10 february in spite of repeated remonstrances by the batallion commander, he was ordered to attack in fog with poor visibility. On 3 february, the first atttack wave encountered a prepared defense position consisting of AT guns and tanks. A number of the attacking tanks were permanently lost and the attack bogged down three kilometers north of Czekesfehervar .On 10 february , during an attack on a village, the enemy AT guns were discovered when only a short distance away, causing the unnecessary loss of two tanks.
If an antitank front consisting of a series of AT gun pockets is encountered in battle, the firing range will be the deciding factor.If an armored unit is suddenly fired upon from a short distance, it is imperative to launch an immediate all-out attack. But if an armored unitencounters a strong antitank position at medium or long range, a withdrawal is called for with an attack at another place.The commander of the Panther tank should always endeavour to use the long range of his weapon.To this end stops should be made for carefull observation to discover the AT guns in good time. Closely connected with the probes is the employment of a combat reconnaissance unit which moves forward on a wide front ahead of the main force in order to draw the fire of antitank gun pockets, which can be discovered only by the flash of the guns.
To carry out such reconnaissance , the tanks must drive forward from observarion point to observation point at the greatest possible speed, carry out careful combat reconnaissance with great coolness , and fire at suspicious points in the terrain in order to draw the enemy's fire. 
The combat reconnaissance units can only take careful and appropriate action if they are far enough ahead of the main force , and are not under pressure from the rear.To fight AT guns successfully requires careful reconnaissance, thoughtful probing, quick decison once targets have been discovered, clear and rational commands and prompt execution. Precisely in this respect armored command suffer from the lack of understanding on the part of infantry officers who cannot understand and appreciate tank methods of fighting antitank guns.If emplaced enemy tanks forming a defense front are to be destroyed, and if is this cannot be done by a flanking attack , the tanks must be painstakingly picked off individuallyby reconnaissance on foot and slow approach under cover.This requires a good deal of time.Resort to a ruse of one kind or another may guarantee success. Thus, for instance, the sound of running motors can be utilised to draw the attention of the enemy to the front while the tanks which are to fire approach on the flank. On two february 1945 , in the northern outskirts of Czekesfehervar, a single company in this way within minutes destroyed twenty Sherman three T 34 tanks, which were excellently camouflaged in the grouds of a factory and had destroyed every tank approaching without the above explained security measures. If an enemy tank attack is discovered in good time, fire should always be withheld until the attacking tanks are within close range. If an enemy must be attacked in open terrain, the attack should be launched simultaneously from two directions.In this way, caught in a pincer movement, the enemy will feel insecure.
On 4 february 1945 , north of Czekesfehervar, the batallion thus succeeded in putting twenty-six tanks and forty-six AT guns out of action.
If an armored unit is caught unawares, and unprepared for action, a lightning assault will increase the enemy's confusion and guarantee success, since owing to poor tank-to- tank communication the Russians are not able to improvise or countermand orders quickly. Under this set of circonstances, one of our batallions Panther tanks destrpyed three enemy tanks at a range of twenty meters in an attack at Kajaszoszenipeter on 26 january.
Tank combat in towns or villages is impossible without the close cooperation of infantry. The limit range of vision from the tank gives cthe defending enelmy an advantage .This is were infantry must help. Jumping from cover to cover under the protection of tanks, the infantryman can spot antitank guns, tanks and heavy infantry weapons and inform tank commanders.This collaboration must be based on mutual trust. Often, however, infantry use tanks as cover and suffer casualties through fire aimed at the tanks. On 1 february 1945, while German tanks were advancing to the outskirts of Czekesfehervar, our tanks suffered losses through flanking fire from  concealed AT guns which could have been spotted in good time with infantry collaboration.
A firmly controlled and carefully prepared surprise attack by night has always been successful , with small losses. Bold and determined action is a prerequisite . A precipitated night attack will fail and result in heavy losses. Thus, in a properly conducted night attack a village situated in a commanding position on a river held by antitank artillery, tanks and a large infantry force , was captured in a surprise attack by eight assault guns and two command cars. The speed of a night attack is subject to less restrictions if a small unit is employed  than woiuld be the case with a larger unit, consisting of thirty tanks, where the coordination of separate operations is required. Tanks should be amply equipped with carbines and grenade launchers for launching parachute flares, apart from special pyrotechnic devices, are the only effective way to illuminate the combat areawithout disclosing the position of ones own tanks.
So far as the fire effect of tanks is concerned,, it must be said that on the whole far too little firing is done.A strong concentration of fire from more than ten tank guns will work miraclkes, even with tenacious russians. If a batallion in the course of attack sudenly concentrates its fire on a strongly fortified village, and then immediately advances a part of its forces, it can always count with certainty on effecting a penetration-a success without any losses. But again and again one discovers  wrong conceptions of what a sudden concentration of fire means. If five tanks fire five rounds each on a target , it is often erroneously called a sudden concentration of fire, whereas for a Panther tank it is nothing but a skirmish. The ammunition expenditure must be in proportion to the strength of the available tank forces. Target points must be given beforehand; there will be no time for adjustments when the firing starts.The gun loaders must work fast enough to attain the same rate of fire as antiaircraft artillery. With such firing methods, Panther tanks are still able to breach the enemy defenses and prepare the way for an attack. On 30 january,in a night attack against Kapolnas-Nyek, which was held by tanks and antitank artillery, the strength of which could not be ascertained in the dark,the batallion fired fifteen rounds from each of twenty tanks against the outskirts of the village.The russians fired and tried to escape across the eastern tip of Lake Valencita with their tanks and antitank guns. At dawn the enemy tanks which had broken through the ice and had been abandoned by their crews were a proof of the effect obtained.
The machinegun is not used enough.The turret machine gun has a devastating effect on massed infantry........
In an attack on an antitank position it is advisable to fire while still under way. The muzzle blast and the shell fragmentation will keep the enemy under cover and shake his will to resist. Hits inflicted upon our Panther tanks indicate that the Russians aim at the side of the turret level with the gunner. According to an order from the Inspektor of Armored troops, it is not permissable to attach chain links to the turret side. The batallion went into battle in compliance with this order . Due to the many armor piercing hits in this spot, chain links were again experimentally attached to some tanks. They proved their value by reducing  the effect of the imact.

IV Armor-armored infantry relations and cooperation

Owing to the wide front sectors and the low manpower of the armored infantry units as a result of the great losses sustained, tanks participate in all operations. Successful cooperation with the armored infantry, whose commander is generally placed in command of a combined unit
, depends on an understanding of the peculiarities and abilities of the tank arm.Proper cooperation will reduce tank losses. Unfortunately, training in this respect is at the lowest ebb, causing tank losses and a considerable wear and tear of equipment. The armored infantry commander the tank as a panacea for all ills, since he cannot realise the weakness and the limitations of the tank, limitations which cannot be surmounted even with the best of intentions. The armored infantry commander sees in the tank a heavily armored monster of many hundred horsepower with a huge cannon, without knowing its shortcomings, such as its thin side armor plating , its restricted field of vision, its limited mobility compared with an armored personnel carrier. How vulnerable the tank is to the weapons solely directed against it,  is known to the armored infantry, only from a distance, for it will happen rarely that an armored personnel carrier is in the immediate vicinity of a tank exploding from a direct hit. During a battle between tanks and AT guns the armored infantry, as a rule, are not with their own tanks, since it is not their mission to be there and they have no business there.But no sooner has the tank battle ended that the armored infantry commanders come forward and ask why the battle is not continued or why it lasted so long. Then the tank force is precipitantly committed against the next objective so that it is at a disadvantage in the next tank versus tank  action in which it may become involved.
.......
Although infantrymen time and time again admit that they cannot solve a major combat assignment without tanks, they persist in committing tanks according to their own ideas; and to make matters worse the combat commands involved are small and under the command of junior officers who do not like to listen to the expert opinion of tank personnel.......
There are armored infantrymen who would like to see tanks moving continuously out in front. Every tactically required stop or pause for observation makes them impatient. If ,before a village which is reported strongly held, tanks halt a while in order not to be trapped by flanking pockets of AT guns or to avoid running up against dug-in enemy tanks the infantry is too quick to assume timidy. An attack should be carried out briskly and systematically after exact reconnaissance and preparation, it should not be a haphazard ride into because an infantry commander is in a great hurry......

If a tank stops when encountering mines, if it reconnoiters and withdraws in order to advance at another place, if it halts for observation when enemy tanks are reported, or if on suddenly coming under flanking fire from AT guns, it wheels to the right and goes into position instead of proceeding in the desired direction, all this is not due to dilatoriness but is the correct action to take in the circonstances.
.......
On 10 february, German tanks advaced into the rear of the enemy south of Lepczeny. An evading movement was carried out to bypass strong enemy resistance and a new direction of atttack was ordered. A immediate attack in the new direction was demanded, briefing and orientation being considered a waste of time. When the tanks halted for reconnaissance, having received flanking fire from enemy tanks, the headquarters of the combined armored battle group interrupted tank to tank cooperation to issue peremptory commands to advance, thus making radio communication and the conduct of operations all the more difficult.
........
On 14 february German tanks were engaged n house-to-house fighting at Czoesz . The German infantry failed to follow up although the Russian pockets of resistance were held down by the fire of the tanks.The enemy took advantage of this critical situation by sending out close combat detachments to attack the tanks, which were thus forced to withdraw to the infantry frontline.  In retreating they ran into mines, resulting in the permanent loss of two tanks.
Many unreasonable demands were deliberately ignored by the tank commanders in order to avoid major losses.

Signed Weidemann
             Captain and batallion commander 
 
   

17-02-2013 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

Against the the russian advance, the germans could retreat behind the Weichsel. Defending this  stream barrier from Thorn to the mouth
with 16 divisions against forces of equal strength is not difficult. Probably the russians would not have gotten involved in   a forced crossing. They would have marched  away to cross the stream above Thorn. This would have presented favourable moments for counterattack. In any case, time would have been won. This gain of time would  have only been a postponement of      the battle for the germans.Considerable 
reinforcements could not be expected by them,while the russians could meanwhile unite their armies and bring them to full strength.
One would have to deal with one strong united army, while one now was faced with smaller separated ones, whose comunications  could be many times hindered by cutting the telegraph wires on the german territory by Landsturm etc...  Evidently, this situation had to be exloited.
One had to try to first defeat one of the russian armies decisively and then turn against the other. There could be no doubt against which the first atttack had to be directed . From the direction of its advance the Narew army was the most dangerous. It was also the one against it wad easiest to assemble a bigger part of ther german forces. If the German commander decided to attack the Narew army, he needed to unite as many forces as possible for this purpose. No division could be used in another direction without compelling reason. It can therefore only be approved that all german forces with exception of the I AK, the 1st reserve division and the 1 st cavalry division where destined against the Narew army.  This resulted in 13 infantry and reserve divisions besides 3 cavalry divisions. If these were united in the line Dtsch Ehlau-Strasburg , then one would have thrown back the enemy , if one succeeded in beating him, in an easterly direction, that is there where it could hope for the soonest reception by the Niemen army.  That would not have served the Germans a lot . The Narew army had to be decisively beaten and completely separated from the Niemen army. This could only be made possible by surrounding the enemy right wing. 
It can therefore only be agreed to that the commander of the Germans had III and V corps advance over Osterode-Bergfriede and II corps on Strasburg while he had the XVII corps retreat on Neumark.       

franz Halder Generaloberst  ,Koenigsstein 1 march 1950

Comments on the study :
           The tank maintenance service in the German Army

With the assistance of the best available experts and on the basis of his own extensive experience at higher headquarters, Generalmajor Mueller-Hillebrand, has succeeded in giving a clear and detailed account of the Tnak maintenance services in ythe Germman army.
The account of the develelopment of the service in part I appeared necessary in order to describe that the tank maintenance system described in part II was not developed after some mistakes and blunders had been made.The observations made in the eastern theatre of operations seem to me especially important.
I fully agree with the opinion of the author concerning the basic problem of a centralised versus a decentralised ttank maintenance service.

Introduction
The basic problem : Centralised versus decentralised tank maintenance service

During the recent war the Geramn army acquired considerable experience in the area of tank maintenance and the recovery of disabled tanks.The prolonged duration of the war, as well as the extensive areas covered by the operations and, in Russia, the technical difficulties caused by the lack of paved roads, together with the limited capacity of the railroad system and the lack of technical equipment in the country itself, increased the wear and tear on our tanks to an extraordinary degree and compelled us to make continual changes in the organisation of the maintenance service.To these difficulties were added the excessive strain on the Geramn armament industry as the lack of manufacturing capacity-difficulties which became finally insurmountable as the result of the air raids.
It became evident duri,ng the war that the factors which determine the demands to be made on the maintenance service differ according to the service of operations, the technical development of weapons, and other factors. The organisation of the maintenance service, therefore, had to be constantly altered and improved.Thus, there is no ideal solution for this problem which can be applierd in every case.
The basic problem with tank maintenance  is whether it should be performed principally by installations in the rear-perhaps even by the armaments industry in the zone of interior- or whether they should be carried out as close to the front as possible, i.e. directly in the field units themselves. If a war waged in the vicinity of a country's borders, that is, not too far away from the tank manufactoring plants of the home armament industry , and if it can be expected that only limited demands will be made on the supply system of the tanks, and , if in addition, the belligerent nation is soo wealthy that it can suplly its troops with a steady stream of new tanks in wartime, then the field units can be relieved to a large extent of the work of repairing disabled tanks and this maintenance work can be transferred to large, central installations further to the rear.
This theory works out quite differently in practice if one realises, for example, that during the short campaign in France in 1940, the tank maintenance platoon of a tank batallion with approximately 100 tanks had to make 327 major repairs, which means that each tank of the batallion had to be sent  to the repair shop on an average of more than three times during the few weeks of the campaign .The work which was done by the maintenance detachment of the comapnies is not included in this. Without a fast working maintenance service attached to the field services this batallion would have had to have approximately 100 percent of its tank equipment replaced after only the first two weeks. Now, if an army is confronted with a war which will make considerable demands on its forces over wide areas of land, even the wealthiest nation will not be able to maintain the fighting power of its tank arm with a centralised organisation.In such a case, maintenance must be performed primarily by the field units themselves.For, in the last analysis, the urgent necessity of supplying the field unitswith an adequate number of spare parts to repair such of their tanks as are no longer serviceable must take priority even over the supllying of new tanks. But then the field units must also carry with them the necessary machines and equipment at their disposal in order to carry out whatever repair work may arise.
The correct solution must be found somewhere between the two extremes of a centralised and decentralised maintenance service . The experience of the Geramn army led more and more to the realisation that it is hardly possible to put too much of the repair service in the hands of the field units themselves. The difficulties which arose during the war in connection with the tank maintenance service were caused largely by the fact that this rule was not observed consistently enough. By the time that the field maintenance service had ben broyught to a full peak of efficiency the production of spare parts by industry was no longer sufficient- a situation which continued up to the end of the war. This prevented the  otherwise excellent field maintenance organisation from becoming fully effective.
The reason for this serious mistake was undoubtedly the fact that the government offices which controlled production in the armament industry failed to realise the importance of the field maintenance service and neglected the production of spare parts in favor of the production of new tanks.Immeasurable harm was causec by this mistake.
However, the question of the importance of the tank maintenance service in comparison with that of tank manufacture is also very greatly influenced by transport requirements. The tank is a weapon which is especially subject to wear and tear on the one hand, while on the other hand it is more often in need of repair than other weapons as the result of enemy fire. Moreover, tanks are heavy and take up a great dal of space.For this reason, tanks can be most economically repaired by the field units. This saves transport space and time. One railway boxcar can carry a tremendous number of spare parts, with which a corresponding number of tanks can be made serviceable again, whreas only one tank can be shipped to the troops on one special car,which because of its weight can only travel oover certain railway routes, not to speak of the  time and labour which is required to repair the damaged tanks for repair, especially when they are no longer able to move under own power.
Here are a few important rules based upon German experience during the war:
 
1. The importance of the repair service in maintaining the fighti,g power of an army can hardly be overestimaterd........In this connection the loss of a tank is considerably more serious than the loss of a man, if one considers, for example, that in Russia during the recent war the ratio  on the Geramn side was one thousand combat soldiers to one tank.
2. One cannot wait until wartime to organise a tank maintenance service. In this case the maintenance service would always lag behind requirements and satisfactory efficience could not be attained......
3. Just as in other military fields, it is also true in the tank maintenancy service , that only the closest personal contact will assure maximum intitiative and therefore top performance.Therefore, maintenance detachments should be integrated into the tank companies, and maintenance companies and platoons should be integrated into the regiments and tank batallions respectively.Then the maintenance personnel is working for its own company, its own regiment or its own batallion. The greatest part of all the maintenance work will be carried out within the regiment......
4. The necessity of tank maintenance should be borne in mind as a principle in designing the tank, if one does not want to be confronted by very unpleasant surprises during a war. To ensure a high number of serviceable, it is necessary to design a simple, sturdy type with easy accessible parts and the fewest possible different models. The simplier,sturdier and more compact the design of the tank , the less wil be the cost of the administrative and maintenance services.Moreover, fewer supplies will be needed and the suplly service itself will be greatly simplified. Should subsequent changes in the design of the tanks become necessary: one should determine whether the advantages of a new design outweigh the disadvantages arising from more complicated repairs and particularly the procurement of spare parts.Under certain circonstances, for example, if subsequent changes are made, the corresponding spare part will automatically become useless and will have to be discarded by all the spare parts depots and replaced by a new part. While the tank is still being designed, it is advisable to consult experienced engineer officers, who have to maintain tanks in the field.
5. The requirements of tank maintenance also greatly affect the production of tanks and tank spare parts, and these two types of production must stand in a definite ratio to each other. In this connection the production of an adequate number of spare partswill normally take priority over the manifacture of new tanks. The necessity for this becomes perfectly clear if one recalls the example which has been cited earlier in this treatise, according to which each tank had to undergo major repairs more than three times during a six-week campaign.
Experience has shown that about seventy percent of such repairs require the installation of new spare parts.
6. The development of operations, climatic conditions or the employment of new , not yet fully tested models may suddenly lead to unexpectedly high tank losses, and this would necessitate special measures to ensure quick repairs.These, too, can best be made by the maintenance services with the field units.....During such special operations it is adviseable to reinforce the tank maintenance companies of the tank regiment with specialists from all branches from the zone of the interior for the duration of these rapid repairs. Another argument in favor of this solution is the fact that very little transport space is required, for it is much simpler and quicker to bring men and spare parts to the place where they needed than to transfer entire maintenance installations, as well as ship the necessary spare parts, set up these installations in working order again, or even to move the damaged tanks hundreds of kilometers to the rear and send them back again to the front after  they have been repaired.
The development of tank maintenance services during the war
Section 1: Difficulties
The difficulties which would have to be faced during a war as far as the maintenance of tanks were concerned were not fully realised before the war . Soon defects became evident which became more acute with the prolongation of the war and called for relief.  These defects were encountered in the following fields:
a) The field units did not have enough maintenance services. It is true that the tank regiments had one maintenance company each and the subordinate units also had  personal for maintenance work. However, this personnel was unadequate and couldn not be employed to the fulles extent because....
b) The maintenance equipment, machines and special vehicles were not sufficient as to numner and type to satisfy the demands .
c) The avilable personnel was not sufficiently trained. It had been assumed that automobile mechanics,welders and other workers from civilian plants would meet the demands of the maintenance service in the field  after a short training period. This was, however, not the case.
d) The need for spare parts had been underestimated because of the brief, peacetime experience of the armored forces, which were still new in service; so that the stocks which had been prepared were not sufficient. The actual need for certain parts became more and more apparent in the field units; it fluctuated according to special circonstances during the war and varied considerably from earlier calculations.  Evenn in peacetime, subsequent or additional orders were sometimes not filled by industry after long delays. Sudden and excessive demands for a certain spare part could sometimes be satisfied only at the expense of the production of new tanks or only after considerable delay.
e) The supply organisation for spare tank parts was set up in the same manner as that for ammunition, weapos and the like. The field units were supposed to file their requests for spare parts through supply channels. These requests had to be collected and forwarded  to the organisation in Germany , which in turn had to ship the spare parts prepared for this purpose to the field units.The fact that this system was too lengthy did not become evident until during the war. In particular , the great number of spare parts required for the various types of tanks, especially since the wear and tear on them varied greatly, called for a carefully planned and fast working message system, adequately trained personnel in the higher staffs , and a smoothly operating supply organisation which would forward the spare parts to the field units.

04-12-2012 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

A lot of retoric is produced here about Manstein but it reads mostly like a negative ad in a political campaign where the opinions of the opposing party are misrepresented. In his memoirs Manstein only makes a detailed assessment on the red army leadership concerning the Stalingrad campaign and its aftermath (Verlorene Siege pp 469-471) and there he does not not present it as awfully bad. He acknowledges that the red army leadership had gotten much better at handling large mobile formations and achieving breakthroughs but criticizes it for not achieving more in the circonstances by not being strong enough at the decisive point. In his judgment the red army could have cut off the whole southwing of german eastern front by being more bold. A not surprising judgment in view of Mansteins operational philosophy and his campaigns. It is all very well to have a negative opinion on the operational abilities of Manstein but the misrepresentation of the many that have a very high regard of his operational abilities is unacceptable. Manstein may not always have been right in his military judgment but they were honest opinions of the commander in the field who does not have the benefit of hindsight. Trying to put part of the responsability for sixth army staying in Stalingrad on Manstein is unjustified and not supported by any documentary source. Even if Manstein had argued for an immediate breakout of sixth army - the necessity of which he was not convinced of on the condition that it could be supplied by air - Hitler would never have authorised it. As soon as all the facts were known to Manstein he made a clear description of the dire situation of the sixth army and expressed his conviction that it could not be supplied by air and needed to abandon Stalingrad as soon as a link was established. It gets worse when Manstein is even accused of forging the historical record in his memoirs. Anyway, an article in an encyclopedia cannot contain just ONE opinion on any fact of history. It is also unacceptable to state that Manstein passes himself off as perfect and always right while the others are supposedly nitwits. Manstein did not write in absolutes. His opinions are not presented as the absolute truth. The possible objections to his ideas are taken seriously even when they come from Hitler. His assessments of his fellow german officers are at worst mostly balanced and with a lot of positives even concerning those he did not really like. Manstein certainly did not write that he realised the war was lost after he was dismissed. The only comment he makes at the end of his book is about him and his officers being convinced of the possibility of exhausting the offensive power of the red army in 1943 by a war of manoeuver. Julian144 (talk) 14:32, 21 February 2012 (UTC)

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/1943SW/1UF_VF/Zhitomir_Vinnitsa_44.JPG

You do no service to wikipedia by trying to protect the actual text from the masssive improvements it needs. The article was rewritten by an individual who does not hide his objective of making Manstein looking as bad as possible.
As sources the individual used mainly a general book on ww2 and a few others who were no biography of Manstein neither were detailed authorative works on the campaigns Manstein was involved in. One would expect the biographies on Manstein to have been mainly used but the author of the most recent version of the article clearly did not consider that it is necessary to do this.
In wiew of his anti-german bias the individual could have chosen to use Glantz but he did not even do that . He did not even read Mansteins writings but did give a detailed description of the content of them.
Rejecting changes simply because they contradict the few books the author used, is prety silly as there many more books written by eminent historians who contradict his few sources. And even where the content of Lost victories is concerned the book itstelf is rejected as a source which comes down to saying that one should not read a book before writing about its content. And historians certainly do use lost victories as a source so rejecting that as a matter of principle is strange.
The article is full of factual errors and bias.
The list is long:
- the misrepresentation of what Manstein proposed to Hitler regarding Stalingrad
- making a statement about Mansteins frame of mind after Kursk which could only be based on his memoirs but finds no support in them neither in any of the recent biographies
- having him sending away all his armoured reserves while actually three divisions were left in place, 2 were taking away by Hitler to AGC and one corps was earmarked for Italy by Hitler
- having Manstein not retreat the assault forces back to the starting positions before the kursk offensive which is,among others,contradicted by Glantz' book on Kursk
- several errors in the chronology after Kursk
- a totally wrong start date for the german counterattack in november 1943 near Kiev(it was 16 november and not late december)
- the whole bait theory including incorrectly stating that Vatutins christmas offensive attacked over the Dnjepr which is contradicted by other wikipedia articles(eastern front among others) which correctly have Vatutins offensive taking place in the same area where he was counterattacked
- a complete lack of detail on what happened in the beginning of 1944
- the whole description of the content of lost victories which is not even close to what it actually says and is in firm contradiction to the specific wikipedia article on lost victories
You can choose to let the article stand and then it will simply be living evidence of what is wrong with wikipedia. Articles are simply not reviewed and so you have extremely flawed articles which are even contradicted by other wikipedia aryicles. If the manstein article had been reviewed by somebody with a detailed knowledge on Manstein, the most recent version would have been rejected for all its flaws and bias.
I will certainly point out the flaws on at least one military history forum and maybe that will inspire others to have a go at it.
And I can come back too.
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21-02-2012 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

Combat method
1.  The strength of the Panzer brigade is its mobility, firepower and armor.
Decisive prerequisite for success is the closed , boldly conducted attack with surprise by the whole Panzer brigade.
2. By flexible and skilled leadership the brigade commander determines timing and terrain for the fight and prescibes events on the opponent. 
3.Exploitation of terrain, deception,temporary evasion and retreat as wellas sudden advance from a different direction are further conditions for success.
4. The most important means for command is radio. Radio discipline and protection of secrets are important for success.
......
5. Starting reconnaissance in good time creates the necessary basis for  the attack. One must secure the establishing of contact with the troops which still hold in the breakthrough area and the staff at the same time.
Detecting the front of the enemy attack and PAK fronts as well as the natural and artificial obstacles and ways of getting around them is important.
6. In spite of the initiation of the attack by the Panzerbrigade always being under time pressure, it is essential to make the time for recce.
This is to be secured by a shortened preparedness for alarm( one hour for the brigade, 20 minutes for the recce platoon)and fast driving into the area free of enemy. 
7. The recce platoon operates as a whole or in recce troops of 2 APC each.....
8. The organisation for the attack is based on the terrain and the available information about the enemy.It should bring to bear the firepower of all own weapons. The individual weapons oof the brigade are to be organised as they will probably be needed based on the assessment  of the situation.
9. On the march in the area of engagement the building of a strong point composed of tanks(one company) has proved itself. APC have to be kept close and heavy infantry weapons are to be far forward.
10. In the attack the Panzer Abteilung always starts together as the main assaultforce of the brigade.The APC batallion follows closely. Dismounting the infantry only happens when the tanks cannot get further or when it is necessary to destroy dug in enemy.

11.Ttank obstacles are moved over by the infantry under fire support by the tanks. They build up firesupport on the other side. Under protection of this and that of the tanks , the  engineers company make gaps in the obstacle for the armored vehicles.
12.After taking away the obstacle, the Panzer Abteilung advances further using its speed. The Panzergreandiere mount and follow the tanks.  
13. If the enemy has fixed himself in a town or an important terrain feature, he is to fixed by attack with weak forces to hit him decisively  from another direction with the mass of the firepower.
14. The concentration of all the heavy infantry weapons to suppress the enemy AT guarantees the best succes. 

15.When strong PAK fronts or insurmountable obstacles  are met, the Panzerbrigade breaks off its attack and fights back to the nearest cover under cover of smoke and mutual fire support.
After new reconnaissance the attack is to started again from another direction.
16. If  a sector that was gained, is to held temporarly , it is to be watched by standing recce troops while the brigade keeps itself ready for counterattack further back.
The dismounting of the Panzergrenadiere  and subdividing of the brigade for the defense of a sector is not done. 
17. Often, the achieving of the objective is made easier by darkness. Strict command, the application of all technical means of orientation with use of directing fires makes keeping the coherence and the leading of the night figth easier.
Nightfighting after thoruogh preparation often leads to success with low losses .
18. Often the Panzerbrigade will have to attack for short periods of times in different sectors of the front. When subordinated, the brigade ommander is personally responsible that the forces of the brigade are not split up and that after each three days of offensive the necessary repairs are ordered . He has to energetically point out that maintaining the comabt power of the brigade depends in the first place from the thorough technical maintance of the vehicles." 

e can say now that it was morally questionnable ,when at that time the weight of the successes made the majority of the people-and with it the soldiers-blind for the violations of ethical fundamentals on which the state should be based. This may have as its foundation the overestimating of the material achievements over the  eternal commandments of human cohabitation which have been given to us by God,-a phenomenon caracteristic for our times and not limited to Germany. May we learn from the consequences.
One should be clear about one thing as I stressed earlier. Anybody that wants to put the responsability on the armed forces of a state to act with weapons against a government that violates the law or is acting disastrously in another way,gives it fundamentally the control over the authority of the government. One should reflect whether this can be in the interest of the state,the people or the armed forces themselves. 




December 1943

Chief of AGS on the phone.

We have sent today a situation report in view of the russian breakthrough at Kiev and I should ask you to submit it as soon as possible.

Chief of the operations section: Hopefully it does not contain any expresions Hitler will immediately 
hook into. You know how distrustfully he looks at all proposals by Manstein, how he almost seeks to prove to him that he is smarter himself. He only needs to find one phrase which he thinks incorrect and the whole report is dismissed. Can Manstein not come himself?

Chief of AGS : Only if he is called as nothing comes from this. He cannot assert himself against Hitler's dialectic. 

Chief of the operations section : He should not fight against the dialectic. Not long ago, Himmler said' Manstein is believing chistian and cannot be faithfull.'

Chief of AGS : Outrageous. So,one shoots at ones best people.

Chief of the operations section : Hopefully your reoport takes the same line as we : giving up the Nikopol bridghead,delaying action on the southwing of the Armygroup, strong concentrations to the west of Kiev to counterstrike.

Chief of AGS : Precisely our thoughts. We have had the focal point of our foreces on the wrong wing for months.  It is a miracle that we have not been thrown into the black sea. When all details are further  ordered from above, then you do not need a fieldmarshall ,but a corporal can command the Armygroup.

Chief of the operations section : At first we need the obtain the vacating of the Crimea, then the conclusions can be drawn more easily.

Chief of AGS: We are looking at things the same way and above all have refused the possibility of opening the link to the Crimea from the bridghead Nikopol.. Herr Schörner who has been sent to us will also not be able to change that. Even with 10 Führer mansates in his pocket.
Another thing: can Koch and his Reichskommissariat Ukraine not disappear? Only one can command in the area of the Armygroup. Koch is superfluous , he makes things more difficult.  

Chief of the operations section : the Generalquartiermaster has tried for a long time to get rid of him.Hitler does not want to makes this open admission of defeat. Koch can only be beaten out of the Ukraine by the Russians.

Chief of AGS : And a last thing. About these Feste Plätze. One cannot declare whatever city into a Feste Platz when it is not suitable terrainwise and divisions are need for its defense.

Chief of the operations section : Hitler has acceeded to our idea that the Armygroups can propose their Feste Platze themselves. More could not be obtained. But maybe more limitations can be pushed through.

Chief of AGS : At least one ray of light.'

02-04-2011 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

Aus einem Soldatenleben pp 289-291:
"The memorandum demanded in the first place the separation of the functions of the Reich War(or defence)Minister from those of the operational and strategic command in war. The Minister would keep the registration,organisation and use of the personnel and material resources for the conduct of the war. In this he would be assisted by a Reichs Defence Council of which the most important Ministers would be members. At the same time ,he would be the political representative of the armed forces. Finally,in his hand could be unified the administrative sections of the Wehrmacht branches which were not necessarily the business of the individual Wehrmacht branches. As a result of this,substantial savings in staff,money and material would be realised.
Secondly,the organisation of the military command in the army, thus the planning and direction of the operations, were treated. The question was whether for this a Reich general chief of staff with a Wehrmacht general staff had to be created.
In the discussion of this question I started from the following considerations. In each country- depending on its military situation and the strategic conditions under which it had to fight- there would be a branch of the armed forces which would be decisive. For Great Brittain ,at the time this is without a doubt the Navy. Maybe later it could be the Airforce. For Germany the decisive branch of the Wehrmacht is without question for the moment, the Army. This would have to fight for the decision on the continent with the aid of the Airforce. Even in a war which would ultimately go beyond the continent, the Army remains the decisive factor until the position of the Reich on the continent is secured. Only then the AIrforce could maybe(in collaboration with the Navy)have the leading role.
I advocated the opinion that the overall command of the Wehrmacht could not be separated from that of the decisive branch of the Wehrmacht ,in the case of Germany, the Army. Without a doubt the overall command of the Wehrmacht cannot do without the influence on the operational command of the most important branch of the Wehrmacht. If one would build a general staff of the Wehrmacht beside that of the Army , it would come to a double command.
Consequently, I proposed that the overall command of the operations would be in the hand of the commander in chief of the army as the decisive branch of the Wehrmacht. Of course, organs of the other branches of the Wehrmacht would be incorporated in its general staff . In the direction of the overall command of the war by the commander in chief of the Army, it could with regard to the Navy and Airforce only concern the determination of the strategic and operational objective and the necessary use of forces in a general way. In detail the command would remain in the hands of the high command of the Airforce of Navy."

19-03-2011 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

That the fullfilling of the duty towards the state, also in its new form cannot be equated to an approval out of inner conviction of the democratic and republican idea ,should be understandeable. The officers and at least the oldest soldiers came from the army and navy of the Empire . The ties to the past were too strong, that  they could fully change overnight . From the republican minded elements no army could have been build which would be prepared and capable to defnd the Republic against its enemies. ...
Before all the republic could not be served by officers who were prepared to change their conviction like a shirt . It had to be left to time to enable the gradual transition from loyalty from a feeling of duty, to the one which came from inner conviction. ...
It was only regrettable that the parties that supported the republic in the first place did not understand how to level the  road from the loyalty out of a feeling of duty to one out of inner conviction. Even when men like President Ebert and Richswehrministers Noske and Gessler recognized the loyalty and dutyfull work of the soldiers and protected them, even when several prime ministers recognized the miltary neecssities, this was not enough. In the parties that supported the Republic , a mistrust predominated which was not justified, even when some faux pas in the military area offered a pretext. Distrust is the last thing with which a state whatever its form, can gain its army for itself. Who needs the soldier as defender of the fatherland and as protection of the authority of the state, should not consider him as a 'necessary evil'. It was unfortunately indisputable that the Richswehr could only find real understanding for its interests at  first at the parties right from the center which again brought in the reproach of disloyalty to the Republic. 

A quote from Seeckt:"
Whether we like the actual form of the state or not  ,whether we think it is the right one, that is not important. Today it is about the state itself. The dangers that threathen him are great from the interior and exterior. ....
Personal feelings must now be subordinated to the battle  against the enemy , the personal opinion must subordinate itself  to the great idea of the saving of the fatherland from the downfall."
And one from Manstein, both from 'Aus einem Soldatenleben'.
"The Reichswehr had conserved from the past the prussian idea of  'serving', which today seems too much to have made place in large circles for one of the 'earning'. With this we come to the essence what is to be said about its position in the Weimar Republic. The individual may hang to the past, the notion of 'service to the Reich' was for him and for the whole what was decisive. With this attitude the Reichswehr won gradually ,if not the favour of certain parties,  the respect and the confidence of the people ...The Reichswehr was not a foreign body in the people, nor a state in the state .It wanted to be the shield of the Reich in the service of the people. .  

 

60 -

a quote from 'Aus einem Soldatenleben', Manstein Athäneum Verlag 1958 pp127-129
/
'Under the leading minds of the generalship and the general staff, which I got to know and judge this way, I would particularly like to mention as an outstanding figure later chief of the general staff Beck,. Not that that he came forward as such immediately in his outer appearance. His great modesty which penetrated his whole being and made him put hin person behind the cause ,  was a hindrance to this. This quality,as at all the honesty of his character were paired with great operational ability , an unerring clearness of judgment, a sense of duty which never failed and a varied education. In all this he reminded his great predecessor , FM Graf Moltke, whom the general staff thanks its reputation in the whole world.
As him, Beck was certainly not how one imagined a shining soldier. He did not have the carefreeness with which the later chief of the Heeresleiting Generaloberst v. Fritsch won the heart of the troops.  As Moltke, Beck personified a type of highly intellectual  scholar, more than that of a soldier. His decisions were not based upon -as with the then chief of the Heerezsleitung v.Hammerstein- what Napoleon called the coup d'oeuil. He did not make off the cuff decisions. He examined the for and against exactly, before a decision was made and could not be seduced by wishfullthinking.
Many have scolded him as a ditherer and it was feared he would be a Fabius Cunctator in war. It has been reproached that he was against technical development or did not  have enough understanding towards it and particularly hindred the development of the tank weapon.
Yes, he frequently poured water in the wine of stormy innovators. But this was done out of a sense of responsability, from the Moltke principle "first examine, then dare", not that he would in any way have been backward.
If Beck had a fault, then it was was this, that his high sense of duty lead him to personally examine or weigh each question thoroughly. So he, who was an excellent teacher for the general staff , could during the travels, not even dismiss out of hand the most erroneous decisions. His sense of justice and his fairness moved him mostly to even then discuss the fore and against. This trait had as a disadvantage that he far overtaxed his capacaty for work.
It has not been given to general Beck-as his great predecessor-with whom he had so much in common, to give the proof of his generalship. But I have no doubt that Beck-on the condition that he had to do with a head of state or commander in chief who was accessible for his counsel- would also have withstood the test of the fieldcommander. Certainly, he had always put the thinking beforec the daring .But , after all in him glowed the godly spark of boldness; nobody would have more consistently exec uted a decision once taken-nonwithstanding all frictions and coincidences,which war brings- than Beck,because he would beforehand have considered all possibilities with a clear mind.
As a human being,General Beck was one of the most noble appearances. That, just because of this,he would have been inferior to a brutal person like Hitler, is understandeable.' 

While Mussolini returned to Rome from his waiting position near Derna on the 20th july and Chirchill could state on the next day that Egypt was out of danger, the german commander began, with the same emphasis which he used only a month before for the continuance of the offensive, now to urge  breaking off the battle and retrezat in the position on the border. Rommel felt the reversal of the situation so strongly that he even took into account for the first time the loss of the whole of Italian North Africa if his proposals were refused and substantial reinforcements did not arrive. 
His proposals met with the firm refusal of the german and almost even more of the Italian high command . Both were unwaveringly confident to conserve the intiative and to reach the objectives in a new attempt, when only first the necessary reinforcements had arrived. In the abscence of other possibilities the Commmando Supremo and OKW had decided together at the end of july that in the first place the forces assembled against Malta would be sent as fast as ppossible to Egypt.
The operation staff Malta already on 7th july been instructed by Cavallero to put aside the attackplans against the island and instead  prepare a crossing to Tunis.
The Commando Supremo now feared , after the pursuit into Egypt had stalled, even more than before it started that the british could start a landing operation in  French North Africa and from there advance into Tripolitania .The last prospect to take away Malta was hereby done away with 
In concordance with the orders meanwhile received from the Commando Supremo, at the end of july Rommel also showed himself  convinced of the necessity to r
resume the offensive shortly  , during a visit by the author on his commandpost 12-15km westly of El Alamein,   There was no talk of retreat anymore. 

Siegfried Westphal Erinnerungen Hase & Koehler 1975 pp 159-1960

Mid april  Rommel proposed, in a memorandum to the OKW, to take Malta in order the create preconditions for better securing the supply over sea. Thereupon he wanted to proceed to the attack against Tobruk. Whether after the fall off the fortress, the attack should be continued into Egypt ,would depend on the situation that would occur. We expected a new British offensive from the beginning of june. To forestall this, the Panzergroup had to attack end may.Consequently ,the attack on Malta had to happen early enough so that a rearranging of Luftflotte 2  from the target Malta to the objective Tobrouk could be realised. If the preparations for the on Malta could not be finished in time, then it was bearable to attack Tobruk first. But Malta had to be taken immediately afterwards.
Temporarily Rommel hesitated to decide on the attack on Tobruk on the end of may. Actually all-including General Gause-advised him to wait untill the fall. In the blazing heat of the African summer the british would not attack, in september we would be better off from the viewpoint of logistics and forces. The only supporter of a possible early attack was I. Rommel was undecided which happened seldomly with him. Then the alllies unexpectedly decided him. An emissary of Bastico, his chief of staff Count Barbasetti arrived. His beard was an honour to his name. With a torrent of words he tried to convince Rommel of the inpracticability of a summer offensive. He brought forward the same arguments as the german supporters. However, he made a psychological error when he said it was 'irresponsible' to proceed already to the attack on Tobruk. That was too much for Rommel. To suppose irresponsability in him who was consumed day and night in the fight for the holding of  Libya , went too far. This visit decided the issue. His sense of contradiction had been called out.
Hitler did not have much confidence in the success of an attack on Malta, in which besides parts of Luftflotte 2 german and Italian paratroups would have the decisive role. Even so, he and Mussolini approved this intention. From the beginning of april to middle may geram bombers attacked the island almost daily with strong forces. Soon it turned out that the preparations for the Malta venture could not be ended before june. The attack on Tobruk therefore got priority.
When after the taking of Tobruk our main forces had reached the Egyptian border, the german airforce would turn on the objective Malta because it could only support one operation effectively.

11-01-2011 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

A quotee from Die 1.Panzerdivision,Rolf Stoves pp474-475 on the fighting in november -december 1943 during which it belonged to the same army corps(the48th) as the LAH and fought in the same battles:

'Even when the 1st pzdiv. in this first 1 and a half month of its renewed fighting in the east....again achieved great successes,it also had to suffer grievous losses:in the pzGr Rgt 1 the commander of the 3rd batallion, and his successor were killed.In the sister regiment 113 both Btl commanders ,their successsors and the regimental commander were severely wounded;Major von Hübner later died of his severe wounds in hospital.Further were killed in this sector the lieutenants Beer,Fisher,Hause,Inselberger,Kurz,Mewes,Richter,Schubert and a number of  NCO's of the Panzergrenadiere.The Pz reg. 1 had beside the loss of many brave tankcrews-especially experienced tankcommanders who as experts were irreplaceable at this time of the war-suffered the loss of many platoon commanders,the Abteilungsadjudant and other officers.Among which Oblt Georg(4.PzRgt 1),Lt Schauer(Adj I Abt Pz 1) and the lieutenants Kempe and Nehring.Lt Graf was mortally,Hptm von Krauss and Lt Stoves were severely wounded....The other unitsalso suffered bitter and irreplaceable losses.'

Just to show that heavy losses particularly among officers were very high in all units involved in the fighting in nov.-dec. 1943

If a panzerregiment is ging to be decimated,it  it is not likly to happen during offensive actions because there the attacker will probably  control the batttlefield and disabled tanks of which only a minority will be total loss,can be recuperated and repaired.
In a retreat a panzerregiment can be decimated because it wil have to destroy non operational tanks that cannot be moved.
This can easily be shown by looking at the losses of the Tiger company of SS panzerregiment 1(W.Schneider,Tiger im Kampf II p151).
During the offensive actions until  23.12.1943 under Peipers command 2 tanks were lost to enemy actions,taking the total strength to 23.During four retreats 16 tanks had to be blown up ( 24.12:7 ; 29.12: 2 ; 02.01 : 4 ; 19-20.01 :3)and one was lost to enemy action,taking the total to 6.So the Tiger company was certainly decimated but purely due to having to retreat and certainly not because of alleged ill executed offensive actions.

Peipers misconduct was such that on 28.11.1943 SS Oberfûhrer Wish proposed him for promotion to Obersturmbannführer:
'He is a plain,prudent and energetic personality.As batallion comander of the armored batallion he showed smart tactical thinking and was able to use each favourable opportunity for the division by fast,agile advances.This special eye for the grasping and exploitation of a favourable situation,as also his hardness in counterattacks and his experience in the command of battles in the back of the enemy,make him seem,particularly as he is himself exemplary brave,especially suited as commander of the Panzerregiment.......'    

Lehmann III p.429:' 0601.1944:...20.00 the commander of the PzRgt opens Osadowka from the south and keeps open the road for the retreat of the division until 24.00 
23.00 Report to the corps:"the mass of the division has moved through Osadowka to the south..."
07.01.1944: 00.00 Stubaf Peiper retreats with the panzer rear guard from Osadowka after the Pz AA 1 has moved through.

Lehmann II p.431:' 08.01 30-40 enemy tanks with mounted infantry roll over the main defense line between PzGrenRgt1 and 2 penetrate atbPzGren Rgt 1 until the hollows to the north of Stepok and at III/2 in Sherebki.In this line they are stopped by concentrated fire from the PzAr1 and thereopon destroyed in a pincer movement by the armored battlegroup under the brave commander of the PzRgt 1 Stubaf Peiper in cooperation with the tank destroyers of Tank destroyer batallion 473.
09.00 the situation is resolved; 33 T34 and seven mechanized guns belonging to the 54.Guard Pz Brig. have been destroyed.

Lehmann III p.438-439: '13.01.1944 08.30 The enemy attacks the defense sector of PzGrenRgt 1 from Chutorysky Hfe with strong armored forces and mechanised guns ,achieves a break-in and advances until Tschessnowka.This armored force is smashed completely in a counterattack by the armored Gr. Peiper and 37 T 34 and 7 mechanised guns are killed.Ustuf Wittmann achieves his 80th and his gunner Woll his 80 th kill.Both get the knights cross.....
Oberst von Künsberg Kdr IR 188 writes the author:"The good  Peiper sent me  then two Tigers in my sector ,where Ustuf Wittmann killed numerous tanks and the other one also twenty during a russian attack...I was then very pleased about the obliging and selfless collaboration between commanders."
The CG General Balck  congratulates Michael Wittmann in a radio message directed at him personally.
23.20 the armored battle group together with parts of Battlegroup von Künsberg and Pz Gren.Rgt 1 starts a counter attack  and has restored the old HKL at 02.10 after driving away the enemy.'

14.10  12.30 Order to Stubaf Peiper to advance as fast as possible with all available tanks and APC , and also the II gep. /AR 1 from the area to the west of Smela to the northwest,destroy the enemy around Chutorysko Hf and gain the railroad Berditschef Ljubar.Krassnopol is then to be taken in collaboration with the armored group DR.
12.55 the armored Group starts,pushes into the relief movements at Chutorysko Hf,destroys at least two regiments,is able to gain the north egde of Krassnopol at 14.00 and stands ,turning to the west,at 16.30 at the bridge in the middle of Molotschki.The enemy flees abandoning his weapons to the norteast,east and northwest......' 

Some context on the operation for which Peiper got the Oak leaves.
A quote fom Ordnung im Chaos, General der Panzertruppe a.d.Herman Balck pp 477-479:'The 06.12 by favourable wetter-light frost and moonlight-all divisions crossed the road Schitomir-Korosten like oriented by a ruler,puctual to the second.The enemy was completely surprised.Our movements had not been noticed by him.He resisted bravely but without coordination.At the evening the enemy front had been rolled up in a length of 36 km. A fight as one experienced seldomly.Without any crisis.
...At first the enemy underestimated our attack completely.Later individual PAK and tanks were opposed to us.Then  there was unrest  in the radio traffic"report immediately from where the enemy comes."your report is not credible."Answer:"ask the devils grandmother. How could I know from where th enemy comes."...A little bit later the radio traffic stopped.The staff of the russin 60th army fled.Manteuffels tanks overran the command post.The 1.pzdiv.captured the staff of an armored corps,unfortiunately without the commanding general.
.....
Attacking the night to 07.12 and during the day ,the divisions covered another 20 km;The 08.12 the Teterew was reached by the Leibstandarte and the 1.pzdiv.The 7.pzdiv.broke into the bridghead of Malin......
The russian 60th army was wiped away.....
The next days brought variable fighting.The corps waged a  forward defense in an offensive way to secure the setting up of the XIII th corps in its new position.....
The russian threw everything he had in the counterattack.This created the opportunity  to attack individual parts with the concentrated divisions and surround and destroy them.At Radomysl,by concentrating the Leibstandarte and the 1.pz.div.,supported by 8 artillery and 5 rocketlauncher Abteilungen on a close space,an advance succeeded towards the 68.div.When the pocket closed on the 12.12, 3-4 more russian divisions went towards their destruction.
The 14.12 the corps attacked with all it had in the opposite direction to the north-again with complete success.The Wehrmachtsbericht of 14.12 reported about our sector:from 6-13.12 the enemy lost 4400 prisoners,around 11000 dead,927 guns,254 tanks.'

Die 14. Panzerdivision R.Grams p128-129:'The answer to the question concerning the best structure for the division for the expected offensive operations was almost obvious:the enemy attack spearheads consisted almost entirely of mechanised and panzer troops.Therefore the division had to put together its armored forces.During the night the orders went out from the HQ which took the I/Gren.Rgt 103,the I /Pz Art Regt and the 3./Pz Pi. Btl 13 from its units and put them under the command of the comander of the Panzerregiment,Oberst Langkeit.' 

Die 16.Panzerdivision W.Werthen p.92 :'The 06.06.1942 the 16.Pz Div. lefts its assembly area in the following march order:Vorausabteilung Witzleben(K 16,PzKp Scheidemann,5./PzartRgt 16,Btl Mues,3./Pi 16) ,KG Sickenius((Pz.Abt Strachwitz,I/S.Rgt Fondermann,I/Artl.Rgt.16 Clemann),KG Krumpen(Pi 16,I/S.Rgt 79 Wota,11/79,1.Pz.Jg;Abt.16,Abt Ackermann mit 7./8.Artl.Rgt.16).

What is your point? You put a link to a bio of Wittmann which contains all the usual information.And then you simply confirm my point about other effects from air strikes other than killing tanks.

Many hits on a tank will cause it damage to its externals:antenna,opticals,gun,jamming turret which will diminish its effecdtiveness without destroying it.
If you hit the very powerfull Abrams tank many times with RPG's it will also sustain damage to its external equipment which force it to be taken out of the battle and repaired. 

I agree with Rommel. I let him speak for himself(Krieg ohne Hass,Verlag Heidenreimer Zeitung pp382-384):
" General von Rundstedt,a soldier of great format,planned to concentrate the available Panzer and motorised divisions in the middle of the french space,in order to achieve a great own superiority on the battlefield by a fast march of these units.In normal circonstances this plan would have been the best solution  in spite of the very weak occupation of the coast and would have led to succes with 100% certainty.However Fieldmarshall von Rundstedt could have no idea of the extent of the anglo-american air superiority and the ensuing operational-tactical limitations.
With an advance of so many Panzer and motorised divisions the respect of the timings would have been an absolute necessity because, in view of the weak coast defenses,this advance would have to be executed as quickly as possible.
With my african experience I doubted-and as events showed with reason,that the timely execution of this plan would be possible .
Before el Alamein we had sufficiently been able to study the effects of the anglo-american bombingtactics on our motorised units.In France it was to be expected that the airforces used on the day of the invasion would be a multiple of the bombingunits the allies disposed of in northafrica.Contrary to the desert,in France only a limited number of roads could be used which led over rivers and cities.Therefore the enemy airforces could have greater effect than in the desert.
I specifically pointed out the following points to Generalfeldmarshall von Rundstedt:
 a)The anglo-amercan fighterbomber would by day and by night with flares fly over the roads for advance and interdict all  traffic
 b)The allied bombingsquadrons would destroy all cities and bridges when this would promise the blocking of a road.Important roads would fall out totally this way
 c)Motorised troops would already sustain heavy losses by airattacks
 d)Because of this timings could never be respected.Large reorganisations would be necessary.With 2-3 divisions you can reorganise quickly ,reorganising an advance of 10 divisions is much more difficult and takes a lot of time,especially when the units are not used to this.
 e)After approximately 10 to 14 days the offensive group would have arrived on the battlefront and have reorganised the troops.Meanwhile the americans could have overwhelmed the weak coastal defenses,advance deep and supply their bridghead.The attack by the units strongly decimated on the march then cannot have any success anymore.(Obviously one could have split off a few units and send them in forced marches to the front but then the compact offensive force,the main advantage of the plan of Fieldmarshall von Rundstedt,would have been done away with).
Therefore I kept to my plan,which in the circonstances,could be nothing else than a compromise."

The stellungsbesetzungsliste in Lehmann's book clearly shows that Peiper always remained in command of the panzerregiment.Kuhlman never formally commanded the regiment.When the strength of the batallions or Abteilungen in a regiment drops so much that they have temporarily to be amalgamated,the regimental commander ceases to effectively command the regiment but the regimental commander stays in formal command.In the action on the 14th january Peiper commanded the armored battlegroup which consists of the Panzerregiment,an Abteilung of self propelled artillery and the SPW batallion. He is also mentioned in command of the armored battlegroup the day before.There is also a mention of him with the panzerregiment on the 7th of january.As first general staff officer of the division Lehmann knew best where Peiper was. Peiper was certainly always still in command of the armored battlegroup until he left on his leave.
The strength reports in Lehmann's book clearly show that the panzerregiment was never destroyed.Its operational strength dropped as is normal in intensive operations(20 tanks on the 11th january;19 tanks + 21 mechanized guns on the 15th) but many of the non operational tanks were in short term or in long term repair repair.
In the detail of the actions there is no evidence of any underperformance of the panzerregiment,on the contrary.
Two commanders got the Knights cross and Peiper himself eventually was proposed for the Oak leaves.
When one looks at the chapter in Schneiders book on the tiger company of the Leibstandarte one sees no sign of any disasters or underperformance either.One simply sees that most total losses of Tigers were due to having to blow them up when they had to be left behind and you also see that because of mechanical failures the operational strength of the tiger company was always low.
In the divisional history of the first panzer division which was also involved in the fighting in november-december 1943 you will see the same story of mounting losses in vehicles and experienced officers because of the heavy fighting.
In conclusion Westermeyer has clearly shown nothing at all.There was no underperformance of the LAH panzerregiment which suffered no more losses than any other unit suffered in the same heavy fighting.
Take away the malmedy massacre and Peiper's SS runes and nobody would ever have written a book about him because he is simply one of the many german regimental commanders..Nobody would ever have bothered to attack his credentials as a regimental commander.

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general g

 

06-09-2010 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

Entscheidungsschlachten des Zweten Weltkrieges p 242-243 Bernard & Graefe 1960

The speed and the dimension of this success were not in the least suited on the german side to remenber the previous arrangements and to make them more important than the impression of the victorious instance.
While the Italian high command , in concordance with the commonly defined plan, tried to banish the army of Rommel to the defense near the Egyptian border by measured orders, and while Mussolini on the proposal of Cavallero , -in a premonition of what would come-urged the german commander againin chief again by letter of 21st june, to nconsolidate the successes and take Malta first, the thoughts of the german headquarters had ran for long  in a totallly different direction.
Hitler had, ,taking up the repeatedly renewed negative decision  of 21st may,immediately after the news of the taking of Tobruk before his military evironment, again unalterably rejected the landing on Malta and linked to this at the same moment the decision to continue the pursuit of the british in the direction of the Suez Canal .
Therefore the strong urging of the victorious commander in Africa nor an agreeing utterance from the Wehrmachtführungsstab and the Oberkommando of the Kriegsmarine had been needed to move Hitler in his answer already transmitted by telex on 21st june to Mussolini ,to commit the total weight of his 'advice' in this sense.
Without dealing even with one word on Malta, he let the enthusiasm of the hour run its course by writing that a 'historical turning point ' had been reached 'which could be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war'. The british army was 'practically destroyed'. The 'quickest and completest exploitation of this situation, which would in no case present itself a second time in the same theatre' demands 4a pursuit without pause until the complete of the british troops' , before through the arrival of new reserves 'a change unfavourable for us would occur'. 'This time' he thought, 'Egypt could be taken from England' , while the simultaneous taking of Sebastopol  freed the way to also over the Caucasus 'advance to the fall of the whole eastern construction of the english empire'.
Under further referral to the 'historical hour', Hitler rose subsequently to a solemn - when also not quite original and successfull- form of speech with the words ' the Goddess of fortune in war approaches the commander only once. When one does not hold onto her in such a moment,one will very often not reach her anymore'. 
Behind the accessory of this exchange of correspondance which in the decisive hour had to makeshiftly replace the forwardlooking planning of a common staff, in the first place became visible again the contrast between the strategic objectives of both coalition partners and also closely entwined in there the differences in the method of warfighting.

08-08-2010 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

06-03-2010 om 17:01 geschreven door wittmann  

179 (unser neuer Armeeführer) heißen, sie haben alleAngst vor der höchsten Stelle. Und die führt nach Schlagworten wie: ,kein napoleonischer

180. Man

einen großen Entschlußvor 3 Wochen, vor 14 Tagen, ja noch vor 5-6 Tagen faßte, sich abzusetzen.

30-12-2009 om 00:00 geschreven door wittmann  

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^{Manstein lost victories p618:"On the one side stood the view of the dictator,who believed in the power of his will,by which he thought he could not only nail down  his own armies where they stood ,but also stop the enemy.Of the dictator who also had to shy away from the danger of  risk,which entailed the possibility of the loss of prestige.Of the man whom with all the aptitude still lacked the basis for real military capabilities.
On the other side stood the view of military commanders,who by education and training still held fast that warfare is an art,whose essential elements are a clear judgment of the situation and the boldness of the own decision.Of which the success  could only be found in mobile operations because only in these could the superiority of german command and troops be shown to its full advantage.
Justice obliges to recognize that the conduct of the operations  the armygroup had in mind,would have demanded from Hitler the taking of big risks in other theatres of war and other sectors of the eastern front and accept strong political and economical disadvantages.,However,it would have been the only way, in 1943 to achieve an exhaustion of the soviet offensive power and open the way for a political draw in the east."}
Siegfried westphal Erinnerungen p10:"Nobody has to be suspicious that I will try to prove by circuitous roads,that the German Reich could have ended the war with a stalemate or in certain circonstances even have won the war with better political or military command at the highest level.I have already pointed out this impossibility in 'Heer in Fesseln'. The general superiority of the opposing side in all aspects and it's determination to defeat the nazi regime were too great.I only want to explain things as I lived them.I do not want to diminish the merit of anybody in even the smallest way or make anybody's fault bigger If I want to stay with the truth-and that is my firm decision-then I also have to show the errors committed.We are all human beings with human flaws.Mediocre decsions not adapted to the situation or even false decisions could therfore not fail to appear and must not be hidden.By the way,everibody has the right to make mistakes".

General Raus does speak about achieving a victory by shortening the lines and staying generally on the defensive untill the red army was sufficiently attritted before resuming the offensive(Newton panzer operations p346-347).What he means by victory is not clear.It could mean the stalemate as envisaged by Manstein. His opinion is certainly very sensible and the only option available.The red army's wastefull tactics could  certainly be exploited and even the USSR did not have unlimited supplies of men. He was against the Kursk operation as it was planned.You attack weakness,not strength.
Even those who do not agree with Raus or any other general should show respect for the opinion of a real general who commanded real troops in a real war.Some modesty is called for.Forumusers  have not worn the boots of a high commander in a real war.Most are amateurs with an interest in military historry who have maybe played general in a wargame.Internetgenerals are not real generals.Worse,there are those who try to chase anybody from this forum who does not share their dognas.I will not flee.
Another gimmick used by the purist is saying that the german army disregarded Hitler's orders and therefore his stand fast orders do not matter.
This is very far from the truth.A man like Model certainly did whatever he wanted but he was an exception.There are enough examples of the contrary.In 1945 for example Generals Harpe and Reinhardt had correctly estimated the russian offensive to begin on the 12th january 1945 and had requested authorisation to fall back on the second line to shorten the line and create reserves.As usual Hitler refused .They should have disobeyed but they did not with catastrophic consequences.
And yes,the german army could do flexible retreats and it did them .Timely retreats to avoid breakthrough or to prevent encirclements after breakthroughs were done(the falling back from line to line by the 9th army after Kursk for example).The prurist clearly undestimates the capacity of  german infantry to retreat(they moved at night and were prepared to fight in the morning)and again ignores what was effectively done.Reading german divisional histories is very usefull to know what really was done.
Planned retreats to shorten the mine were done(Büffel Bewegung).
However many retreats after breakthroughs were done too late because getting authorisation took too long.Pockets were created that could been avoided(for example the tcherkassy pocket).The destruction of AGC would certinly have been avoided if authorisation had been given to shorten the line before the attack.Garrisons of useless Feste Platze were lost(Tarnopol,Vitebsk etc..)
On the subject of AT defenses two quotes from Guderian in 'Panzerleader' :
p.297"6.Antitank defense will devolve more and more on the assault guns,since all other anti-tank weapons are becoming increasingly ineffective against the enemy equipment or else are expensive in terms of casualties.All divisions on the main batle fronts,need to be supplied with a certain complement of these weapons;the secondary fronts will have to do with a high command reserve,while the divisions are for the time being equipped with self propelled anti-tank guns.In order to economise on personnel and material,a gradual amalgamation of the assault gun batallions and anti-tank batallions is necessary." 
p319:"On december 7th(1943) it was decided that the full production of the old Czech 38 ton tank to be witched to tank destroyers(the Hetzer)...This tank destroyer was to be the basic weapon for the anti-tank batallions of the infantry divisions,and was thus the belated answer to my proposal made on march 9th. ....
I was now at last in a position to carry out my ideas on this score,but it was too late;Only one third of anti-tank companies could be equipped with the new weapon by the time the russians launched their 1945 winter offfensive." 

Lets have Manstein himself speak about his original idea 

Lost victories  p 476:"The pure defensive could therefore not be our business.Rather,we had to-within a strategic defensive- show these factors to their best advantage which still formed our superiority against the enemy: the better and more flexible command and the higher battleworth and also the higher mobility(at least in the summer)of our troops.
We had to-even when we in general were now on the defensive- at least try to deal the enemy powerfull blows,which would not only inflict heavy bloody losses but would also cost a high number of prisoners and all iin all could at least lead to  make him ripe for a draw;Also within a strategic defensive we had to again come to mobile operations,,in which lay our strength. Be it that we used favorable opportunities the enemy offered us or brought about ourselves...."
Lost victories p480-481:"The idea of a backhand strike which was proposed to Hitler several times by the CG AGS in the months february-march 1943 was based on the suspected enemy objectives. A fighting retreat should be done in front of the expected attack against the Donets area to let the enemy armies advance  to the west into the line Melitopol-Dnjepopetrowsk.At the same moment strong forces should be gotten ready behind the north wing of the army group .With them the expected  attack there should be crushed to then advance south/southeast in the deep flank of the enemy armies advancing through the Donets area against the lower Dnjepr and destroy them on the coast.
.....
If this first partial strike succeeded ,were important enemy forces destroyed,then maybe a second strike aimed to the north against the enemy center could follow.....
Such a backhand strike had two preconditions.The high command had to be prepared to lay the main focus on the eastern front and within this on the south wing.On the north wing  of AGS a srong superiority should be secured on the expected enemy forces ,where the operation to succeed.For this it would have been inevitable to rigourously uncover secondary theatres of war,even with the danger of difficulties there.Being safe on all theatres ,had to put into question even a partial success in the east.We also would have had to fall back on forces from AGC and AGN,at least mobile reserves would have to be created there,if need be by timely undertaken shortenings of the front(in the first place by the clearing of the already endangered Orel arch of AGC)...."

Was certainly a better idea than attacking the Kursk salient.A Typically Mansteinian idea.The only problem was that it meant giving the determination of the time of the attack to the red army which could be after an allied landing in Europe. 

A discussion about the feasability of flexible defense for the german army has as much sense as a discussion about the feasibility of a manned mission to the moon in the sixties.None because both were effectively done.Making statements to the contrary cannot change historical facts.
Some armchairgenerals are clearly...armchairgenerals in the negative sense of the word.The reality of what happened on the terrain does not bother them. 

To do a flexible defense you do not need more resources.You will have to do more digging because you will have more defenselines.At the end of the day,you will lose less men and less equipment  .Timely  retreats are always better than retreating too late ,getting surrounded and in the best case breaking out with at least massive loss of equipment.
These retreats can also be part of plan to lure the enemy deep and use armored forces against his flank or rear to inflict at least partial reverses.
And infantry can certainly retreat in face of enemy mobile forces.Movement is done during the night,ready to fight in the morning.That is what german infantry divisions did many times when falling back.
A flexible defense   also means the application of zone defense in which the first line will be given up in favour of a second line further back in the zone to escape the enemy artillery fire.
Simply trying to hold one long too thin line at all cost is never an option.Leads to destruction by enemy artillery,breakthough and encirclement.
Anything other is better.
All the alternatives were efectively done and could have been done on the whole front if Hitler had allowed it.There was no material impediment to that .Would always have  reduced losses considerably and at least slowed down the red army.Bleeding it enough to reach a stalemate was not excluded. 
Some quotes from F.W. von Mellenthin in 'Panzerbattles' as the opinion of a real commander is always more important

The opposition now starts to misinterpret 'flexible defense' to suit its own purposes.
As said before zonedefense is only one aspect of an elastic form of defense.If even after application of local reserves the main defense line cannot be held then timely retreat will be necessary (preferably to a next prepared defense line which one should always possess) .Otherwise zonedefense is only a more elastic form of fixed defense. Timely retreats are an integral part of flexible defense as stated before.These retreats can also be intentional to lure the enemy in a trap.
Amored reserves are used to counter attack broken through enemy armored formations.Within a strategic defensive you do not have to possess the capacity to do this everywhere along the front because restoring the line at all cost is not the objective.That would also only be another form of 'hold fast doctrine'.It is about inflicting heavy losses where you can and by whatever means.You use opportunities that the enemy offers you or you create them yourselves. To do this it is better to be strong in one place and inflict a heavy defeat on the enemy there than achieve nothing anywhere by spreading your armored reserves thin.
That is why Manstein wanted to concentrate everything on the south of the eastern front in 1943 and inflict a massive defeat on the red army there,accepting risks anywhere else.There was enough space to work with.Losing terrain was therfore not an issue.It is always about the enemy army and nothing else.
The Manstein proposal was certainly much better than attacking the Kursk salient.Would have been interesting to see how that played out.
So yes,the german army could practice flexible defense in the real sense of the word within a stategic defensive along the whole eastern front.That is never a problem and always saves a lot of men and equipment.At the end of the day,at the minimum the red army would have been seriously slowed down .

Some clearly WANT to misunderstand what a truly  flexible defense actually means.It means being prepared to give up large chunks of terrain if necessary to shorten the line to create defensive depth or to free forces for use elsewhere .It means you are prepared to intentionally retreat to lure an enemy in a trap.It means not absolutely wanting to regain a line by counterattack.Counterattack is only optional.Even an elastic zone defense is not really flexible defense if counterattacks to regain the line are a dogma(this was the main flaw in the elastic defense executed during ww1)It means you will not defend a line longer than is prudent.It means you will withrdaw  units in time in case of a breakthrough to avoid pockets.
 Because of Hitler's stand fast orders a  flexible defense in the real sense of the word was seldomly executed by the german army.At most an elastic zone defense minus was executed where it was a dogma to regain the line.Constructing a second line and retreating on it were mostly out of the question.And there ware also the mostly useless feste platze.
A truly flexible defense intends to inflict as much losses on the enemy as possible while preserving the own troops and equipment.
Holding terrain at all cost is not an option.


Army group South certainly did not have freedom of movement after Kursk.
Manstein can explain that better himself.Lost victories p511-512:" When,which was obvious,the soviet leadership sought the decision in this campaign against Army Group South,then on the german side there was no other choice but to strenthen itself here at much as possible for this decision.The fight had to be conducted in such a way that the opponent did not achieve the decision.
Two things were necessary for this:
In the area of Army Group South the running of the battle had to be based on the operational requirements and aim to exhaust the offensive power of the enemy,however not try to hold certain areas at all cost.
On the german side the main focus of strength within the general conduct of the war had now clearly to be to the east and within the eastern front looking ahead toAGS.
In both respects the leadership of the Army Group has had to fight an incessant fight with Hitler during the campaign of 1943-1944 for the recognition of the operational requirements.
 For political and  reasons of war economy,Hitler insisted on holding first the Donets area ,later the Dnjepr bend (and at the same time at Army Group A the Kuban and the Crimea).  
As a result, AGS was nailed fast with its right wing at first in the Mius,Donez,later in the Dnjepr bend ,the holding of which had to be a mistake from an operational viewpoint.
As she stuck out far to the east into the enmy front,she gave the opponent the possibility of an attack from two directions,whereby our armies had the sea in the back.Above all ,the front of the Armygroup was lenghtened in a fatal manner by these sticking out bastions.Forces had to be committed to their defense ,which could simply not be missed on the northwing of the Armygroup.On this however,and not in the Donets or in the Dnjepr area lay the operational decision.If the Soviets succeeded in destroying the northwing of the Armygroup by bringing into action  an
 overwhelming superiority then the objective of surrounding Amygroups South and A on the Black See would have been attained. This would be the  more decisive ,as more forces were committed for political or economical reasons on the non decisive south wing of the Army Group.
The question was very simply wether the economical and political viewpoints were to be decisive for the military command on the german southern wing. Practically speaking,as the situation now was, wouldwe give up the Donets and the Dnjepr area or should we sacrifice Amygroups South and A by the attempt to hold these areas at all costs. .....
We wanted clearly to know(request from the Armygroup at OKH)wether

either the Armygroup had to hold the Donetz area,also at the risk  that it would be cut off by a breakthrough in the direction of the Dnjepr.That would only be possible if the OKH were capable of preventiing this forseeable development on the northwing of the Armygroup by supplying of forces or by the intervention of AGC. 

Or if it mattered that the russian would bleed out in the course of this summer .In this case,if need, be a step by step retreat would have to be executed in the Donets area to free sufficient forces for the north wing.

The answer we thereupon got through the chief of the general staff was "the Führer wants both"
In the question of the main focus of forces it has to be said that who is not prepared to, if need be,give up areas to save forces will not be in a position to be strong enough at the decisive point."

Seems pretty clear to me.After Kursk the situation was again that AGS could not defend its front which was much too long. A step by step retreat to bleed the red army retreat was the only option.If Hitler wanted to hold the Donets area at all costs then he had to make some hard decisions to free a lot of troops elsewhere.He was unable to do that . 

To prevent the noticeable 'panther psychosis' in the Armygroup,the name Panther position has been omitted.The program to build positions has in no way been reduced as a result of this ,but has been strengthened.With all means stopping positions are built speedily on the decisive sectors. Then follows the building of further fallback positions and the linking pieces between the indvidual blocking positions."

A typical answer of an armchairgeneral who does suppose to much and disregards what effectively was done.For an infantrydivision on the defense the choice is not between retreating and not retreating.There are situations in which retreat is imperative and then waiting too long only leads to disaster.It is always usefull to have at least one fallback position.Breakthoughs and encirclement have to be avoided.A planned and ordered retreat is always the best solution.And retreating at night was done all the time by german infantrydivisions.The retreat of the ninth army after Kursk is a good example of that.
And the infantrydivisions of AGS had to retreat too.A volontary step by step one on the southern wing to shorten the line ending up on a well prepared line on the Dnjepr. would been better than what effectively happened.
And AGN was surrounded in Courland because of the collapse of AGC combined with Hitler not wanting to give up the baltic states.

Every army can practice deception and every commander can be deceived if the enemy puts a lot of effort into it..Red army followers try to make people believe that the red army had a copyright on deception.Obviously not as history proves.Deception is an inherent part of any major military operation. All commanders including great ones can even make mistakes and have.
The greatest german commander of ww2  that Manstein was ,was obviously going te be asked for advice. It should be clear that most of the highest commanders of the wehrmacht that could still be called upon after ww2 were at the retirement age.At most they could give advice.Their active service was over.Their reputation was such that they were asked.And as is wellknown the US army had some write down their kwowledge which was oviously very useful because those that served on the eastern front kwew the red army  very well.. 
Manstein's reputation as the greatest german commander of ww2 is certainly not going to suffer because of some unsourced accusations by one or more red army followers on this forum.
 .As Manstein seems to irritate some,another interesting quote about the situation after Kursk.
Manstein lost victories p513 :"Instead,during the campaign of 1943/1944 the german high command was concerning the uniting of sufficient forces on the decisive points of the eastern front ,always straggling the red army. As a result,It was  not possible for the command of the Armygroup to prevent successes of the superior enemy,but at the most limit its operational consequences.
She stood under the handicap to be on the one hand limited in its operational freedom of  decsison by the attachment to the Donets area and on the other hand not disposing of enough forces for the operational decisive northern wing.It was forced ,to fix an important part of its units on the operational false spot,to hold the Donets area and later  the Dnjepr bend;At the same time it had to throw its reserves continually from one wing to the other ,to restore the situation at least more or less at one spot,or to counter a dangerous crisis,without at the same time being able to prevent that the enemy meanwhile comes to successes on other spotsthanks to his superiority."

Well said.AGS  only reacting and trying to limit the damage.More was not possible in the framework of Hitler's orders.And Manstein did certainly limit the damage.AGS  was not destroyed.  He was never deceived about the red army's intentions.He knew where the decisive point was.  

The latest attack on Manstein can best be answered by a quote from his foreword to 'lost victories':
"I have tried to present the self experienced,self thought and self decided,NOT IN HINDSIGHT,but as I saw it AT THE TIME.
Not the researching historian but the acting human speaks.Even when I have tried to see the events,the people and their decisions in an objective way,the judgment of a co-actor will always be subjective.Nevertheless I hope that my writings will not be without value,even to the historian."

The opposition clearly does not know when to quit.Again we are faced with a lot of assertions we are supposed to accept at face value even if they are inherently incredible.It is time to throw the A bomb.
Fitst of all we are supposed to believe that the german army  had the large amounts of fuel and ammunition needed to lauch the Kursk offensive AND the defensive fighting that followed in the months afterwards but not for Manstein's first idea in which the Kursk offensive is omitted and just the defensive fighting(including volontarily giving up the Donets area) is done plus a strong armored counterattck into the red army's flank.Incredible.  
We are are also supposed to accept that the german infantrydivisions on the southwing of AGS could not do a step by step retreat to the Dnjepr after the stopping of the Kursk offensive because infantry supposedly cannot do that..Also ridiculous,if alone because the retreat to the Dnjepr was effectively done under much more unfavorable circonstances in september 1943.
Obviously it is pure coincidence that the german army could supposedly not do the things that would have at least slowed the red army down a lot.Such statements can only be made by somebody who is either very pro red army , very anti-german ,or  who suffers from a serious lack of knowledge of military operations or any possible combination of the beforementioned .
Concerning the blanket accusations of falsehood levelled at german commanders,they are first denied and then suddenly reiterated and supposed to be proven a  long time ago.
And then there are  the attempts at intimidation.A clear sign of mounting frustration.
Concrning examples of retreats by german infantry I  put some quotes out of 'Panzeroperations'by Steven Newton concerning the retreat of XI corps in the summer of 1943 to illustrate how german infantrydivisions executed a step by step retreat. 
p214:"With these considerations determining the conduct of operations,I decided-Hitler's order nonwithstanding-to fight a delaying action in successive positions until the withdrawal reached Kkarkov and then to hold the city".
p237:"On the northern front we held positions south of Belgorod for one day and abandoned it before the Russians deployed their forces.Continued resistance in any one position would have led to heavy casualties and the annihilation of the isolated XI corps."
p240:"During the night of 9-10 august ,XI corps made an unobserved withdrawal to a hastily prpepared postion about ten kilometers to the south,the salient of which had already been occupied by advance detachments.Weak rear guards ,left behind in the former position ,led the Soviets to believe that the line remained fully manned. The next morning,when russian infantry attacked the position after a heavy artillery bombardment,they found only the rear party maintaining contact.Our troops ,who had been thoroughly exhausted by the previous day's fighting and the subsequent night march were able to recuperate during the morning hours.By noon the first enemy troops cautiously approached the new position.It's gun emplacements and strongpoints were well camouflaged;soviet ground and air reconaissance failed to locate them.The 106th,198th,and 320th infantrydivisions held this line,the latter having been pulled back from its positions along the Donets to rejoin the corps.
Russian attacks resumed during the afternoon with increasing violence.......
By the evening of 10 august the russian attacks had lost some of their sting.Having learned from experience over the past few days  ,the Soviets  made probing attacks after dusk dusk to maintain contact with XI corps in case of another German night withdrawal.We gave these probes a hot reception and-after all such attacks had been repulsed-withdrew unmolested to the next prepared position.By the time that the infantry arrived to occupy the new line, the bulk of the artillery and antitank guns were already in position and ready to fire.Forming another solid block ,XI corps maintained unshaken by renewed enemy onslaughts.
We employed the same delaying tactics during the following days.The withdrawal to successive positions exhausted the troops ,but the casualty rate stayed low.The russians disproportionately high losses ,which forcecd hem gradually to relax their pressure on german lines....."
p248:"In he meantime the overall situation of Armygroup south had deteriorated to the to the point that Field Marshal von Manstein ordered a withdrawal west of the Dnjepr river.During this retrograde movement ,we employed the same delaying tactics that had been successful during the withdrawal from Belgorod to Kharkov.Again and again,delay on successive points forced the Soviet to make time-consuming preparations for battle and to suffer heavy casualties leading to the progressive exhaustion of their corps and divisions.The russians recognized our intentions and attempted every day to frustrate them by forcing an armored breakthrough.Above all,the enemy wanted to capture major cities comanding the road net needed for speedy manoeuvers.In view of the rainy weather ,the possession of hard surface highways became a decisive factor to both sides since the mud prevented any movement of the roads.We took this factor into account and concentrated our antitank defenses in and around important towns.....
p249:"With a change in the weather,the ground dried.The infantry divisions  were able to move faster,and the daily rate of the withdtrawal was increased up to thirty to fifty kilometers.The pursuing soviet armor did not manage to renew its pressure until XI corps halted for several days at the Krementchug bridghead.Russian striking power had been impaired by several weeks of battering against our delaying actions on successive positions ,until the energy of the enemy counteroffensive had finally spent itself." 

.

Near Kiev Manstein was not surprised.From a purely operational viewpoint he always considered his northwing most important because a break there could lead  to the surrounding of AGS.However,for reasons of war economy and political reasons,he had first to hold the Donets area and later the Dnjepr bend and the Crimea.After the retreat to the Dnjepr,from a purely operational viewpoint he would have fallen back on the Bug in the south and given up the crimea to free reserves for the northwing.
And repeating again and again in a very arrogant way that Mansteins ideas could not be executed, does not convince for reasons already mentioned.It is all about not WANTING to accept that there were better alternatives which would undoubtedly have lead to a better result for the german army.Any UNPREJUDICED person with a minimum of insight in military operations can understand that.

The attempt to let others(red army oficers by pure coincidence) accuse Manstein of dishonesty turns out to be a dud.Just proves russian generals were not averse to spinning reverses they still could suffer in 1943/ 1944.For example,the denying of the presence of mud near Kiev in november 1943  is rather funny as all histories of the german divisions involved in the counterattack mention the serious mud problem.

Concerning Manstein's memoir in general I am going to put the quote out of the forword again: "I have tried to present the self experienced,self thought and self decided,NOT IN HINDSIGHT,but as I saw it AT THE TIME.
Not the researching historian but the acting human speaks.Even when I have tried to see the events,the people and their decisions in an objective way,the judgment of a co-actor will always be subjective.Nevertheless I hope that my writings will not be without value,even to the historian."

Sounds pretty clear to me but not to everybody it seems.

It is nice to see that again the feasibility of a flexible retreat is denied while it was effectively done.A sign of the stubborness of the oppositionThere are examples enough of flexible retreats(Büffel Bewegung,retreat of the ninth army in the summer of 1944,the retreat to the Dnjepr,the flexible defense of AGN in 1944....)
These statements only confirms why the word 'armchairgeneral' is mostly used as an insult.
So yes, the german army could have executed the retreat to the Dnjepr on the southwing in july/august instead of in september.
And yes,the german could obviously omit the kursk offensive in favor of a retreat to the Dnjepr(and give up the Kuban bridghead) combined with a massive counterattack.Costs less resources than what was effectively done.
And no,the german army did not have to omit any operation on the eastern front in 1943 because of lack of resources.Proof of the contrary has not been given.
Obviously the opposition always denies the feasibility of anything that would been more favorable to the german army than what was effectively done.It does that in every discussion;
And making sneers at Manstein for supposedly having been deceived a second time when he wrote his book intentionally disregards that he wrote it on the  basis of the knowledge he had when the events took place.
And the US army  officer who wrote a text about red army deception to which a link was placed here did not make sneers at his german counterparts.The sneers at german intelligence officers are the sole responsability of one user.
The piece just proves that an army can always deceive if it puts enough effort into it.That is also one of the reasons why it is such a disadvantage not to have to initiative.

^{Deep battle or blitzkrieg or whatever one calls it is not undefeatable.Theories always sound good.In practice there is an opponent on the other side and he does not have to play your game,on the contrary. Confronted with an opponent as strong as you who are who also has large armored reserves  and good leadership proficient in armored warfare ,it will fail.It is not obvious that you will succeed in breaking through your opponents line if it is very deep or he chooses to do tiùmely retreats to avoid breakthrough ..If you do achieve breakthrough your armored forces can be  blocked,or  cutoff and annihilated by strong enemy armored reserves.The germans at Kursk either did not break the enemy line  or were stopped by enemy reserves.In 1942 the red army suffered a heavy defeat in the  second battle of Charkov.After Stalingrad Manstein defeated the red army again by counterattacking  a large  force of panzerdivisions..The red army only could achieve successful deep breakthroughs when faced with weakness.}
In 1944 and 1945 the german army had become an easy victim.
And it is not a coincidence that some intentionally misinterpret flexible defense to make it supposedly not workable against deep breakthroughs.

A quote from Mittlere Ostfront Juni 1944 by general Niepold pp256-257 to illustrate retreats effectively done by the german army in the summer of 1944
"It was shown  how the Army group in the 2nd phase of the battle,in defiance of the inevitable retreat ,.pressed sharply that the troops set themselves up again and again in postions wich were near to each other and continued the defense.It came to incessant fights by the armies,corps and divisions for the timely order for retreat before enemy break ins in the abscence of reserves could widen to unstoppable breakthroughs.
In general  it was about the appropriatedness of this tactic of retreat in short jumps.
Fieldmarshall Model said:'One can not retreat too fast.The artillery can only have its effect in defense.The point of view of the army to conduct the fight in a delaying action is false.'...
Whether one calls it defense or delaying action,the position was tenaciously held as long as possible with infantry to give  time to the artillery and the antitank weapons to have their defensive power have its effect.However,one protected oneself from breakthrough and destruction by  retreat at the last minute.Even when one continually had to give up terrain under pressure from the enemy,still this type of combat can most aptly be called ' defense limited in time',also when the troops had to retreat to a new position every day between the 6th and 16th july.
Because the mass of the divisions fought and moved on foot,only a retreat from line to line was possible.One can not enough appreciate the performance of german infantry which fought by day and marched by night.The real delaying action can only be done by armored troops,then and now." 
A quote from 'Von Minsk bis Lyck Die 12.panzerdivision' p 108-109,General  Niepold on the same subject

You may think you are military expert but you are not. I can only be educated by real military experts like Generaloberst Herman Hoth who gives an explanation concerning the notions 'strategy' and 'operations' in his book 'Panzeroperationen'. I quote:  
"The transition from strategy to operation is vague.The definition by Clausewitz-that strategy is the doctrine of the use of the battles for the purpose of the war-seems too narrow and dogmatic to us. The main area of the strategy is as Clausewitz  explains,the warplan. It determines the purpose and objective of the war, measures the forces to be used accordingly , seeks to ascertain the center of force of the enemy, the capacities, character weakness of the enemy people and the willpower of its government, takes into account the impacts on other countries, to deduce out of all these often mutually contradicting elements the center of gravity of the enemy power. As one sees, the mainpart of strategy is subject to political points of view. It can not be different. Then "poltics have engendered war". False judgments in the warplan or indeed the lack of a warplan must have fatal consequences , which cannot be compensted by military means. Justifiably it has been criticized that Hitler had no clear idea in 1940 how the war should be continued and ended after the quick defeat of France.  The opportunity to attack England over the channel directly after the capitulation of France  with the combined force of Army,Navy and airforce could not be used because no preparations had been made for a landing operation.
The strategy and therefore politics not only determines the planning of the war but also effects the whole course of the war. Because war is only decided by the final victory ,strategy has to take care that the final objective- in general the defeat of the enemy- is kept in sight,that the collective push for the center of the enemy power is not weakened by secondary enterprises, that the main battle is sought which promises the decisive victory ,that the success in battle is pursued with extreme vigor.  
We now come  in the border area between strategy and operations and also in the area that has always been the subject of the competence struggle between politics and the conduct of war. The soldier who fully recognizes the overweight of the political in the strategy, will tend to say that political viewpoints have to stop at the border of the 'operation'. that in the lacking of the political element is really to be recognized the  distinctive mark of the operational area. But things are not so easy. The halt ordered by Bismarck to operations in Bohemia in 1866 and hit such tough resistance from the military thinking King seems justified today to us. Another example maybe helps us further. When Hitler in the autumn of 1940 provisionally renounced pursuing the decision against England and decided to attack the USSR,, this happened for political,ideological and military grounds. The decision falls within the general conduct of the war in the area of strategy. The directives for the execution of the war against Russia(Barbarossabefehl) contained the war aims , the missions for the three parts of the armed forces and also political and economical viewpoints. These were also of a strategic nature, even as the proposals of the OKH formed the foundation for the directives. Of an operational nature on the other hand  was the 'Aufmarschanweisubng für Barbarossa', which the OKH published on  the  31st  january 1941 on the basis of the Barbarossa directives.
Thus, the strategy is the area of the supreme direction of the war.....
We now try to clarify the notion 'operations'. It usually encompasses events on a single theatre of war on the basis of a plan of campaign or operational outline. Its first result is the directive for deployment. It contains the strength and the formation of the forces made ready for the campaign ,the operational objective that should be attained by the campaign , probable strength  and formation of the opposing army, the missions for the subordinated army groups and army reserves which should according to Moltkes doctrine mostly not go beyond the first clash with the enemy .
From the deployment evolve the operations ; that is the march of the readied forces to the battle. The textbook example for this are the campaigns of Moltke in 1866 ,1870/71 but also the wideranging movements in the US civil war. Particularly the campaigns in France pointed the way for generations of military commanders in Germany. By fast and bold operations which culminated in decisive battles ,the war was ended before politics fell on the soldiers out of fear for the intervention of foreign powers. On the basis of these war experiences the idea of bold operations which were alone decisive took more and more root in the german army. In Berlin however the old victorious comander fights with his doubts if the future war which engages whole armed peoples in mass armies  can still be ended the same way as the wars of 1866 and 1870/71 ; he looks for other means to make the probable enemy willing for peace. The first world war confirmed the reservations of Moltke,on the decisive western theatre the trenchwar gave few room for operations. The objective to free the command of the war from these restraints  and give it back the operational freedom , lead in Germany shortly before the second world war to the formation of panzer formations with operational and not tactical missions. " 
When a famous military leader explains his ideas about strategy,operations, tactics etc.. in a book or article, that has the same value as a doctor wrting about medicine or any other famous practitioner talking about his trade.
On 24.11.1942 Manstein advised Hitler that "The breakout of 6th Army to the southwest is still possible and the safest way.Staying put means ,in view of the fuel and  ammunition situation,running an extreme risk. I can in spite of this ,for the time being, not join tha postion of Armygroup B  for the breakout , as long as there is a prospect for sufficient supply,at least with antitankmunition,infanterymunition and fuel. This is decisive". <ref>Kehrig, Manfred ''Staingrad'', Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags- Anstalt, 1974 page 564.</ref> On 28.11.1942 Manstein advised Hitler "..If therefore the forcing of a decision should not be possible and only a limited link to 6th Army woould result,then I consider it necessary,to use this to pull out 6th Army from the encirclement with the objective of achieving an operationally capable organisation of forces in the general line Jaschkal-Kotelnikowo-Don-Tschir-Usinko ".<ref>Kehrig, Manfred ''Stalingrad'', Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974 page 575.</ref> Wintergewitter, launched on 12 December, achieved some initial success and von Manstein got his three panzer divisions and supporting units of the [[57th Panzer Corps]] (comprising the [[German 23rd Panzer Grenadier Division|23rd Panzer Grenadier Division]], and the [[German 6th Panzer Division|6th]] and [[German 17th Panzer Division|17th Panzer Divisions]]) within 30 miles of Stalingrad by 20 December. However, the corps was halted at the town of [[Aksay, Rostov Oblast|Aksay]], and strong Russian forces eventually pushed them back.

On 19 December 1942 von Manstein had ordered [[Friedrich Paulus|Paulus]] to execute the attack to linkup with the [[57th Panzer Corps]]. Erich von Manstein did not however order the abandonment of Stalingrad, only to be prepared for doing so. At the same time he advised Hitler "...Because for reasons of weather and available forces the supply by air and with this the maintaining of Sixth Army ,is not possinle, as the 4 weeks of encirclement have proven, the 57 th Corps clearly cannot establish a land connection with sixth Army, I now consider the breahthrough of sixth Army to the southwest as the last possibility , to conserve at least the mass of the soldiers and the still mobile parts of the army" .<ref>Kehrig, Manfred ''Stalingrad'', Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974 page 598.</ref>  
Some state that Manstein could have ordered the abandonment of Stalingrad but they disregard that this could not be done without Hitler knowing it. The [[German Sixth Army|6th Army]] never executed the attack because it considered it did not have enough fuel and ammunition to do so.<ref>Stalingrad, Manfred Kehrig</ref>

In them he presented the thesis that if he had been allowed to operate by Hitler,maybe a draw could have been achieved on the eastern front
"The first question which had to be answered was this,whether there could be  still a thought of achving a bearable solution in the east at that time. Surely not anymore in the sense of thely fighting down of the soviet power. But was there not still the hope of achieving a remis?A solution which would have meant the prospect for the Reich of maintaining itself
That militarily-with correct operational commanding-a remis could still be achieved in the east at that time,,was at any rate at the Ob.Kdo der H.Gr.Don(which meanwhile had been renamed in Armygroup South)our conviction." .<ref>Mannstein, Erich ''Verlorene Siege'', Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe, 1983 page 474.</ref> "
"Both could have been foreseen,rspectively avoided if the german command had clearly concluded from the general situation in the spring of 1943 that everything had to be done now  to achieve in the east a remis or at least the exhaustion of the soviet offensive power. When henceforth it had been prepared to act in accordance with this conclusion with regard to time and forces. Manstein p.505.
'On the one side stood the view of the dictator,who believed in the power of his will,by which he thought he could not only nail down  his own armies where they stood ,but also stop the enemy.Of the dictator who also had to shy away from the danger of  risk,which entailed the possibility of the loss of prestige.Of the man whom with all the aptitude still lacked the basis for real military capabilities.
On the other side stood the view of military commanders,who by education and training still held fast that warfare is an art,whose essential elements are a clear judgment of the situation and the boldness of the own decision.Of which the success  could only be found in mobile operations because only in these could the superiority of german command and troops be shown to its full advantage.
<sup>Justice obliges to recognize that the conduct of the operations  the armygroup had
Befehl im Widerstreit pp 265-268

hief of the general staff: The strong russian attacks in the area of Charkow and against the Orel bend continue unabated. Specifically at Manstein on the northwing of AGC the situation west of Charkow has stronly aggravated .I see a strong danger for the link to AGC.
Hitler :Manstein is a good commander when he has ample forces. He does not understand how to find solutions in crisises.
Chief of the general staff: I think that the situation forces to make comprehensive considerations. May I start with the basic principle of the russian operations. Without doubt the objective of their offensive is, to break through in the direction of Kieve,separate AGS and AGC and then push AGS against the Sea of Azov. THe forcal point of the Russians is clearly against the northwing of Manstein.
Hitler: Both Armygroups will at least prevent that link between them is lost. The Russian can do everything and we are not even capable to cut off this miserable Kursk salient.
Chief of the general staff: The attack started too late. 
Hitler: The command only started the business halfheartedly.-What can happen now to support the front. From where can we take foreces. Jodl?
Chief of the Wehrmachtführungsstab: The east must fend for itself. The west has been combed clean, Italy needs every man,because otherwise Sicily cannot be held. Maybe we can release forces in Norway.
Chief of the general staff :  They would come too late. I see only hte possibility to give up the Donets area and this way rrelease forces for the Kiev area.
Hitler: Obviously,vacate and vacate. then we will soon end up at the border of the Reich.. Anbd the russian gets his land without losing a man.
Chief of the general staff: If we remain in front then we are in danger of losing our troops. We would only do the russian a favour,we play his game.
Hitler: What should become of the Kuban bridghead?
Chief of the general staff: We will have to give that up in any case. It does not serve the purpose you want to achieve as we cannot go on the offensive anymore.
The russian knows that too and does not see in it a threat anymore.
Hitler: Do not think you will gain forces this way. They will all be needed for the Crimea. And what do you think of the effect on Turkey. The gentlemen ignore the political consequences.
Chief of the general staff: We cannot sacrifice divisions for Turkey.
Hitler: Zeitzler,you are much impressed by the Russians. One needs the nerves to see such crisises through. Wenn I give up the Donets area, then I can put an end to the war in a few months. Then we do not have enough coal anymore. 
Chief of the general staff: Speer has told me that it is not so bad. Anyway,lately we have not been able to get much coal out of the Donets area because of the railway situation
Hitler: How does Speer get these informations? Towards you? That is what I still lacked, that he involves himself in the military command.
Chief of the general staff: I asked him for it.
Hitler:  Do not come with vacating again,Zeitzler! We will hold the Donets area.
Chief of the general staff: Then we at least subordinate to Manstein the whole front to the sea of Asov. It cannot be that still large parts are subordinated to Armygroup Kleist to the north of the sea of Azov. The command must be in one hand.
Hitler: So mister Manstein can do what he wants. He will vacate the whole of the Ukraine,only to operate. How I can feed the german people is indifferent to him. Zeitzler,we must keep the matter in hand ourselves. Otherwise Manstein will face us with the fait accompli.
Chief of the general staff: We could impose restraints on him.
Hitler: I know how that goes. Than the reports will be made in such a way hat only remains the solution he wants. I have experienced that enough. If only I could rely on the reporting. All only think of themselves and their sector. The commanders in chief do not care about the global situation. We will see how we will cope.
Chief of the generalstaff: Than please authorise at least that a defenseline is built on the Dnjepr. It is urgently needed.
Hitler: Good,I agree . But take care that the front does not hear about it. And have calculated how long it takes to transport two divisions of AGN to the area of Kiev. And see to it that the setting up of new units in the Heimat somewhat quickened.
Chief of the Wehrmachtführungsstab: But they were destined for Italy.
Hitler: One has to see where they are needed more urgently. But Zeitzler, you should get the vacating of the Kuban bridghead and the Donets area out of your head. Pay attention,tomorrow things will look completely different.
On the way home.
Chief of the general staff:Atleast he has authorized the Dnjepr position. This toughness is to despair.
Chief of the operations section: it costs us decisive time everytime. The troop has to pay for it. When we do not give freedom of action to Manstein,we will not come out from the dependence on the enemy.
C
ef of the general staff: Nothing new to me. But make that clear to the Fûhrer!....

An excerpt from an article by Major i.G Middeldorf in Wehrwissentschaftliche Rundschau Oktober 1953 on 'Zitadelle'
 :" The reasons for this failure will be cited briefly in the following : 
It is certain that in 1943 gave a certain free cover in the west. But did one absolutely have to strike from the forehand? From the study of the postwar literature it emerges that the urging of the western powers on the basis of the strategic situation would have forced the Russians absolutely into the attack in the summer of 1943. Then however the russian would have been forced into the wearing down fight through a deep system of defensive positions.From the experience of the two world wars such an operation attrits the attacker in an uncommon measure even with a strong expenditure of material . In the consequent battle in the open our Panzerdivisions would have come into play against the weakened enemy under much more favourable circonstances and in their proper mission.
When striking from the forehand however they were used from the beginning- because of the lack insufficient number of infantrydivisions- f or the fight in the defense positions which is foreign to their nature, before they could deploy in the open space.  Beyond this they had to cover their their long flanks themselves, so that the already slim attack wedge became even slimmer and therefore decisively lost in striking power.  The commanding generals of the Armygroups had in agreement with the OKH time and time again insistently pointed out this sore point of the operation. The 19 mobile units would have suffised for a great victory if they had been only deployed in the open space at their full striking power. 
The choice of the timing also had a negative influece. The Inspector General of Panzertruppen had considered a pause beyond june as urgently required for the refitting of the Panzerdivisions. From the viewpoint of the front beginning to mid june was the latest time to execute the operation as planned. Hitler did not do the first neither did he take the second counsel. Anyway,beginning july was the most unfavourable time,especially because it lacked surprise. Time had worked for the enemy in every respect. What still could be risked in the first half of june became a mistake in july.  "</sup>

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