Realists - thus do name themselves the philosophers who believe in physics as the all-embracing method to construct an adequate conception concerning the world: Physicalism. The physicalist believes in the existence of energetic-material substrates, which he pretends to be the one and only base of reality as a whole. He believes to be able to undo the object of things put in there by subjects, pretending that in this way an energetic-material substrate (abbreviated: EMS) is left.

Subsequently, let us consider the argument that the physicalist uses to choose physics as the basic method in order to construct his conception concerning reality. He does argue namely that it is a clear ascertainment that, for instance, theologies do have mutual contradictions whereas in physics exists a consensus concerning things that have a truth-value and things that do not have one.

Let us make a supposition in order to make clear the shortage in this argument. Suppose there exist two theologies, named A and B. C is the name we give to physics. Now, put A, B and C as explanation systems on one row, without grouping them mutually; this means: without naming A and B theologies and C physics. Now, choosing one of the three, nevertheless which one, it is an evidence that such a choice cannot be justified by arguing that between the other two no consensus exists.

One problem is the implicit criterion that is being handled over here to distinguish between what is direct and what is indirect. I suppose that for instance in the case of the sensory perception of a thing, one can speak of a “substrate which is direct and approachable for third persons”.

Looking at the leg of a fly by the help of a microscope, I am doing a far more indirect observation, but I accept that in this case it still concerns an exteriorised form. Though, using an apparatus of observation which obliges me to interpret my observation in some way, or otherwise: an apparatus of observation which is ‘interpreting’ on the basis of its very construction, the border between direct and indirect seems to become less clear. Thereupon: are there not specific cases that bring me in uncertainty about the reproducibility of that thing that I believe to observe? In the case I am blind, I am eventually able to testify by consensus the reliability of the observations one passed to me, but what about the consensus about the reliability of observations by instruments making observable substrates that are not directly observable? One can make an image of infra- or super-sonic sounds, one can consider them as being real substrates by defining them, or as observable by certain not-human beings, or as waves. But notice that the latter case becomes problematic in respect of the initial definition of sound as being “something that can be heard (by someone)”, which is being changed to: “specific waves in the air”, and here one can ask himself in what way one can name a wave as a substrate, for not the air itself, but its specific movements are the things which make the ‘sound’ possible. On the other hand it is certainly true that we could not hold that our ears make an error each time we think that we hear sounds, while, based upon a physical definition of sound, one should be able to state that sounds factually are not sounds. Considering the hearing as the criterion, one can speak about sounds, but considering the instrument as the criterion, it looks one comes closer to the substrate, yet the essence of the sound (which was the point of departure), does not longer exist beyond specific limits. So, do we not have to conclude that the essence of sounds relies as well on something that is external to us, as on something that is subjective, something that, as a consequence, it is not relevant to search for its substrate because, in doing so, the initial and essential signification is being replaced by another one?

Another impasse concerns the distinction made by the physicalist between natural and cultural objects. For instance, Vermeersch proclaims a mountain to be a natural object “because the characteristics that make us identify it as a mountain are the result of the influence of natural laws”. On the contrary, Vermeersch proclaims a plough to be a cultural object “because the characteristics that make us recognise it as a plough are the result of the intervention of the human being”.

Vermeersch bases the above mentioned distinction on the distinction between the human being and nature, in addition to which the human being is not been considered as being part of nature. But which criteria do permit Vermeersch to distinct the human being from nature? For, considering man to be a system of information and, at the same time, considering a system of information to be fully natural, consequently one has to consider the activities of the system of information to be essentially not-distinct from the activities of an animal system of information, or to be not-distinct from whatever natural activities, and even to be not-distinct from the activities of human products (for instance: a windmill).

Now, a possible remark could be to consider the difference of complexity as a criterion. But this is rejectable, for the complexity of the different entities only gradually differs in a nearly continuous scale.

Opposite this, we accept the being of a subject to be the criterion, and we do so corresponding our second remark concerning the distinction that Vermeersch makes between a natural and a cultural object. For as Vermeersch considers a mountain to be a natural object, he overlooks that, in doing so, he necessarily initially ascribes an identity to nature in order to be able to consider and to name it subsequently as an object. One considers something to be a significant object as soon as it distinguishes itself from the environment as a significant whole to the subject. In other terms, the mountain becomes an object by its instrumentalisation; which means: it becomes an object-in-view-of a subject. Yet on itself it is not an object separated from the rest of nature. In other terms: as we do name objects which have been constructed in that way, the names or that what they are based on, are the actual authors of the distinct objects.

We explained earlier in what way the individual act of making a choice actualises exactly that possibility which is being demanded from the individual by the extern reality - the problem; we also did explain how this happens on the penalty of the destruction of the individual. By this means, at the same time, and in an implicit way, we did define in terms of the Darwinist mechanism of selection, the individual anticipation of thinking. Let us explain first what we must understand by this.

In ethology, the behaviour of lower species of animals is being explained as an unreasoned and mechanical one, although it appears to be very ingenious: in there, the efficiency of behaviour is being ascribed to a natural process of selection. Let us name this natural selection a ‘selection by the group’ and, in analogy, let us name the anticipation or the reasoning a ‘selection by the individual’. In the case of a selection by the group, the inefficient reactions are being wiped out, not by the individual animal but by the whole set of differently reacting animals. In analogy, by anticipating or thinking in that way, one is doing nothing else than making selections: the individual reacts rationally (- in other terms: it anticipates as it whips out the inefficient reactions.

Notice now that none of both the processes of selection have their source in the individual or in the group: the generation of a choice by an individual, as well as the selection of the very best action within a group, are being forced from the individual or from the group by the external.

Comparing the selecting nature with a labyrinth now, we make sure that it is the labyrinth that is determining for what passes it and what does not. But this means that the out-come of the passage through the labyrinth was determined from beforehand, just as the result of the correct reasoning is being determined by its premises. Therefore the ‘explanation’ of nowadays world and man in terms of natural selection, in fact is not an explanation, but a postponement of the problem. No matter whether man is being modelled out of clay or out of nature: as the clay is not responsible for the shape which comes out of it, so dead stuff is not responsible for the labyrinth which is being modelled out of it and which has not been able to generate something else than what came out of it indeed.

The argument of the existence of ‘accident’ or ‘chance’, in which an accidental happening is being defined as “a happening which escapes from causality” does not fit; until something will have been proven, one must accept that the case we do not perceive causal chains is being provoked by the shortage of our capacity of perception or by the shortage of our theory and not by the absence of causal chains. For concerning one and the same reality it is impossible to accept that some things would be subjected to causality while other things would not.

Let us consider the Darwinist process of natural selection again, and let us suppose in order to make things clear that only one description of the situation each moment of time would satisfy in order to give a full representation of the actual situation, and, at the same time, the differentiation from the one moment to the other would be a realisation of only one of the two possibilities (which, on that very moment, would not yet have been realised). Thus we get a simple schedule, representing a binary tree whereby each nod splits itself repetitively into a new fork.

Let us name the nods by the help of a series of natural numbers, their length representing the moment of time. Then we get this schedule:

Nothing does oblige us to follow the ‘right’ direction, yet if we do not do so, we will never reach the aim. Let us now suppose that whichever choice should bring one towards the aim: in that case the possibility to reject one’s own freedom would be absent. So, the existence of the aim requires the possibility for us to reject the aim. In other words: participation in the final aim requires specific obligations from the participants.

A lever does not lift: it is the subject that makes this action happen, while using the lever as an expedient. In the same way the subject uses the sign as a carrier of the meaning. The sign itself does not carry any meaning (and consequently is not a sign) unless ‘by order of’ (/ ‘by adjudication of’) the subject. Without the subject, a lever is not a lever and a sign is not a sign. Without the subject there is no meaning at all in the sign. And an information system is not a subject.

The physicalist claims that the presence or the absence of consciousness in robots constructed by man would be no more verifiable than it is in third persons. If one at least refuses solipsism and keeps some common sense, one should not doubt this.

Factually, machines transform energy and matter, but they do not have any need to execute energetic-material transformations. The human being, on the contrary, does have this need: it transforms energy and matter out of its own need, and in the perspective of this very difference, machines can be considered as transformers of energy and matter in view of human needs. The human need thus executes these transformations with the help of the body as through the use of tools. Machines are tools: they take over functions from the human body but they do not take over needs. Asserting that an engine has a need for fuel, one must remember that there can only be talk of ‘needs’ in view of the human being. The engine itself does not bother about the fuel.

In this very case, the function of the action is satisfaction of needs, and because a machine cannot have needs, the function of the action of a machine does not exist. So the machine does not ‘act’; things just ‘happen’ to it.

And then this ethical problem remains: suppose that a man has been reconstructed perfectly. In that case he should be at the same time an object (namely: the possession of the constructor) and a subject, which is counterfactual to the conditions of reality.

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Physicalists like to compare man to a machine, and subsequently they accept that man can be considered as a machine that is only a little more complex than the machines we have produced until now. So, principally man should be constructable. The ethical consequences of such a theory are far-reaching: the robot earns respect as soon as Turing’s expert judges as such. At the same time the human being itself degrades to the level of the machine: physicalists believe that a human being essentially is nothing more than a (very complex) machine.

In doing so, physicalists overlook some fundamental things. Until now we gave some general remarks on the basic intuitions of physicalism. We will now elaborate this question a little more.

If one nevertheless complies with the consideration that physical interaction between transmitter and receiver has to be labelled as ‘communication’, than one must consider all natural processes to be ‘communicative processes’, as we noticed before. The concept of communication then loses its content.

Thus, if one still wants to distinguish between communicative and non-communicative processes, it is clear that one has to come up with an adequate criterion. Because the physicalist rejects the subject (- the human being) as the criterion (- remember Vermeersch's speaking of “the mutual communication between machines”), he has to indicate a criterion within the world of objects, more specifically within the world of natural objects (- for there is no such thing like objects of culture without human beings). Now it is evident that chaos cannot offer any criterion, for it does not even allow different objects or entities, for there is no such thing like an object without the presence of a subject.

On the contrary and as has been noticed before, each machine has to be considered as an instrument, a tool of a subject, a part of nature that by human interpretation (or action) becomes an extension of one or more physical operations (- muscle-power, sensory activity, brain-activity etcetera) of the subject.

The theory of information says “that the measure of information of a message depends on the measure of our uncertainty about the condition of the source and that this uncertainty depends in the first place on the number of possible choices that can be made”. For example: ”when our source only contains a small number of signs, our uncertainty about the choice of the message is not very strong; for in that case we can expect beforehand our guess to be right. When a large number of possible messages occurs, our chance to guess the right one decreases”.

On the contrary, we can prove by a counter-example that this uncertainty is independent from the number of possible choices one can make.

Suppose an American receiver expects a message consisting of one single sign, let it be the sign “+” or the sign “-”, concerning the atomic bombing on Hiroshima. At a given moment, a message that contains one single sign reaches him, yet because of a failure by the communication-system, he gets the sign “x”. The receiver can interpret this sign in only two different ways; still, his uncertainty is maximal.

The theory of information replies to this objection in this way: “As soon as we measure the quantity of information by its importance, we deal with a mere subjective situation. It is safer to arrange that we will consider the quantity of a message only as a function of its probability. (...) One might think that this is a narrow point of view, but in fact it is the only one which, for the time being, permits an objective criterion and it is sufficiently intuitively acceptable to judge it to be valuable”.

Where positivists claim that such an arithmetic has a rationality rate that equals 1, they in fact claim that rationality equals ‘being determined’.

Let us take as a second example the above reasoning, and let us suppose at the same time that it can be considered as belonging to the sphere of philosophy, so that, according to Vermeersch, it gets an index of rationality equal to 0.5. Let us remember also that positivists implicitly do define rationality as a determined action. Consequently, if this definition of rationality is correct, it must be considered as necessary, and it must get an index that equals 1. Yet at the same time we considered the making explicit of this implicit definition as a philosophical activity. So, as a consequence to this reasoning, we must adjudge also to philosophy an index of rationality that equals 1.

(1) Freedom is always the freedom of a subject. (2) This always concerns a choice. (3) My freedom is being determined by the measure in which my action, for which my freedom is a condition, determines all my other actions. (4) The identification of Freedom and Rationality, by which Rationality has been identified with Determined Action, implies a specific conception concerning Freedom, so that this conception excludes the possibility of Freedom while holding on to the specific definition of the word. Subsequently the concept of Rationality is being postulated unjustly.

Inherent to physicalism is micro-reductionism, which reduces the mind to a biological process, and biology to physics. The universe would be built (- and here again we find this dangerous reduction of creation to a mere construction! -) out of elements which form more complex wholes. The objects coming to existence in that way are being divided into eight levels: on level zero we find the logical-mathematical objects, on level one, the quarks or the most elementary building-stones of reality, and so it goes on via atoms and molecules until, at the end, at the seventh level, we get the groups of pluricellular organisms, and on level eight, their products. Vermeersch admits that there exists a parallel between, on the one hand, the levels mentioned and, on the other hand, the generality of the theories about the objects situated in the corresponding levels, and the number of descriptions of the structure in relation to the types of objects. In the first parallel there is a direct proportionality, in the second parallel there is an inverse one.

Let us notice that such a division relies upon the degree of generality with which one considers these objects. In other terms: by considering the objects in view of their generality, one creates, through this specific perspective, the levels 1, 2 or 3. On the other hand, by considering the objects in view of the discovering of specific structures, one creates, just by that specific view, for instance the levels 5, 6 and 7. In other terms, it is tautological to admit that one can ascertain that for instance with the levels 0 to 3 more general theories and less descriptions of structure in the concerning science should correspond, meanwhile for instance with the levels 5 to 7 more descriptions of structure in the concerning science do correspond. In still other terms: the fact of the generality of the theories and of the specificity of the descriptions of structure is not following from the levels, but the existence of the levels in fact relies on the way one is considering the existing things. Expressed in still another way: drawing one’s attention to what things have in common, one creates the levels 0 or 1. Drawing one’s attention to the mutual differences between things, one creates for instance the levels 5, 6 or 7.

According to micro-reductionism, the existence of man is unnecessary for the existence of whatever else. In other terms: the human being is the most contingent being.

Now the micro-reductionist asserts that the elements of the universe put themselves together to more complex units, all the time. In this perspective, the human being still is a fairly complex unity. Considering him as being contingent, one must also judge the laws that effected him out of more elementary particles, and equally one must judge these more elementary particles as they are. Going on in this way, down to the more elementary, one must judge eventually nothing to be necessary. Yet if nothing is necessary, this pair of concepts ‘necessity-contingency’ becomes irrelevant.

If one considers on the contrary the human being as a necessary being, one must also consider the human products, containing the theory of micro-reductionism, to be necessary. Yet a necessary theory cannot consider man as being contingent without considering itself at the same time as being contingent. So this supposition results into a contradiction and must be considered as an absurd one.

Subsequently, let us examine the thesis that the existence of man is not necessary for the existence of some other thing. True enough, micro-reductionism neglects the existence of goals, but at the same time it is even so true that everything has a reason of existence, and so all levels (which antecedent to humanity) are necessary for all levels they produce. But then one must accept also that eventually something must be necessary for the existence of quarks. Since at this point quarks are hypothetical constructions, their condition of possibility consists of nothing else but human consciousness. From this follows that man is not the most contingent being, for he is necessary for the existence of quarks ànd for everything quarks are necessary for. In other terms, this is not about necessary and contingent things in reality but about necessary and contingent suppositions of things in reality, which means that only necessary and contingent suppositions have relevance in this context.

Now let us consider the concept ‘accident’ more in general. One speaks about ‘accident’ when an event occurs that deviates from the predictions of a theory. But it is clear that by reasoning in that way, one is guilty to induction. The fact that I am unable to predict an event by the hand of my ordering theory, does not give me the right to name this event ‘accidentally’. My reasoning would be correct only by saying that in such a case my theory is incomplete. For a fact is necessary because of its factuality. The only thing I can say about an unpredictable event is, that in fact it is incompatible with my prediction, and that its unpredictability is not accidentally, for it results from the incompleteness of my theory. In other terms: accepting the incompleteness of my theory, I will also have to recognize the necessity of an unpredicted event, and, as a consequence, I cannot consider this event to be ‘accidental’. Later we will give an application in connection with the Darwinist theory of the process of selection.

Kant already wrote that we can only understand nature to the degree to which we would be able to construct it by ourselves. The significance of this proposition may not be underestimated: we are not able to (re)construct nature, for nature itself is not a construction. Because all the things we construct by our hands and plans are made out of elements we find in nature, we are inclined to believe that nature itself is the result of such a process of construction. Giving in to this inclination, we are arguing by induction. Suppose we should analyze a tree into material components, we would find as a result a whole of different elementary particles such as water, carbon and others. In fact, this tree is not at all the result of a construction of such elementary particles, and reconstructing these particles would never result into a new tree. For our analysis has been limited to the material analysis of one specific tree. Everything beyond this, cannot be analyzed any more, and this fact excludes each imitative reconstruction. But first of all, reconstruction is impossible because a tree, and more generally nature as a whole, is not a construction. For instance, a parrot is able to imitate a human expression, but the essence of an expression, namely its sense, cannot be comprehended by the parrot, which makes its achievement irrelevant. The parrot only repeats sounds. And exactly in his reckless belief concerning the reconstruction of creation, man equals such a talking parrot, unaware of his grotesque attitude. Man with his mechanical world-view is comparable to the deaf musician who is unable to have the slightest feeling for his own performance as a result of his own deafness: to him, the playing of music is hard labour, something comparable to the operating of a very complex machine. As a matter of fact, physicalists now believe that nature is such an absurd orchestra without noise, and they believe so only because they are unable to hear.

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In fact, it suffices that we prove the irrelevancy of the applicability of Carnap’s verification principle to the reality as a whole, in order to be able to declare the basic intuitions of physicalism and its rejection of metaphysics to be invalid. Blinded by recklessness, yet the physicalist is not someone to come easily to an understanding with. So we will have to meet him on his own territorial, and we will try to question his thesis from the inside.

To begin with, Vermeersch’s basic intuition, namely: that the knowledge about the ‘knowing subject’ can teach us more about the knowledge of the ‘knowing subject’, is strikingly evident. For is not also the knowledge about, a knowledge of the ‘knowing subject’? So this intuition says little more than that knowledge benefits from knowledge.

Concerning the pursued description of the knowing subject in terms of the mechanical, first of all two remarks must be made. In the first place, an information-system is not a knowing subject: it derives its sense from the (working) human: a pair of tongs does not pinch by itself and neither does an information-system do anything by itself: in both cases, it is their agent who carries out the act. Secondly, the presupposed knowledge concerning the act of knowing is in its turn submitted to the problem of self-reference: there is a fundamental discrepancy between information and the act of knowing: without the act of knowing, a text does not give any information.

Additionally, it may be remarked that this is also valid in the case that this information holds that there is a structural equivalence between the thing and its concept: in his theory of forms, E. Vermeersch puts the case that structural equivalence is a material matter. But we claim that structural equivalence is a sort of information, and so it cannot exist until it is being known - by a subject.

Man reduces the in se neutral reality to an instrument, and he does do so by bestowing sense upon it and by transforming it into his own world. He does this for his own sake: he wants to live and to raise the quality of his life. Nevertheless, our world is nothing but a ‘superficial’ phenomenon: an animal is unable to distinguish it from the rest of the landscape: to an animal our houses mean nothing but rocks; manifestations of our language are nothing to them but sounds. No creature can see further than to where it reaches. Our instruments, and especially our own world, have no other existence but their ‘function for us’: the simplest lever alike, they all exist out of natural laws that we took advantage of in order to enlarge our grasp on reality. Obviously this applies to both our information- and communication-tools: they have no self, no needs and as a matter of course they have no need to communicate.

The world is visible, soil can be walked on, rain is wet and the wind is cold: the attributes of things, especially the attributes of our instruments, are related to our bodily being, which is necessarily our ultimate parameter. A book, like a machine, derives its functionality or its being from the acts of writing and reading. Further more, we describe an information-system by concepts derived from our own information-processing activity: the terms “sender” (or: “transmitter”) and “receiver” are nothing but more general terms for “speaker” and “listener”, or “writer” and “reader”. As tools are modelled on the human body (because they are extensions of the body), the information-system is modelled on human communication.

Nevertheless, we can verify by experiment that the reliability of an expert is not at all evident. Turing’s computer is a trompe l’ oeil. Even today the legendary Tijl Uilenspiegel has hypocrites applauding empty canvases. And we remember the suspicious death of Van Meegeren after he had confessed to be the author of a painting, experts thought to be by Vermeer.

No machine can properly take the initiative to create whatsoever. But exactly this initiative, this specific purposefulness, is of essential importance in relation to the act.

On the other hand, the musicians in an orchestra performing the Brandenburg Concertos have only a technical part in this creation: in this quality they merely operate as the composer’s instruments; though Bach is physically absent, these musicians are directed by him; the subjectivity of the performer is not of fundamental importance because the performer can be replaced by another one. However, the irreplacebility of the musician applies only to his willingness to function as a mere instrument of the composer. As a consequence, no one can judge the aesthetic qualities of the performer when he performs in a correct way an unknown piece of music. For this performer may be someone who perfectly governs the technical skills that can be imitated by a programmed pianola. By the way, it seems that education nowadays is perfectly satisfied by teaching this kind of acrobatics: for the solving of problems via problem-solving programs that must be learnt before, cannot be properly called ‘problem-solving’: this way of action is nothing but the mere application or execution of programs - a way of action that ignores creativity, out of a fundamental distrust in the human person and a misplaced trust in l’ homme machine...

Franklin’s lightning conductor makes firewood of all former theories, for the ability to ‘create’ something implies the complete understanding of that thing, according to Vermeersch.

The urgency of praxis confirms indeed that each resolution of a problem makes the problematisation itself redundant. Nevertheless, the ability to make a thing does not necessarily imply the full understanding of that thing.

In conclusion we notice that the physicalist accepts that thoughts arise from the activity of the brain. Here, he seems to forget that the ‘certainty’ he relies on to explain thought, is less certain than the act of thinking itself: for the activity of the brain supposed to produce thinking, does not come to us but by thinking itself: the activity of the brain is in the first place a matter of thinking , as is the existence of a chair (- see: Kant’s Ding an sich). But just as we cannot judge about the existence of the chair, we cannot do so about the existence of the activity of the brain either. That the brain activity has to be presupposed in order to give a physicalistic explanation of thinking, is all we can say for certain; put otherwise: the brain activity is hypothetical and subordinated to thought itself.

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Sometimes, the metaphysical question concerning the ultimate ground of being has been restricted to the mere technical question concerning its ultimate building-stones. This is a mistake, because reality is not a construction. Kant says that we can only understand nature to the extend in which we are able to construct it by ourselves; which means, properly, that we are unable to understand nature, because we cannot (re)construct it (H. de Vos 1968: 63). Spinoza distinguishes between what is causa sui (God, Nature) and things that have an exterior cause (Spinoza 1974). Also Gödel distinguishes between the creation of something (- out of nothing) and the construction of something (- out of something else which already has been created) (H. Wang 1996: 14: "Gödel distinguishes creation, in the sense of making something something out of nothing, from construction or invention, in the sense of making something out of something else"). Concerning these important warnings, Kant, Spinoza and Gödel have been preceded by Augustinus, who criticises the unbelievers: "Thus, forsooth, [they reason] from their carnal familiarity with the sight of craftsmen and house-builders, and artisans of all descriptions, who have no power to make good the effect of their own art unless they get the help of materials already prepared. And so these parties [i.e.: the unbelievers] in like manner understand the Maker of the world not to be almighty, if thus He could not fashion the said world without the help of some other nature, not framed by Himself, which He had to use as His materials" (Augustinus 1999: II, §2). Even in the case that God created things out of something (- e.g.: 'clay', 'matter unseen', 'matter without form'), He has been the creator of it - thus says Augustinus.

Apart from art and ethics, we can say that all man-made things are tools, or: extensions of our physical bodies. Our world is an instrument: it is our common, extended body. From nature we recruit the raw material or the elements for that instrument.

Because our world is a (man-made) construction, we tend to conceive nature in the same way: we tend to see nature as a construction that we can break up into elements in order to build up our world with them. But this is a mistake. Nature in its turn has not been built out of elements that have been retrieved from still somewhere else. Where we do believe so, we conceive ourselves as potential (re)constructors of nature, or as Gods.

Carnap disapproves of metaphysics for the reason that its propositions are not experimentally verifiable. But the claim of applicability of this principle to the whole of reality, actually veils the conviction that reality can be (re)produced. In Logical Positivism, in Physicalism and in Micro-reductionism, we deal with the misconception Augustinus, Kant, Spinoza and Gödel warn against: the misconception in which man sees himself as God. He is not God, says Spinoza, because he is not causa sui.

By our conception, reality finds its foundation in its destination: all the ‘lower’ things come out of the ‘higher’ wherein they have their reason and their ultimate sense of being. It is our conviction that only in this way, a satisfactory ‘explanation’ of reality as a whole can be obtained.

Opposed to this conception stands the nowadays as successful as it is malicious conception concerning reality by physicalism, the newest form of materialism, in which things have been turned upside down. Materialism did not understand the cautious words of mentioned philosophers.

Physicalism is principally a part of atheism, because atheism accepts coincidence while denying any form of teleology: it rejects a priori the question of sense and pretends to find satisfaction in a reductionistic know-how about micro- and macrocosm, which in fact are conceived as if they were nothing more than an accidental happening. It is ethically irresponsible that physicalism leaves man orphaned. In this text however, physicalism will get our attention in the perspective of its cognitive irresponsibility.